Opinion
66204-0-I 66206-6-I
05-29-2012
GRAZYNA PROUTY, Respondent, v. TAHOMA SCHOOL BOARD, Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Cox, J.
Under RCW 28A.405.210, a teacher may obtain a hearing on the determination that probable cause exists to not renew his or her employment contract. But review of this determination is only available if a teacher files a written request for a hearing within 10 days after service of notice of the school district's decision on the employee. Failure to timely file such a request results in a loss of the statutory right to such a hearing.
RCW 28A.405.210.
Id., Robel v. Highline Public Schools, 65 Wn.2d 477, 485, 398 P.2d 1 (1965).
Here, the Tahoma superintendent properly served Grazyna Prouty with proper written notice of the probable cause determination, but Prouty failed to timely request a hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of this action.
Prouty was employed as a teacher for English Language Learner students in the Tahoma School District. The district placed her on probation because of alleged teaching deficiencies. After a period of probation, the superintendent of the Tahoma School District found probable cause existed not to renew Prouty's employment contract. The letter informing Prouty of this determination was personally delivered to her on March 5, 2010. The superintendent also attached a copy of RCW 28A.405.210 to the letter, informing Prouty that she had a right to a hearing if she filed a written request within 10 days of the letter's receipt.
Thereafter, Prouty sent letters to the Board secretary and president requesting a hearing before the Board. Prouty subsequently sent letters to the same individuals, disclaiming any request for a hearing concerning the nonrenewal of her contract. She then wrote additional letters to the same individuals dated March 15 in which she requested an "open hearing" pursuant to RCW 28A.405.210. Neither recipient received a letter until March 16.
On March 30, the Board voted not to renew Prouty's employment contract for the coming school year. After receiving written notice of nonrenewal, Prouty wrote another letter to the Board president dated April 7 requesting a hearing.
She also appealed the Board's decision to the King County Superior Court under RCW 28A.405.320. The Tahoma School District moved to strike, which the trial court converted into a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing and consideration of further documentation by both parties, the court granted summary judgment for the school district.
Prouty appeals.
UNTIMELY FILING OF THE REQUEST FOR A HEARING
Prouty argues that she timely filed a request for a hearing with the president and secretary of the Board. Because she failed to timely file a written request, we disagree.
A motion for summary judgment may be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. We review a summary judgment order de novo, viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.In interpreting a statute, a court's fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent. We first look to the plain language of the statute.Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the legislative intent is apparent and we will not construe the statute otherwise.
Khung Thi Lam v. Global Med. Svs., 127 Wn.App. 657, 661 n.4, 111 P.3d 1258 (2005).
Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass'n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010).
State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007).
State v. Landsiedel, 165 Wn.App. 886, 890, 269 P.3d 347 (2012) (quoting State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003)).
Here, the plain meaning of the statute in question is clear. RCW 28A.405.210, 28A.405.300, and 28A.405.310 outline the process by which a school district may terminate the employment contract of a certificated school employee. Under RCW 28A.405.100(4)(a), after an employee has been placed on probation and if he or she fails to show "necessary improvement during the established probationary period . . . ." Following a period of probation, the superintendent may determine that there is probable cause for the nonrenewal of the employee's contract. Under RCW 28A.405.210, if such a determination is made, the superintendent must provide written notice to the certificated employee:
Such notice shall be served upon the employee personally, or by certified or registered mail . . . . Every such employee so notified, at his or her request made in writing and filed with the president, chair or secretary of the board of directors of the district within ten days after receiving such notice, shall be granted opportunity for hearing pursuant to RCW 28A.405.310 to determine whether there is sufficient cause or causes for nonrenewal of contract . . . .
This statutory language is clear. An employee must file a written request for a hearing regarding the probable cause determination within 10 days of service of notice of the probable cause determination. If he or she fails to do so, the employee cannot obtain a hearing or a review of the school board's determination. This interpretation of the plain language of RCW 28A.405.210 has been confirmed by holdings of the supreme court and Division Three of this court.
In Robel v. Highline Public Schools, District No. 401, the superintendent served Robel on three different occasions with a probable cause determination notice. Robel admitted to receiving at least one of these notices. But she failed to file a written request for a hearing with the school board until a month after the last notice. The court held that the employee's non-compliance was clear:
65 Wn.2d 477, 398 P.2d 1 (1965).
Id. at 478-80.
Id. at 479-80.
Id. at 480.
The requirements of RCW 28.67.070 . . . had been fully complied with. Appellant had 10 days within which to file a written request for a hearing before the school board following actual or constructive receipt of the notice. She did not do so. Failing in this, the ultimate decision of the school board not to renew the contract became final and conclusive.
Id. at 485 (RCW 28.67.070 was recodified as RCW 28A.405.210).
In a more recent case addressing the application of RCW 28A.405.210, Division Three of this court reinforced the plain language interpretation of this statute's requirements. In Greene v. Pateros School District, the superintendent served Greene with a nonrenewal probable cause notice on March 27. Within 10 days of service, Greene sent a letter to the superintendent. But rather than requesting a hearing on the probable cause finding, "the body of the letter was a specific response to the seniority list . . . ." Greene may also have made an oral request to the superintendent for a hearing. The court held, however, that
59 Wn.App. 522, 799 P.2d 276 (1990).
Id. at 526.
Id. at 526-27.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 527.
[u]nder the plain language of former RCW 28A.67.070 there are two steps to perfecting a request for a hearing: (1) prepare a written request for a hearing and (2) file it with the president, chairman or secretary of the board of directors of the district. Both steps must be completed within 10 days after receiving the notice of nonrenewal. Mr. Greene's letter dated April 3 does not request any kind of hearing and was not filed with an officer of the board of directors.
Id. at 530-31.
Thus, the court held Greene's letter could not "reasonably be construed as a request for a hearing within the meaning of former RCW 28A.67.070 [recodified as RCW 28A.405.210]."
Id. at 531.
Here, there is no dispute over the material facts. Prouty acknowledges that she received written notice of the probable cause determination on March 5. This notice included reference to her right to a hearing under RCW 28A.405.210. A copy of the statute was attached to the letter. There is no evidence in the record that Prouty filed a written request for a hearing on the probable cause determination by March 15, the 10th day following written notice to her of the superintendent's letter.
Prouty did send two letters dated March 10, one to Michael Maryanski, the superintendent of the school district and the Board secretary, and the other to Didem Pierson, the Board president. In these letters, Prouty requested "the hearing by the Tahoma School Board as soon as possible as the Tahoma School District made the decision to non-renew my continuing contract based on the input of the supervisors who evaluated me for two years and each area was marked unsatisfactory." Maryanski sent a response to Prouty's initial letter on March 11. Prouty then responded with a letter dated March 15 in which she disclaimed any attempt in the March 10 letter to request a hearing. "Since I have received your response to my request of March 10, 2010 I am sending another request on March 15, 2010. I kindly inform you that my plan is not to talk about the contract . . . ." In a letter to Pierson dated March 15, Prouty also indicated that her March 10 letter was not a request for a hearing concerning the probable cause determination. She wrote:
Clerk's Papers at 556, 606.
Id. at 560.
I am requesting the hearing by the Tahoma School Board concerning the following:
(I will talk about)
- Vision
- Continuous Improvement
- Assessment
- Climate
- Collaborative partnership
- Accountability
Id. at 559.
Thus, in both of these March 15 letters, Prouty disclaimed any request for a hearing on the probable cause determination in the letter of March 10. This exchange of communication is fatal to any claim that she timely filed any written request for a hearing on the probable cause determination. Like the employee's written request in Greene, Prouty's letters were not requests for a hearing concerning the probable cause determination. Thus, as in Greene, these letters do not constitute timely requests under the plain language of RCW 28A.405.210.
Prouty also sent several other letters, dated March 15, including one to Maryanski and one to Pierson, "requesting an open hearing, as is my right, over the Tahoma School District's decision—a notice of probable cause to nonrenew my contract." While Prouty, in these letters, clearly requested a public hearing under RCW 28A.405.210, they were not "filed, " as that term is generally understood, within the 10-day time period that the statute requires.
Id. at 610; Report of Proceedings (Sept. 17, 2010) at 10.
Prouty claims that her letter dated April 7, sent within 10 days after she was informed of the Board's nonrenewal of her employment contract, preserved her right to a hearing. It did not.
Under RCW 28A.405.210, the key date is the service of the probable cause letter, not the notification of nonrenewal. To preserve one's right to a hearing, a written request must be made in writing and filed with the president, chair or secretary of the board of directors of the district within ten days after receiving [the notice of nonrenewal] . . . ." Filing requires that the receipt of such notice have been received within 10 days. Thus, it is not enough that the school employee sent notice within this time period - the notice must be received within 10 days as well. Like the employee in Robel, Prouty did not comply with the requirements of the statute because she did not timely file a written request for a hearing. The receipt of notification of nonrenewal is irrelevant for purposes of requesting a hearing.
RCW 28A.405.210.
Id.; Robel, 65 Wn.2d at 485.
RCW 28A.405.210; Robel, 65 Wn.2d at 485.
OTHER MATTERS
In her briefing, Prouty makes several substantive arguments about the district's decision not to renew her contract. Because she failed to timely request a hearing on the probable cause determination, we decline to address these arguments.
We affirm the order granting summary judgment.