Pp. 317-323. 667 F.2d 1133, affirmed. MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
The challenge to the initial entry by Officers Griffin and Dowell was identical in both Mr. Courtney's criminal case and the present case, and Mr. Courtney was a party in the prior criminal case. Appellants argue, however, that collateral estoppel does not bar relitigation of the issue relating to the constitutionality of the initial entry because they did not have a fair opportunity to litigate the claim, relying solely on Prosise v. Haring , 667 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1981), aff'd , 462 U.S. 306, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983). In Prosise , 667 F.2d at 1137, the court noted the general proposition that collateral estoppel might apply to defeat a § 1983 constitutional claim because the dispositive issue had previously been decided in a prior criminal action.
Following this course, every federal court of appeals considers one’s incentive to litigate in the collateral estoppel context. See, e.g. , Canonsburg Gen. Hosp. v. Burwell , 807 F.3d 295, 306 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ; DeGuelle v. Camilli , 724 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2013) ; Kosinski v. Comm’r , 541 F.3d 671, 677 (6th Cir. 2008) ; Maciel v. Comm’r , 489 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2007) ; Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. , 458 F.3d 244, 250 (3d Cir. 2006) ; Salguero v. City of Clovis , 366 F.3d 1168, 1174 (10th Cir. 2004) ; Simmons v. O’Brien , 77 F.3d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 1996) ; In re Belmont Realty Corp. , 11 F.3d 1092, 1097 (1st Cir. 1993) ; Sun Towers, Inc. v. Heckler , 725 F.2d 315, 322 n.7 (5th Cir. 1984) ; Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson , 749 F.2d 663, 666 (11th Cir. 1984) ; Wickham Contracting Co. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York , 715 F.2d 21, 28 (2d Cir. 1983) ; Prosise v. Haring , 667 F.2d 1133, 1141 (4th Cir. 1981). C
See 449 U.S. 90, 105, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (Section 1983 claim for unlawful search barred by issue preclusion because the validity of the search had already been resolved in denying the motion to suppress). “[A]mong the most critical guarantees of fairness in applying collateral estoppel,” however, “is the guarantee that the party to be estopped had not only a full and fair opportunity but an adequate incentive to litigate to the hilt the issues in question.” Prosise v. Hari ng , 667 F.2d 1133, 1141 (4th Cir. 1981), affirmed 462 U.S. 306, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983) ; see generally Restatement (Second) of Judgments (§§ 27–29 (1982)).
Whether that same guilty plea forecloses a future cause of action or legal proceeding, however, "'is to be determined on the basis of other principles, specifically, of collateral estoppel and the full faith and credit statute.'" Prosise, 462 U.S. at 310, 103 S.Ct. 2368 (quoting Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133, 1136-37 (4th Cir. 1981)). Prosise illustrates the type of analysis that a court should undertake.
Unable to find any cases utilizing the American Law Institute's notion of "evidentiary estoppel," the court "conclude[d] that the conclusive effect given to a guilty plea . . . is founded on issue preclusion rather than estoppel." Winker, 319 N.W.2d at 293-94 (citing especially Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 462 U.S. 306, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983)). The same result obtained in State Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d 35 (Me. 1991), in which a man pled guilty to murdering his wife and son and attempting to murder his daughter.
Allen, 449 U.S. at 104, 101 S.Ct. at 419; Guenther v. Holmgreen, 738 F.2d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 1984), certiorari denied, 469 U.S. 1212, 105 S.Ct. 1182, 84 L.Ed.2d 329. Critical to the application of collateral estoppel is the guarantee that the party sought to be estopped had the opportunity and the incentive to litigate the issue aggressively. Haring v. Prosise, 667 F.2d 1133, 1141 (4th Cir. 1981), affirmed, 462 U.S. 306, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 595. But to qualify for full faith and credit, state proceedings need only satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of due process. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1897, 72 L.Ed.2d 262; Jones v. City of Alton, 757 F.2d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 1985).
Without expressing any view on the merits, however addressed on remand, we observe that such an issue may of course in appropriate cases be determined by summary judgment. See, e.g., Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133, 1136 (4th Cir. 1981), aff'd on other grounds sub. nom. Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983).
See for instance: Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488, 496 (7th Cir. 1981); Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 1980); Poindexter v. Woodson, 510 F.2d 464, 466 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 846, 96 S.Ct. 85, 46 L.Ed.2d 68; Clemmons v. Greggs, 509 F.2d at 1340 ("[t]he use of tear gas when reasonably necessary to prevent riots or escapes or to subdue recalcitrant prisoners does not constitute cruel and inhuman punishment," citing Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135; Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 509 (10th Cir. 1969); Breece v. Swenson, 332 F. Supp. 837, 840 (W.D.Mo. 1971). The instruction on good faith, used by the magistrate in this case, is exactly the instruction approved as the classic statement of the rule of good faith in cases such as this, stated by the court in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1029, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324, cited with approval by us recently in Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133, 1136 (4th Cir. 1981), aff'd., 462 U.S. 306, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.(2d) 595 (1983), and Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). We think the above review both of the authorities of this circuit as well as of other circuits makes it abundantly clear that the use of mace on an unruly or "recalcitrant" prison inmate, though confined in his cell, is not plainly per se unconstitutional and thus the rule for denying to the defendant in this case the defense of good faith immunity is not present [i.e., the unconstitutionality of the defendant's conduct was so clearly established that the defendant should have known his conduct was illegal].
See Luke Construction Co. v. Simpkins, 223 Va. 387, 291 S.E.2d 204 (1982). This general rule of non-preclusion, which has been followed in Virginia since 1916, see Prosise v. Haring, 667 F.2d 1133, 1138-39 (4th Cir. 1981), aff'd, ___ U.S. ___, ___ — ___, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 2374-75, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983) (discussing Virginia cases), is based upon Virginia's requirement of mutuality of estoppel and its recognition that "the parties in a criminal proceeding are not the same as those in a civil proceeding and there is a consequent lack of mutuality."