Opinion
Civil Action 4:23-CV-1311
06-05-2024
STACEY PROPST, SR., Plaintiff v. WILLIAMSPORT, PA, et al., Defendants
MARIANI, D.J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
William I. Arbuckle, U.S. Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Stacey Propst, Sr. (“Plaintiff”) initiated this civil rights action on behalf of himself and others in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Several claims were dismissed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania before the case was transferred to this Court. Only Plaintiff's excessive force claims against the City of Williamsport and five unidentified police officers remain.
Currently before the Court is Defendant City of Williamsport's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and a supporting brief. (Docs. 23, 24). The Court has issued three orders directing Plaintiff to respond. (Docs. 25, 30, 31). To date, no response has been filed. Accordingly, it will be recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed in its entirety pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that Defendant City of Williamsport's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) be deemed moot.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff alleges that, on March 27, 2021, five Williamsport police officers assaulted him. Plaintiff asserts he was at the police station to report a robbery. At some point after he arrived, five police officers “slammed” Plaintiff to the floor. As a result of this use of force, Plaintiff injured his collarbone, rotator cuff, and right arm. Plaintiff alleges that this entire incident was captured on a surveillance video.
Plaintiff also alleged other claims in his complaint. These claims, however, were dismissed before this case was transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Docs. 9, 10). We will limit our discussion of the facts in this case to those relevant to Plaintiff's remaining claims only.
Plaintiff initiated this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. As relief, Plaintiff requests five million dollars in compensatory damages. While pending in the Eastern District, Plaintiff's Complaint was reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and all claims except for an excessive force claim against the City of Williamsport and five of its police officers were dismissed. (Docs. 9, 10). On August 8, 2023, this action was transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Thereafter, Plaintiff's Complaint was served on the City of Williamsport.
Once this lawsuit was transferred, the Clerk of Court mailed Plaintiff a letter. That letter explained that Plaintiff has:
an affirmative obligation to keep the court informed of his or her current address. If the plaintiff changes his or her address while the lawsuit is
being litigated, the plaintiff shall immediately inform the court of the change in writing.(Doc. 13). Plaintiff was also mailed a copy of a standing order which explained that “[i]f the Court is unable to communicate with the plaintiff because the plaintiff has failed to notify the court of his or her address, the plaintiff will be deemed to have abandoned the lawsuit.” (Doc. 14).
On December 4, 2023, the City of Williamsport filed a motion to dismiss and supporting brief. (Docs. 23, 24). Upon receipt of that motion and brief, the Court issued an order directing Plaintiff to respond to Defendant's Motion on or before December 18, 2023. (Doc. 25). In that same order, Plaintiff was advised of the consequences of non-compliance. Id. No response was received.
On January 26, 2024, Plaintiff contacted the Clerk's Office via telephone and reported he relocated following a house fire and did not receive any documents filed in his case in December 2023. Two weeks later, the Court received written notice of Plaintiff's change of address. (Doc. 28). Defendant served a new copy of its motion and brief on Plaintiff at his new address, and the Court issued a second order. This time, Plaintiff was directed to respond to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on or before March 6, 2024. (Doc. 30). No response was received.
On May 6, 2024, the Court issued a third order directing Plaintiff to respond to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. In that order, Plaintiff was afforded until May 20, 2024 to file his response. No response was received.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute or failure to abide by a court order, stating that: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” A district court also “has authority to dismiss an action sua sponte if a litigant fails to prosecute or to comply with a court order.”
Qadr v. Overmyer, 642 Fed.Appx. 100, 102 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)); see also Adams v. Trustees of N.J. Brewery Emps. Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that a court could dismiss sua sponte under Rule 41(b).”).
Decisions regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute or abide by a court order rest in the sound discretion of the court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. A court's discretion to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or abide by a court order, while broad, is governed by certain factors, commonly referred to as Poulis factors. Those factors are:
Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).
Id.
“In balancing the Poulis factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation' to determine whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff's case.” Consistent with this view, it is well-settled that “no single Poulis factor is dispositive,” and that “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.” Moreover, recognizing the broad discretion conferred upon district courts in making judgments weighing these six factors, the Court of Appeals has frequently sustained such dismissal orders where there has been a pattern of dilatory conduct by a pro se litigant who is not amenable to any lesser sanction.
Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
See, e.g., Emerson, 296 F.3d 184; Tillio v. Mendelsohn, 256 Fed.Appx. 509 (3d Cir. 2007); Reshard v. Lankenau Hosp., 256 Fed.Appx. 506 (3d Cir. 2007); Azubuko v. Bell Nat. Org., 243 Fed.Appx. 728 (3d Cir. 2007).
IV. DISCUSSION
Here, Plaintiff has failed to prosecute his case or comply with the Court's orders directing him to do so. Accordingly, for the reasons explained herein, the Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissing Plaintiff's lawsuit under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The first and fourth Poulis factors-the extent of Plaintiff's personal responsibility, and whether Plaintiff's conduct was willful or in bad faith-weigh in favor of dismissal. Plaintiff is representing himself in this matter. Thus, it is his responsibility to update his contact information, respond to motions he opposes, and abide by Court-imposed deadlines. On multiple occasions, the Court attempted to inform Plaintiff of these responsibilities, and of the consequences for noncompliance. (Docs. 13, 14, 25, 30, 31). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to fulfill his responsibilities despite these warnings and despite his awareness of the consequences. Furthermore, Plaintiff sought no other relief from the Court, such as an extension of time to comply. Therefore, we infer Plaintiff's failure to comply with the Court's orders directing Plaintiff to respond to Defendant's Motion, and setting deadlines for that response, is intentional.
Colon v. Karnes, No. 1:11-CV-1704, 2012 WL 383666 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2012) (reasoning that where a Plaintiff is proceeding without an attorney, it is the Plaintiff's responsibility to comply with court orders).
See, e.g., Qadr, 642 Fed.Appx. at 103 (affirming a District Court's Rule 41 dismissal where it held that the plaintiff failed to comply with three orders and failed to respond to Defendants' motion to dismiss).
The second Poulis factor, whether the adverse party has suffered prejudice because of Plaintiff's dilatory behavior, also weighs in favor of dismissal. Examples of prejudice in this context include “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Prejudice for purposes of the Poulis analysis, however, does not mean irremediable harm. Although this factor does not weigh heavily in favor of dismissal given the early stage of this litigation, it is not neutral either. Plaintiff's failure to respond to Defendant's motion frustrates and delays the resolution of this case.
Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir. 1984).
Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003).
See e.g., Mack v. United States, No. 3:17-CV-1982, 2019 WL 1302626 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2019) (observing that a litigant's continued inaction, and failure to communicate with the Court prejudices defendants who seek timely resolution of a lawsuit).
The third Poulis factor, whether Plaintiff exhibited a history of dilatory behavior over the life of this case, also weighs in favor of dismissal. Plaintiff's noncompliance has resulted in a six-month delay in the resolution of Defendant's Motion. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to comply with a letter and standing order advising Plaintiff to “immediately” update his address, and three additional court orders. Thus, we find that this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
The fifth Poulis factor requires the Court to consider the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal to assure this litigation progresses in an orderly fashion. Generally, a litigant's pro se status severely limits the court's ability to utilize lesser sanctions. This case is no exception. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in this action. Given Plaintiff's limited resources, it is unlikely Plaintiff will be able to pay any monetary sanction. Plaintiff has failed to comply with three orders directing him to respond to Defendant's Motion. Considering his history of noncompliance, we have no basis to believe Plaintiff would comply with an order imposing a lesser non-monetary sanction. Thus, there does not appear to be a lesser sanction that would assure the orderly progression of this litigation.
Cribbs v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:22-CV-1950, 2023 WL 5103139, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2023) (citing Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011), Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191, and Nowland v. Lucas, No. 1:10-CV-1863, 2012 WL 10559, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2012)).
Last, before dismissing a case, the Court must consider the meritoriousness of a litigant's claims. A claim is deemed meritorious when “the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff ....” “Generally, in determining whether a plaintiff's claim is meritorious, [courts] use the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Even assuming, however, that Plaintiff's excessive force claims could survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), consideration of the sixth Poulis factor cannot save Plaintiff's case because he is wholly noncompliant with his obligations as a litigant. No one Poulis factor is dispositive, and in this case the untested merits of Plaintiff's claims, standing alone, do not outweigh the balance of the other factors. Therefore, given that the first five factors weigh in favor of dismissal, we will recommend that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's case for failure to prosecute and failure to abide by a court order.
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 870.
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) Defendant City of Williamsport's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) be DEEMED MOOT.
(3) The Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case.
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.