Our approach herein is consistent with that we have taken in prior cases in which injured members of the motoring public have sought to recover from a negligent motor carrier's insurer despite some irregularity casting doubt on the existence or extent of coverage. See Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. Ramirez, 277 Ga. 392 (1) ( 588 SE2d 751) (2003) (insurer liable to injured third party despite fact that policy had lapsed prior to accident); DeHart, supra, 270 Ga. at 385 (2) (insurer liable to injured third party despite expiration of policy prior to accident); Ross, supra, 269 Ga. at 269 (insurer liable to injured third party despite fact that injuries were sustained in accident involving vehicle not listed in insured motor carrier's policy). In all these cases, the Court's rationale has hinged on the policy purpose of the Act to protect the motoring public.
Id. at 269. Cf.Progressive Preferred Insurance Company v. Ramirez, 277 Ga. 392, 395 (2003) (where policy, itself, covered vehicle in question, "the insured's liability to a third party injured by the insured is based on the policy itself as opposed to liability based on the minimum coverage imposed by law"). Based on the foregoing, the court finds here that the Progressive policy, itself, is not the source of coverage, but rather the Form F endorsement is. The court discusses below the amount of insurance coverage provided through that endorsement and the limitations of coverage discussed in the policy.
We thank that Court for promptly and thoroughly answering the questions. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia, Progressive Preferred Insurance Co. v. Ramirez, 277 Ga. 392, 588 S.E.2d 751 (Ga. 2003), the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
For instance, Georgia courts interpreting a similar motor carrier insurance cancellation provision have found that a person injured by a motor carrier can recover under the motor carrier's expired or cancelled insurance policy where the injury occurs before the insurer files a notice of termination with the Georgia Public Service Commission ("PSC"). See Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. Ramirez, 588 S.E.2d 751, 753-54 (Ga. 2003) (citing DeHart v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 509 S.E.2d 913 (Ga. 1998) ("Because the policy continued until the PSC received proper written notice of cancellation and Liberty Mutual did not file a Form K cancelling the policy with the commission before [plaintiff] was injured on May 28, 1988, . . . Liberty Mutual is liable to [plaintiff] based on the continuous coverage provision of the Georgia PSC regulations."); Smith v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 195 S.E.2d 205 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) ("[U]ntil proper notice is given to the [PSC], the policy is effective for the benefit of the public.")). The provision, Rule 1-8-1-.
When a Form E certificate of insurance filed with the state provides that an insurance company has issued its insured an insurance policy and the policy lapses before the incident giving rise to liability on the part of the insured, and before proper notice of the cancellation is given to the State, the policy remains in effect as to the injured third party. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. Ramirez, 277 Ga. 392 (2003) (answering certified question from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals). It is undisputed that Yarbrough did not register with the DMVS. While "[t]he failure to file any form required by the commission shall not diminish the rights of any person to pursue an action directly against a motor carrier's insurer," O.C.G.A. § 46-7-12(a), it is undisputed that if defendant had attempted to file a certificate of insurance on Yarbrough's behalf, the certificate would have been rejected and returned to defendant.
When a Form E certificate of insurance filed with the state provides that an insurance company has issued its insured an insurance policy and the policy lapses before the incident giving rise to liability on the part of the insured, and before proper notice of the cancellation is given to the State, the policy remains in effect as to the injured third party. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. Ramirez, 277 Ga. 392 (2003) (answering certified question from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals). It is undisputed that Yarbrough indicated to defendant that he had not made any filings for authority with the federal government or with any state government.
The term is usually given to a policy provision, like the pedestrian provision here, which limits coverage above the minimum statutory amount to the named insured and other specified individuals. SeePlitt, et al. § 110:21, at 110–42–43 (explaining that “a policy may validly exclude coverage with respect to permitees generally by limiting coverage to operation by a named insured or a member of his or her immediate family”); 7 am. Jur. 2d Automobile Insurance § 30 (2015) (observing that “an insurer and insured may limit the coverage provided under some parts of the policy to the statutory minimum required by the financial responsibility law”); see also Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. Ramirez, 277 Ga. 392, 588 S.E.2d 751, 754 (2003) (finding that a restriction on insurance coverage to the minimum statutory coverage “when the insurer's liability is based, not on the policy, but on the ‘applicable filing,’ ” was a “limitation,” not an “exclusion”); Dominguez v. Fin. Indem. Co., 183 Cal.App.4th 388, 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 739, 749 (2010) (classifying as a “coverage limitation” a policy provision “which provides that where coverage otherwise exceeds the minimum limits required by California's ‘Financial Responsibility Law,’ ‘then such amounts in excess of the minimum limits shall not apply to a loss where the operation, maintenance or use of your insured car is by a person other than you, a relative, and an agent or employee of you or a relative’ ”). Because this is a limitation that restricts coverage above the statutory limits for pedestrians to the named insureds and their relatives, and not an exclusion, we need not reach State Farm's argument that we should remand for further discovery on whether the provision is “cust