This case presents us with four issues: first, whether the federal tax was due and payable; second, which version of the Arizona insurance liquidation statutes should be applied in this case; third, whether the applicable state statute granted policyholders' claims priority over those of the federal government; and fourth, if so, did it do it in a manner that escaped preemption — pursuant to the provisions of the McCarran-Ferguson Act — by the federal superpriority statute. This is an appeal from the CFC's grant of summary judgment, which we review de novo. Promac, Inc. v. West, 203 F.3d 786, 788 (Fed. Cir. 2000). As explained below, we hold that the tax was due and payable, and that the 1977 Arizona priority statute is applicable. Furthermore, because the 1977 statute does not elevate the priority of policyholders above that of government claimants, there is no conflict between the federal superpriority statute and state law.

See Bienkowski v. Northeastern University, 285 F.3d 138, 140 (1St Cir. 2002) ("The standards are the same where, as here, both parties have moved for summary judgment. `The court must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard'") (citation omitted); Promac, Inc. v. West, 203 F.3d 786, 788 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("When both parties move for summary judgment, each party's motion must be evaluated on its own merits and all reasonable inferences must be resolved against the party whose motion is under consideration"). However, the courts task is somewhat easier here, where the principal theories advanced by the parties are opposite sides of the same issue: applicability of a particular exemption.

"The fact that both parties have moved for summary judgment does not mean that the court must grant judgment as a matter of law for one side or the other; summary judgment in favor of either party is not proper if disputes remain as to material facts." Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Promac, Inc. v. West, 203 F.3d 786, 788 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that on cross-motions for summary judgment each party's motion is evaluated on its merits, making all reasonable inferences against party whose motion is under consideration). II. Breach of contract

Rather, "each party's motion must be evaluated on its own merits and all reasonable inferences must be resolved against the party whose motion is under consideration." Promac, Inc. v. West, 203 F.3d 786, 788 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Discussion