Opinion
CV424-002
01-19-2024
DORIS PROMAN, and GLENN J. PROMAN, Plaintiffs, v. CAROL BACON MILLER, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
CHRISTOPHER L. RAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Pro se plaintiff Doris Proman has filed a pleading of an ambiguous nature. See generally doc. 1. She paid the filing fee, but there is no record that she has requested a summons directed to any defendant. See generally docket. On January 12, 2024, the undersigned received correspondence from Proman. The intent of that correspondence is unclear. To the extent that the correspondence is comprehensible, it refers to a “case.” See, e.g., Exhibit A at 3-4. The Court infers that this is a reference to the present case, as this is the only case she has pending, but the correspondence does not include any information that expressly indicates Proman intended it to be filed into the docket of this case, specifically. Nevertheless, the Court preserves a record of it on the docket, but for the reasons discussed below, the Court will take no further action related to it.
Correspondence addressed to judges is not a proper form to request relief or file documents in a case. See, e.g., In re Unsolicited Letters to Federal Judges, 120 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1074 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (“[I]f a litigant seeks judicial action of any sort . . ., it must be contained within a motion .... It cannot be requested in a personal letter to a judge.”).
Any request for relief of any description must be made by motion. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(1) (“A request for a court order must be made by motion,” in writing, stating “with particularity the grounds,” and stating the relief sought). Even if the Court charitably construed Proman's correspondence, see, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), it does not seek any relief the Court can discern, nor does it present any apparent grounds for any relief. Proman is advised that disregard of the Court's rules, including both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules, and filing of meritless documents may subject her to sanctions, including dismissal of her case. Cf. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[O]nce a Pro se [in forma pauperis] litigant is in court, he is subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules provide for sanctions for misconduct and for failure to comply with court orders.”); see also Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d 386, 387 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[P]ro se filings do not serve as an impenetrable shield, for one acting Pro se has no license to . . . clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.”). Since the correspondence is improper and does not clearly request any relief, the Court will take no further action related to it. To the extent that Proman seeks any relief or other action from the Court, she remains free to request it through a properly presented and filed motion. To ensure a complete record is preserved, the Court attaches the correspondence received, in its entirety, as Exhibit A to this Order.
In its attempt to discern the purpose of Proman's correspondence, the Court reviewed the Complaint she filed. See doc. 1. That review revealed significant defects. Proman's Complaint is presented, in part, on a form. See, e.g., doc. 1 at 1. In response to the form's prompt's Proman has identified herself and Glenn J. Proman as the plaintiffs. Id. She invokes this Court's federal question jurisdiction, asserting that her claims arise under the Constitution's First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. See id. at 2. Her list of constitutional provisions concludes with the otherwise unexplained notation “commit murder.” Id. Her identification of the defendants is somewhat less clear, but the Clerk identified no fewer than eighteen. See generally docket. Rather than assert the factual bases of her claim or claims, Proman simply incorporates “attachments,” doc. 1 at 3, which the Court construes as a reference to the approximately 275 pages on the docket, see docs. 1, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3 & 1-4. Similarly, her request for relief incorporates the attachments. See doc. 1 at 3. The Complaint is signed only by Doris Proman. See id. at 4.
The first defect in the Complaint is that it purports to assert claims on behalf of Glenn J. Proman but is not signed by him or by any proper representative. Doris Proman has signed the Complaint “pro se.” Doc. 1 at 4. Although parties are authorized by statute to pursue cases Pro se, that authorization is limited to “their own cases.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[t]he provision appears to provide a personal right that does not extend to the representation of the interests of others.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 873 (11th Cir. 2008); see also, e.g., Franklin v. Garden State Life Ins., 462 Fed.Appx. 928, 930 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The right to appear Pro se . . . is limited to those parties conducting ‘their own cases' and does not apply to persons representing the interests of others.” (citations omitted)). To the extent that Glenn Proman wishes to assert any claims in this case without an attorney, he must sign pleadings himself.
The second issue is that the Complaint, as currently presented, can only be characterized as what is “often disparagingly referred to as [a] ‘shotgun pleading.'” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). The Eleventh Circuit has engaged in a “thirty-year salvo of criticism aimed at shotgun pleadings, and there is no ceasefire in sight.” Id. at 1321 & n.9 (collecting cases). The crux of the Court's admonishment of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to adhere to pleading requirements designed to ensure that a defending party is provided enough clarity to adequately respond. Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8-11 (rules for civil pleadings before the Federal Courts). They typically present in four varieties: (1) a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts; (2) a complaint that is replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action; (3) a pleading that does not separate into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief; and (4) a pleading that asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which defendant allegedly committed which claim. Adams v. Huntsville Hosp., 819 Fed. App'x. 836, 838 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23). To the extent that the Complaint's claims are discernable at all, they fall into the third and fourth categories.
The Complaint's failure to allege any facts at all also renders it frivolous. The Supreme Court has explained that “a complaint . . . is frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Since the Complaint, as discussed above, does not include any factual allegations, invoke any discernable legal framework in support of relief, or, indeed, claim any particular relief, it clearly “lacks an arguable basis” in both law and fact. The Complaint might, therefore, be dismissed sua sponte. See Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 264 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding “district courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee ....”).
“A district court has the ‘inherent authority to control its docket and ensure the prompt resolution of lawsuits,' which includes the ability to dismiss a complaint on shotgun pleading grounds.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320). Before doing so, plaintiffs are entitled to a single opportunity to amend their pleadings in order to better present their claims. See id. at 1296. Therefore, Proman is DIRECTED to file an
Amended Complaint by February 9, 2024. The Amended Complaint must comply with the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8-11, which, inter alia, requires short and plain statements. The pleading must specifically identify each claim asserted, the facts supporting each specific claim, and the defendants against whom those particular claims are asserted. Glenn Proman must sign it to assert claims and to be considered a plaintiff, and Doris Proman may not proceed Pro se on his behalf. The Amended Complaint must also include a statement of the basis for the Court's jurisdiction, a recitation of all material facts, and a prayer for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief. The Amended Complaint will supersede the current Complaint and should reassert all claims against all named defendants. See Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1345 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1999) (“An amended complaint supersedes an original complaint”); Varnes v. Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n of U.S. & Canada, 647 F.2d 1365, 1370 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1982) (“As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint unless the amendment specifically refers to or adopts the earlier pleading.”). The Clerk is DIRECTED to send her blank copies of Form Pro Se 1 (Complaint for a Civil Case) and Form Pro Se 15 (Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Non-Prisoner)). Proman is advised that failure to submit her amendment timely may result in dismissal for failure to obey a court order or failure to prosecute. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).
A copy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is available on the federal judiciary website at https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/current-rules-practice-procedure/federal-rules-civil-procedure.
SO ORDERED.