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Proschold v. Proschold

Supreme Court, Special Term, Suffolk County
May 24, 1982
114 Misc. 2d 568 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982)

Opinion

May 24, 1982

Blottner, Derrico Hoffman for plaintiff.

William G. Kerwick for defendant.


In this action governed by the New York Equitable Distribution Law (Domestic Relations Law, § 236, part B), plaintiff wife moves to vacate a notice to submit to physical and mental examination pursuant to CPLR 3121 on the ground that the question of plaintiff's physical and mental condition is not in controversy. The court denies plaintiff's motion.

Plaintiff commenced this action for divorce alleging as causes of action, constructive abandonment and defendant's cruel and inhuman treatment of plaintiff. In neither of these causes of action does she place her physical or mental condition in controversy. Also, defendant has not raised plaintiff's physical or mental condition in his answer. Both parties, however, do seek custody of the infant issue of the marriage.

Under section 236 (part B, subd 5, par d, cl [2]) of the Domestic Relations Law, the court must consider the age and health of both parties in determining an equitable distribution award, and, in determining the amount and duration of maintenance, the age and health of the parties must also be considered (Domestic Relations Law, § 236, part B, subd 6, par a, cl [2]). For example, the ill health of the propertied spouse may, under some circumstances, justify a larger equitable distribution award to a needy spouse ( Rock v Rock, 89 S.D. 583; Perkins v Perkins, 168 Mont. 78; Weiland v Weiland, 255 Iowa 477) or an ill spouse may or may not be entitled to a larger award of maintenance ( Matter of Downing, 210 N.W.2d 436 [Supreme Ct, Iowa, 1973]; Abney v Abney, 575 S.W.2d 842 [Mo Ct App, 1978]; Pfohl v Pfohl, 345 So.2d 371 [Fla App, 1977]).

While the health of the parties is a statutorily mandated factor to be considered in equitably distributing marital property or in determining the amount and duration of maintenance, the long-standing rule in New York has been that before a party can conduct a physical or mental examination of the other party or obtain disclosure of hospital records, two things must occur: (1) the party seeking the disclosure must make a showing that the mental or physical condition of another party is in controversy, and (2) the person whose physical or mental condition is in controversy must waive the physician-patient privilege by affirmatively placing his physical or mental condition in controversy ( Koump v Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287), and the same rule applies in matrimonial actions (but cf. Wegman v Wegman, 37 N.Y.2d 940 ). Accordingly, the court holds that there is no right to a physical or mental examination simply because a spouse seeks an equitable distribution of marital property and/or nonpermanent maintenance of normal duration.

Here, however, both parties are seeking custody of the infant issue of the marriage, and the New York Court of Appeals has held that the health of a parent is a relevant consideration on the issue of custody ( Matter of Darlene T., 28 N.Y.2d 391). Unlike the inflexible rules concerning competency of testimony, the rules applicable to privileged matter have been held flexible enough to cause considerations of public policy upon which the particular privilege is based, to yield in situations where the wise and proper administration of justice is at stake. This approach has been particularly evident in cases involving the custody and welfare of children (see Matter of Lucas, NYLJ, Oct. 7, 1981, p 15, col 3 [Family Ct, Suffolk County, CANNAVO, J.], and the cases cited therein). Although, abstractly, certain privileges obtain in matrimonial actions (see Yaron v Yaron, 83 Misc.2d 276), a party waives his right to a physician-patient privilege or psychiatrist privilege when disputing custody, thereby putting his physical, mental and emotional well-being into controversy (see, e.g., Baecher v Baecher, 58 A.D.2d 821). Although the court recognizes the potential for abuse in these cases, the court's broad discretionary power to grant a protective order "to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or the courts" (CPLR 3103) should provide adequate safeguards ( Wegman v Wegman, supra). Here, the tests stated by CPLR 3121 have been satisfied and plaintiff's motion is denied.

Defendant shall settle an order providing for the appointment of a physician by the court.


Summaries of

Proschold v. Proschold

Supreme Court, Special Term, Suffolk County
May 24, 1982
114 Misc. 2d 568 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982)
Case details for

Proschold v. Proschold

Case Details

Full title:MARY PROSCHOLD, Plaintiff, v. GUENTHER PROSCHOLD, Defendant

Court:Supreme Court, Special Term, Suffolk County

Date published: May 24, 1982

Citations

114 Misc. 2d 568 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982)
451 N.Y.S.2d 956

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