The determination of whether a contract is, or is not, ambiguous is a question of law for the court to decide. See Rath v. Managed Health, 123 Idaho 30, 844 P.2d 12 (1992); Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 829 P.2d 1342 (1992); Wooden v. First Security Bank, N.A., 121 Idaho 98, 822 P.2d 995, 997 (1991); Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 794 P.2d 1381, (1990); De Lancey v. De Lancey, 110 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d 32 (1986); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980); Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 791 P.2d 1313 (Ct.App. 1989). A contract is ambiguous if it is subject to reasonable conflicting interpretations.
In this instance, a retrial for damages only would hamper a jury's ability to grasp the proper view of this case. See Prouse v. Ransom, 791 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Idaho.App. 1989) (acknowledging that in a partial remand the precise effect of the error is difficult to quantify); Roberts v. Mullen, 446 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex Civ 1969) (stating that "issues of liability and damages in tort cases are indivisible and it is improper to reverse a judgment and remand the case for trial on the issue of damages only"). [¶ 25] The proposed bifurcated proceeding urged by the majority opinion is justified "only if the matter is clearly separable without unfairness to the parties."
I.C. § 12-117(2). See also Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 739, 791 P.2d 1313, 1318 (1990). Because the BLRID was not entitled to fees or costs under I.R.C.P. 65(c), we order the appellants' award should not be offset by the amount awarded to the BLRID.
I believe that this is one of those cases that would be difficult to retry on damages alone, as the jury would not have a proper view of the entire case. See also Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 791 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Idaho App. 1989) (stating that when "the precise effect of the error is difficult to quantify" and that the jury's perception "might well have affected the award," the entire judgment must be vacated); Roberts v. Mullen, 446 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (noting the Texas Supreme Court's holding that "issues of liability and damages in tort cases are indivisible and it is improper to reverse a judgment and remand the case for trial on the issue of damages only"). It is my opinion that in this case, it would be better for a jury to hear the entire evidence before attempting to make a determination of the proper measure of damages.
The initial inquiry for determining whether a document is ambiguous is also a matter of law. Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 791 P.2d 1313 (Ct.App. 1989) (citing Clearwater Minerals Corp. v. Presnell, 111 Idaho 945, 729 P.2d 420 (Ct.App. 1986)). In determining the effect of the notices of default and of sale received by Douglass, "to be sold to satisfy said obligation" is reasonably susceptible to only one meaning.
See, Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 794 P.2d 1381 (1990); Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984). The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous or not is a question of law over which we may exercise free review, see Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 794 P.2d 1381 (1990); DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d 32 (1986); Pocatello Industrial Park, Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980); Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 791 P.2d 1313 (Ct.App. 1989), and in determining whether a contract is ambiguous, our task is to ascertain whether the contract is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation. Spencer-Steed v. Spencer, 115 Idaho 338, 766 P.2d 1219 (1988); DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d 32 (1986).
Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 261-62, 999 P.2d 914, 916-17 (Ct.App. 2000); Chadderdon, 104 Idaho at 411, 659 P.2d at 165. If the court determines that a party has prevailed only in part, it may apportion the costs and attorney fees in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the judgment or judgments obtained. Id. See Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 739, 791 P.2d 1313, 1318 (Ct.App. 1989). Because an award of attorney fees is a discretionary decision, on review we examine the trial court's decision to determine whether it correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
We determined that the value of the lots was not easily ascertainable because it required the trial court to sift through conflicting expert testimony and differing theories of recovery, but that prejudgment interest was owed on the amounts expended for taxes and water assessments because the dates and amounts of those expenditures were not disputed. Similarly, we approved prejudgment interest on discrete portions of a larger damages award, in Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 791 P.2d 1313 (Ct.App. 1989) and Bergkamp v. Carrico, 108 Idaho 476, 700 P.2d 98 (Ct.App. 1985). We have been cited to no authority, and have found none, disallowing prejudgment interest on a liquidated component of a larger damages award, and we perceive no reason for a rule that would deprive a claimant of prejudgment interest on a plainly liquidated claim merely because he or she also pressed an entirely separate, unliquidated claim in the same litigation.
Authority for apportioning attorneys fees to a partially prevailing party is found in Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Peterson, 102 Idaho 111, 121, 626 P.2d 767, 777 (1980). See also Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 644-45, 862 P.2d 321, 336-337 (Ct.App. 1993); Badell v. Badell, 122 Idaho 442, 450, 853 P.2d 677, 685 (Ct.App. 1992); Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 739, 791 P.2d 1313, 1318 (Ct.App. 1989). Bolt contends that there is no basis for the court's determination that the Kulms were the prevailing party.
Whether a contract is ambiguous and, if not, what the contract means, are questions of law over which we exercise free review. Prouse v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 791 P.2d 1313 (Ct.App. 1989). Although the contract in Prouse was written, we see no reason why we should not apply this rule to the interpretation of the oral Hartman-Draper contract where the parties' deposition testimony shows that they agreed to the same contract terms.