Opinion
No. 05-04-01324-CV
Opinion Filed May 12, 2005.
On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 0307464-B.
Affirmed.
Before Justices MORRIS, FRANCIS, and LANG-MIERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lou Propst sued her former lawyer, Adrianna Martinez Goodland, for breach of contract. The trial court granted a directed verdict in appellee's favor at the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, finding there was no evidence to support any element of her breach of contract claim. In two issues, appellant argues the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict for appellee and in refusing to hear her motion for sanctions. The facts of this case and its procedural history are well-known to the parties, and we do not recite them in detail. The dispositive issues being clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.4. We affirm.
Appellant represented herself at trial as well as in this appeal. On the day of trial before the jury was selected, appellee informed the trial court that she and appellant had agreed to stipulate to the admissibility of certain evidence, i.e., a videotape from a State Bar of Texas grievance hearing and paperwork filed during or as a prerequisite to the disciplinary hearing.
During her case-in-chief, appellant called two witnesses, neither of whom testified to any of the elements breach of contract. After their testimony, appellant rested without offering any of the stipulated evidence or even her own testimony. Appellee moved for a directed verdict, arguing the existence of a contract had not even been established. During argument on the motion, appellant referred to the stipulated evidence. The trial court, however, explained that appellant had not offered the stipulated evidence nor was her opening statement to the jury any evidence. Despite the trial court's comments, appellant did not move to reopen the evidence. The trial court granted the directed verdict, and this appeal ensued.
In reviewing the granting of a directed verdict, we must determine whether there is more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a fact issue on the elements of breach of contract. See Coastal Transport Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 233 (Tex. 2004). We consider all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was instructed and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences; we give the losing party the benefit of all reasonable inferences created by the evidence. Id. The elements of a breach of contract cause of action are: (1) the existence of a valid contract, (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff, (3) breach of the contract by the defendant, and (4) damages to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. Frazin v. Hanley, 130 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
In her first issue, appellant relies solely on the stipulated evidence to reverse the judgment in this case. She first argues the evidence was admitted. The record, however, shows the evidence was not admitted. The trial court merely accepted the parties' stipulation to the admissibility of the evidence. Because the only evidence relied upon by appellant was not admitted at trial, it necessarily cannot be some evidence to defeat the directed verdict. Appellant does not argue that the evidence actually admitted was sufficient to avoid a directed verdict. Regardless, we have reviewed that evidence and conclude it was no evidence of the existence of a valid contract, performance, breach, or damages. We resolve the first issue against appellant.
In her second issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to hear her post-judgment motion for sanctions against appellee. In the body of this issue, appellant argues facts to support why she believes sanctions were appropriate. She does not, however, argue any law pertinent to either issue. Under these circumstances, we conclude this issue is waived. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h). We resolve the second issue against appellant.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.