Opinion
No. 3-960 / 03-0677
Filed February 11, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, K.D. Briner, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals the district court's denial of her motion for a new trial and its grant of defendants' motion to tax costs. AFFIRMED.
Pete Leehey of the Pete Leehey Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Richard C. Garberson and Heather L. Fleming of Shuttleworth Ingersoll, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Mahan, JJ.
Amy Prouty appeals the district court's denial of her motion for a new trial and its grant of Nicole and Carol Martin's motion to tax costs pursuant to Iowa Code section 677.10 (2001). We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
On September 25, 2001, Amy Prouty filed this action against Nicole Martin, driver, and Carol Martin, owner of the vehicle, for damages as a result of a collision which occurred on January 6, 2000. The Martins answered asserting comparative fault. On November 5, 2002, the Martins filed an offer to confess judgment in the amount of $4,538. Prouty rejected the offer and the case proceeded to trial.
The jury assigned twenty-five percent of the fault to Prouty and the remaining seventy-five percent to Nicole Martin. The jury awarded damages for past medical expenses of $3,253.53, past loss of time/earning of $263.78, and past physical and mental pain and suffering of $500. The jury did not award damages for future medical expenses, past loss of full use of body, future loss of full use of body or future physical and mental pain and suffering. Considering the comparative fault percentage assigned to Prouty, she was awarded $3,012.98 in damages.
Prouty filed a motion for a new trial alleging, inter alia, that the jury's verdict was inconsistent. The motion was denied. The Martins filed a motion to tax costs against Prouty based on nonacceptance of the Martins' prior offer to confess judgment. In response, Prouty challenged Iowa Code chapter 677, Offer to Confess Judgment, on constitutional grounds. The district court granted the motion, taxing the costs of the Martins' litigation expenses from the time of the offer to confess judgment against Prouty in the amount of $499.28 plus court and jury costs in the amount of $209.55. Prouty appeals both rulings.
Scope of Review.
This court's standard of review of a trial court's action on a motion for new trial is for abuse of discretion. Foggia v. Des Moines Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Iowa 1996). When constitutional issues are raised, our review is de novo. Soo Line R. Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 521 N.W.2d 685, 688 (Iowa 1994). A party challenging a statute carries a heavy burden of rebutting the presumption of constitutionality with which statutes are cloaked. O'Hara v. State, 642 N.W.2d 303, 314 (Iowa 2002) (citing Channon v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 852 (Iowa 2001)). The party must negate every reasonable basis upon which the statute can be upheld as constitutional. Id. (citing Channon, 629 N.W.2d at 852).
New Trial.
Prouty argues the jury's verdict was inconsistent because it awarded damages for past medical expenses but not past loss of full use of body. The Martins contends Prouty did not preserve this error for appeal. They further argue that even if the issue was properly preserved, the verdict was not inconsistent.
Prouty requested the district court submit a jury instruction stating that if the jury awarded medical expenses it had to award damages for pain and suffering. Prouty did not request a similar instruction in regards to loss of full use of the body. Therefore, the Martins assert Prouty did not preserve error on this issue. As Prouty points out in her reply brief, her appeal is based on the jury verdict not the instructions given. Prouty moved for a new trial asserting, inter alia, that the jury's verdict was inconsistent because it awarded medical expenses but not loss of body. The district court denied Prouty's motion for new trial stating,
It is axiomatic that the jury is free to believe all, some or none of the testimony of any witness. The court cannot think of a reason why the jury could not find that the plaintiff suffered injuries which caused her to incur medical bills and to miss work and which caused her pain and suffering but which did not incapacitate her body. In fact, that is a common scenario in soft-tissue injuries.
We find the issue was properly preserved.
Iowa case law supports that there is an inconsistency when a jury awards damages for past medical expenses but does not award damages for past pain and suffering. Cowan v. Flannery, 461 N.W.2d 155, 160 (Iowa 1990); Shewry v. Heuer, 255 Iowa 147, 152, 121 N.W.2d 529, 532 (1963). "We can find no logical ground on which the jury could award plaintiff the cost of medical services made necessary by his pain and suffering and yet allow him nothing for the pain and suffering." Shewry, 255 Iowa at 152, 121 N.W.2d at 532. However, there is not comparable case law concerning the failure to award damages for loss of use of body while awarding damages for medical expenses. But see Thompson v. Allen, 503 N.W.2d 400, 401 (Iowa 1993) ("We agree that the jury's return of no damages for past pain and suffering and past loss of full use of body results in an inadequate verdict.") (emphasis added).
Loss of use of the body is "the inability of a particular body part to function in a normal manner." Brant v. Bockholt, 532 N.W.2d 801, 804-05 (Iowa 1995). Prouty has not presented evidence of functional impairment due to her injury. Prouty's chiropractor, Dr. Swope, assessed that she had sustained a five percent physical impairment of the body as a whole. Dr. Thomas Hughes testified that after evaluating Prouty he could find nothing to indicate she had a permanent partial impairment. The jury's verdict is clear that it made certain credibility judgments and decided the verdict accordingly. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Prouty's motion for new trial based on verdict inconsistency.
Iowa Code Chapter 677.
Prouty argues that Iowa Code chapter 677, Offer to Confess Judgment, is unconstitutional on three grounds: 1) it violates a plaintiff's constitutional right to a jury trial, 2) it violates the equal protection clause, and 3) it violates the due process clause. The Martins contend Prouty did not properly preserve error on the right to a jury trial and due process clause issues. Even if we find Prouty did preserve the issues, the Martins argue that chapter 677 does not violate the United States or Iowa Constitutions.
In determining the sufficiency of an objection to preserve error, "the test is whether the exception taken alerted the trial court to the error which is urged on appeal." Dutcher v. Lewis, 221 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Iowa 1974). In Prouty's resistance to the Martins' motion to tax costs, she states,
3. Iowa Code Chapter 677 does not afford plaintiffs a mechanism to offer to accept judgment and recover court costs if the jury verdict turns out to be more than the offer to accept judgment.
4. The disparate treatment of plaintiffs and defendants under Iowa Code Chapter 677 denies plaintiff litigants, and in this case Plaintiff Amy Prouty, equal protection of the law.
5. Iowa Code Chapter 677 should be declared unconstitutional, as it provides an advantage in litigated cases to defendants, without making comparable provision for plaintiffs.
On appeal, Prouty claims these statements should have been "sufficiently specific to alert the trial court" that the complaint was based on a constitutional right to a jury trial and due process as well as equal protection. State v. Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 1995). Prouty further argues that due process and equal protection claims require similar analysis and therefore the court should have been properly alerted.
We agree with the Martins that Prouty's resistance to their motion to tax costs did not preserve error on the right to a jury trial claim. The language in the resistance is inadequate to put the district court on notice of either a due process claim or that her right to a jury trial was violated.
Iowa Code chapter 677 provides four separate methods of offering to confess judgment. Hughes v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 545 N.W.2d 318, 319 (Iowa 1996) (citing Sheer Constr., Inc. v. W. Hodgman Sons, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Iowa 1982)). Iowa Code section 677.10 provides that "[i]f the plaintiff fails to obtain judgment for more than was offered by the defendant, the plaintiff cannot recover costs, but shall pay the defendant's costs from the time of the offer." In the present case, Prouty failed to obtain a jury verdict of $4,538 as offered by the Martins. In its ruling assessing costs against Prouty, the district court stated,
[Prouty] asserts no more than the statute affects plaintiffs and defendants differently. The court is unable to discern a constitutional requirement that the law must in every respect treat plaintiffs and defendants the same. At the outset, the law allocates the burden of proof quite differently between plaintiffs and defendants.
The Equal Protection Clause provides, "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Iowa Const., art. I, § 6. The United States Supreme Court has held that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause does not mean that a State may not draw lines that treat one class of individuals or entities differently from the others." Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 1003, 35 L.Ed.2d 351, 354 (1973). But rather the test is whether the difference in treatment is an invidious discrimination. Id. (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 16 L.Ed.2d 169, 172 (1966)).
Prouty asserts that chapter 677 discriminates on the basis of wealth, favoring corporate defendants. She further asserts that poor litigants comprise a suspect class and therefore we should apply strict scrutiny in analyzing the statute. The statute reflects no indication of any such classification. Iowa Code chapter 677 does not discriminate between different types of plaintiffs or defendants in an action for the recovery of money. The statute applies across the board in all actions to recover money, regardless of whether the litigants are individuals or corporations, rich or poor. The purpose of the statute is to encourage settlement of disputes, put an end to litigation, and to prevent the accumulation of costs. Id. (citing Shirley v. Pothast, 508 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Iowa 1993); Tilton v. Iowa Power Light Co., 250 Iowa 583, 587, 94 N.W.2d 782, 784 (1959)). Further, the fact there is no reciprocal statute, i.e., an offer to accept judgment, is a legislative policy determination for which we need not interfere.
We do not find chapter 677 unconstitutional; therefore the district court's ruling taxing costs against Prouty is affirmed.