This is because "[t]he declarations page—which lists the types of coverage provided and the policy limits and premiums for each—is part of the insurance contract," and contracts must be construed in a way that gives effect to every provision. Rumick v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. , No. 17 C 2403, 2018 WL 3740645, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2018) (quoting Progressive Premier Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Kocher ex rel. Fleming , 402 Ill. App. 3d 756, 761, 342 Ill.Dec. 633, 932 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (5th Dist. 2010) ); see alsoAlshwaiyat v. Am. Serv. Ins. Co. , 2013 IL App (1st) 123222, ¶ 33, 369 Ill.Dec. 233, 986 N.E.2d 182, 191 (2013) ("Illinois courts have long recognized that an insurance contract includes the printed form policy, declarations, and any endorsements."). The Truck Tire Defendants cite a Missouri case for the proposition that policy declarations cannot limit the scope of insurance coverage.

A court should look to the facts of the case and the language as a whole to determine if a clause is actually an anti-stacking clause. See Progressive Premier Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Kocher ex rel. Fleming, 402 Ill.App.3d 756, 342 Ill.Dec. 633, 932 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (2010).{19} Of course, the Limitation of Insurance clause does use the term “involved in the accident” after the word “vehicles” (“[r]egardless of the number of ... vehicles involved in the ‘accident’ ”). The Luceros argue that the term “involved in the ‘accident’ ” only modifies “vehicles” and not any of the antecedent terms before it—like covered autos (“[r]egardless of the number of covered ‘autos' ”). The Luceros note the absence of a comma between “claims made” and “or vehicles involved in the accident.

¶ 9 "Stacking ordinarily involves combining or aggregating the policy limits applicable to more than one vehicle where the other vehicles are not involved in the accident." Progressive Premier Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Kocher, 402 Ill.App.3d 756, 760, 932 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (2010). "The issue of whether coverage may be stacked arises only because the existence of coverage is a given."

{19} Cases from other jurisdictions have defined “stacking” as the “combining or aggregating [of] the policy limits applicable to more than one vehicle where the other vehicles are not involved in the accident.” Progressive Premier Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Kocher ex rel. Fleming, 402 Ill.App.3d 756, 342 Ill.Dec. 633, 932 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (2010) (emphasis added); see Anderson, 756 So.2d at 35 (“Stacking of coverages occurs when coverage from vehicles not involved in the accident is sought to be added to the coverage for the vehicle involved in the accident.”). Although New Mexico cases have not strictly defined stacking as applying to vehicles not involved in the accident at issue, they have applied stacking only to cases having those circumstances.

This is because Plaintiffs are not seeking "stacking" as that term is generally understood. {19} Cases from other jurisdictions have defined "stacking" as the "combining or aggregating [of] the policy limits applicable to more than one vehicle where the other vehicles are not involved in the accident" Progressive Premier Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Kocher ex rel. Fleming, 932 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (emphasis added); see Anderson, 756 So. 2d at 35 ("Stacking of coverages occurs when coverage from vehicles not involved in the accident is sought to be added to the coverage for the vehicle involved in the accident."). Although New Mexico cases have not strictly defined stacking as applying to vehicles not involved in the accident at issue, they have applied stacking only to cases having those circumstances.

Instead, the Lucero I court reasoned that the Limit of Insurance provision only prevented aggregating “policy limits applicable to more than one vehicle where the other vehicles are not involved in the accident .” Id. at 47 (quoting Progressive Premier Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Kocher ex rel. Fleming , 402 Ill.App.3d 756, 342 Ill.Dec. 633, 932 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (2010) ).Alternatively, the Lucero I court noted that even if the Limit of Insurance provision applied, the policy was ambiguous.

Since Hobbs was decided, every Illinois Appellate district that has faced the issue presented in the case at bar has held, in line with Bruder's dicta and Hobbs' discussion of the Bruder dicta, that an anti-stacking provision, containing language similar to the provision at issue here, which refers to the limit of liability shown on the policy declarations page, is rendered ambiguous when the declarations page lists multiple limits.See Bowers v. General Cas. Ins. Co., 386 Ill.Dec. 467, 20 N.E.3d 843, 848 (Ill.App.Ct.2014) (3d District); Progressive Premier Ins. Co. v. Kocher, 402 Ill.App.3d 756, 342 Ill.Dec. 633, 932 N.E.2d 1094, 1102 (2010) (5th District); Johnson v. Davis, 377 Ill.App.3d 602, 318 Ill.Dec. 290, 883 N.E.2d 521, 529 (2007) (5th District); McElmeel v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 365 Ill.App.3d 736, 303 Ill.Dec. 201, 851 N.E.2d 99, 103 (2006) (1st District). Nationwide argues that our decision in Grinnell Select Ins. Co. v. Baker, 362 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir.2004), requires that we deviate from this mass of Illinois authority.

The declarations page forms part of the Policy and sets forth the insured, what risks are covered, the policy limits, the policy period, and, here, the entity providing the insurance. See Progressive Premier Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Kocher ex rel. Fleming, 932 N.E.2d 1094, 1098, 402 Ill. App. 3d 756, 342 Ill. Dec. 633 (2010) ("The declarations page—which lists the types of coverage provided and the policy limits and premiums for each—is a part of the insurance contract."); 16 Williston on Contracts § 49:25 (4th ed. 2018) ("The contents of a declarations sheet, or the declarations page, of an insurance policy is regarded a part of the insurance contract. The declarations page is the one page of the policy likely to be read by the insured, and contains the terms most likely to have been requested by the insured; it therefore is held to define the coverage afforded the insured and to control over more restricted terms contained in the body of the policy.

In addition to Pennsylvania, the states of Arkansas, Ohio, North Carolina, and Virginia also apply a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in this context. See Collins, 61 S.W.3d at 822; Hook, 938 N.E.2d at 1097; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(b)(1); Joynes v. Payne, 36 Va.App. 401, 551 S.E.2d 10, 23 (2001); seealso 3 Equitable Distrib. of Property 4 th § 10:27.5 (noting that most states with a statutory marital property presumption that do not explicitly provide for a standard of proof to rebut have held that a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient). [12] ¶17.

Thus, "clearly and convincingly" in this context means that the record must provide us with "a firm belief or conviction" that appellant's sentence was contrary to law. Hook v. Hook, 189 Ohio App.3d 440, 2010-Ohio-4165, 938 N.E.2d 1094, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.). {¶ 22} A sentence is not contrary to law where the trial court considers the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, along with the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12, and imposes a sentence within the statutory range.