Opinion
NUMBER 13-18-00291-CV
06-27-2019
CHRISTOPHER M. PROPST AND STRIDE INVESTMENTS, LLC, Appellants, v. GREGORY K. PROPST, INDIVIDUALLY AND DERIVATIVELY ON BEHALF OF RIOSTAR SOLUTIONS, INC., Appellees.
On appeal from the 275th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Hinojosa, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes
In September 2016, Appellees RioStar Solutions, Inc. (RioStar) and RioStar co-owner Gregory K. Propst (Greg) filed suit and application for injunctive relief against appellants RioStar co-owner Christopher M. Propst (Chris) and his management and consultant company Stride Investments, LLC. (Stride), alleging breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, violations of the Texas Civil Theft Act, and tortious interference with contract. In October 2016, the trial court entered a temporary injunction order. In June 2018, the trial court signed an order extending the 2016 temporary injunction following hearings on appellees' request for enforcement of the 2016 temporary injunction and appellants' motion to dissolve the 2016 temporary injunction.
The temporary injunction order required Chris to (1) pay a monthly brokerage royalty fee to appellees, (2) provide weekly brokerage activity reports to appellees, (3) resign as RioStar's director and officer, (4) terminate Stride's contract with RioStar, and (5) turn over electronics for a forensic sweep.
Appellants bring this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's 2018 temporary injunction order. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014. By two issues, appellants argue that the trial court (1) entered an invalid temporary injunction order, and (2) abused its discretion in denying appellants' motion to dissolve the temporary injunction. The temporary injunction order at issue, however, expired by its own terms on September 24, 2018. The interlocutory appeal is therefore moot, and we dismiss the appeal for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Appellants argue that the June 2018 temporary injunction order, in its incorporation of the trial court's October 2016 temporary injunction order, is in violation of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 31, 2013, RioStar, a Texas corporation, was created and incorporated. At its inception, RioStar was owned in equal shares by relatives, Chris and Greg. On August 23, 2013, RioStar entered into an "Independent Contractor/Sales Agent Agreement" with Patterson Freight Systems, Inc. (Patterson). Under the contract, Patterson provided RioStar with sales and operational materials, including an email domain and computer software that tracked RioStar's business transactions and customer lists. On October 1, 2013, RioStar entered into a "Management Services Agreement" with Stride.
By mid-2016, the relationship between Chris and Greg had deteriorated, which adversely affected RioStar. On August 31, 2016, RioStar received a termination notice from Patterson. Chris and Greg, on behalf of RioStar, requested a termination extension date, and Patterson agreed to extend the termination date until September 26, 2016.
Pursuant to the contract's termination terms, RioStar was required to discontinue use of Patterson's materials, including software.
On September 20, 2016, Greg filed suit and an application for temporary injunction against Chris and Stride. Meanwhile, on behalf of Stride, Chris executed a new contract with Patterson on September 27, 2016; Stride then subsumed use of RioStar's former software and email account.
The suit also named individuals and companies associated with Patterson and Stride, which are not parties to this appeal.
On October 19, 2016, the trial court entered a temporary injunction order requiring Chris to: (1) "pay RioStar a royalty of 10% of the gross brokerage or $10,000, which ever is greater, during the term of the Temporary Injunction"; (2) provide "weekly reports to RioStar of all brokerage activity"; (3) resign as RioStar's director and officer; (4) terminate Stride's contract with RioStar; and (5) turn over electronics used by former RioStar employees, including his personal laptop and cell phones, to counsel for a forensic sweep. The court additionally ordered:
[t]his Temporary Injunction Order shall remain effective until the trial on the merits set for 9:00 o'clock a.m., on the 1st day of May 1, 2017, in the Courtroom of the 275th Judicial District Court, Hidalgo County, Texas, unless dissolved or modified sooner by Order of this Court.
The case did not proceed to trial on May 1, 2017. On May 24, 2017, appellees filed a motion to hold appellants in contempt for failure to comply with the 2016 temporary injunction, to extend the temporary injunction, and to enforce the temporary injunction. Appellants responded by filing a motion to dissolve, deny removal, or modify the temporary injunction, and alternatively, appellants requested a bond increase. Although the court held the injunction evidentiary hearing on May 30, 2017, and multiple hearings thereafter on this matter, the second temporary injunction order was not signed until June 19, 2018.
The trial court's order took "judicial notice of all prior proceedings, the pleadings, including the evidence presented, the pleadings, responses and arguments of counsel, [and found] that the Temporary Injunction issued on October 19, 2016 should be extended." The court specifically ordered that: "[T]his Temporary Injunction Order shall remain effective until the trial on the merits set for 10:00 o'clock a.m., on the 24th day of September, 2018, in the Courtroom of the 275th Judicial District Court, Hidalgo County Texas."
II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
On appeal, our review is generally limited to the narrow question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, and orders are strictly construed to ensure compliance with the letter of the law. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); InterFirst Bank San Felipe v. Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1986); Super Starr Int'l, LLC v. Fresh Tex Produce, LLC, 531 S.W.3d 829, 838 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2017, no pet.).
Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that "[e]very order granting a temporary injunction shall include an order setting the cause for trial on the merits with respect to the ultimate relief sought." TEX. R. CIV. P. 683; Qwest Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 2000) (holding that an order granting a temporary injunction that does not meet procedural requirements set out in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure is subject to being declared void and dissolved); Sargeant v. Al Saleh, 512 S.W.3d 399, 409 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2016, no pet.) (same).
However, when an injunction becomes inoperative because it has expired, its validity becomes moot. Parr v. Stockwell, 322 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. 1959). Mootness is a threshold issue that implicates a reviewing court's subject-matter jurisdiction, and appellate courts are prohibited from reviewing an injunction that has become moot. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999) ("This prohibition . . . prohibits courts from rendering advisory opinions.") (citations omitted); Arroyo v. Garza, No. 13-17-00496-CV, 2018 WL 3764236, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Aug. 9, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Although mootness was not raised by the parties, "[w]e are obligated to determine, sua sponte, our jurisdiction to hear and consider an appeal." Parks v. DeWitt Cty. Elec. Coop., 112 S.W.3d 157, 161 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (citing Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)).
Separate and apart from the trial setting, which must be present on the face of an order, a temporary injunction order may expire (1) at a fixed time, or (2) contingent on an event, such as a final judgment. See Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Grp., P.A., 802 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1991) (providing that, if not otherwise specified, a final judgment acts as finality for a temporary injunction); see also Yardeni v. Torres, 418 S.W.3d 914, 917 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (providing that "before [the appellate court] had the opportunity to dismiss the appeal for mootness, Torres moved to amend and renew her initial temporary injunction order," extending the expiration date); see generally 44 Tex. Jur. 3d Injunctions § 114.
By its own prescribed terms, the order here expired on the date it ceased effect: "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Temporary Injunction shall remain effective until the trial on the merits set for 10:00 o'clock a.m., on the 24th day of September, 2018 . . . ." Although Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires language setting the trial of the merits, the rule does not dictate that the setting act as an injunction terminus date. TEX. R. CIV. P. 683; see, e.g., Electrolux Home Care Prods., Ltd. v. Int'l Mfg. Sols. Corp., 247 S.W.3d 239, 241-42 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.) (holding the order specified the end-date of enjoinment: "60 days from the date of this order"); see also Trice v. State, 712 S.W.2d 842, 852 (Tex. App.—Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (same).
Having determined the trial court's order specified an expiration date which has now passed, we are unable to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellants' motion to dissolve the temporary injunction or entered an invalid order in violation of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683. The trial court's temporary injunction has no present operative effect and is moot. See Jones, 1 S.W.3d at 86; Wolf v. Starr, 456 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.).
III. CONCLUSION
The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
GREGORY T. PERKES
Justice Delivered and filed the 27th day of June, 2019.