Providence Wool Combing Co. v. Sec'y of War

5 Citing cases

  1. Cooper-MacDonald Inc. v. United States

    559 F.2d 575 (Fed. Cir. 1977)   Cited 1 times

    As a whole, paragraph (3) of § 103(g) is directed, in large part though perhaps not wholly, at non-performing brokers — those who bring two interested parties together so that performance can ensue — and at the least paragraph (B) seems to zero in on such brokers who do not themselves perform but who help the prime get the wherewithal to perform, and whose compensation is keyed on an ascending scale to the prime's receipts from the Government. Both this court and the Tax Court have suggested that the "subcontract" provisions of the Renegotiation Act should receive a broad reading so as to include all sums likely to add to the Government's costs ( Comprehensive Designers, Inc. v. United States, supra, 545 F.2d 1283, 1285, 212 Ct.Cl. ___, ___ (1976); Providence Wool Combing Co. v. Secretary of War, 14 T.C. 979 (1950)), and, in the light of its text and general objectives, we adopt that approach for subparagraph (B). One example is an attorney who happens to work on the formulation of the prime's renegotiable contract and whose compensation depends on the amount of that contract; another illustration is of a sub who works solely on the non-renegotiable facets of a conglomerate's business but whose compensation is a percentage of the conglomerate's total sales, including its renegotiable business.

  2. Vaughn Mach. Co. v. Renegotiation Bd.

    30 T.C. 949 (U.S.T.C. 1958)   Cited 3 times

    Petitioner bears the burden of proving that determination erroneous. Stoner Manufacturing Corp. v. Secretary of War, 21 T.C. 200; Providence Wool Combing Co. v. Secretary of War, 14 T.C. 979; Western Precipitation Corporation v. R.F.C., 9 T.C. 877; Nathan Cohen v. Secretary of War, 7 T.C. 1002. Petitioner claims that in 1951 and 1952 it lost business as a result of the Program, and that in accepting orders under the Program it assumed a risk of saturation of its post-1952 market.

  3. Gale v. War Contracts Price Adjustment Bd. (In re Estate of Gale)

    19 T.C. 1107 (U.S.T.C. 1953)

    07 received from Raymond De-Icer Co. was not based or contingent upon the amount of contracts procured by him for his principal, it was not derived pursuant to subcontracts as defined in section 403(a)(5)(B), as construed in the Wolff case. The legislative history of section 403(a)(5)(B) discussed in George M. Wolff, supra, 150-151, and Providence Wool Combing Co., 14 T.C. 979, indicates that Congress intended to give the Government the right to recover excessive fees and profits earned not only by manufacturers but also by manufacturers' agents on contracts procured by such agents for supplying commodities of war-end use. Petitioners' theory of this case, as evidenced by their pleadings and brief, is based upon the cancellation agreement only.

  4. Larrabee v. War Contracts Price Adjustment Bd.

    17 T.C. 69 (U.S.T.C. 1951)   Cited 2 times

    Sales of machinery to be used in the performance of war contracts are renegotiable. National Electric Welding Machines Co. v. Stimson, 10 T.C. 49; Providence Wood Combing Co. v. Secretary of War, 14 T.C. 979. The customers of the petitioner in the performance of their contracts had to use machines.

  5. Armstrong v. War Contracts Price Adjustment Bd.

    15 T.C. 625 (U.S.T.C. 1950)   Cited 3 times

    We think we need not go into the details of Congressional procedure or the cases, and their bearing direct or indirect upon this problem. The general question as to meaning of subcontract and the length to which renegotiation was intended to go was considered (though the case does not primarily involve the particular language here in question) in Providence Wool Combing Co. v. Secretary of War, 14 T.C. 979. Other cases give us some general light upon this question.