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Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Weyant

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Oct 6, 2003
309 A.D.2d 739 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)

Opinion

2002-06929, 2002-08581

Argued September 15, 2003.

October 6, 2003.

In an action for a judgment declaring that Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company is not obligated to indemnify or defend Jason McQuiston or Brenda Jones with respect to any litigation arising from a February 27, 1999, automobile accident (Action No. 1), and a related action to recover damages for personal injuries and wrongful death (Action No. 2), Susan Weyant, Eric Molina, Sheldon Spotard, and Barbara McDonald, defendants in Action No. 1 and the plaintiffs in Action No. 2, appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (McGuirk, J.), dated June 11, 2002, which granted the motion of the defendant Brenda Jones for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in Action No. 2 insofar as asserted against her and granted the separate motion of Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company for summary judgment in Action No. 1, and (2) a judgment of the same court entered July 31, 2002, which, in Action No. 1, inter alia, declared that Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company is not obligated to indemnify or defend Jason McQuiston in Action No. 2, and, in Action No. 2, dismissed the complaint in that action insofar as asserted against Brenda Jones.

Finkelstein Partners, LLP, Newburgh, N.Y. (George A. Kohl 2nd of counsel), for appellants.

Kaplan, Winkler, Buratti, Vitali, Burns Girolamo, White Plains, N.Y. (Kevin Burns of counsel), for respondent in Action No. 1.

Friedman, Hirschen, Miller Campito, P.C., Schenectady, N.Y. (John R. Polster of counsel), for respondent in Action No. 2.

Before: ANITA R. FLORIO, J.P., SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, STEPHEN G. CRANE, REINALDO E. RIVERA, JJ.


DECISION ORDER

ORDERED that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the order is vacated, and the motions are denied; and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the appellants.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the actions ( see Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment ( see CPLR 5501[a][1]).

In response to the prima facie showing by Brenda Jones that she had not, inter alia, granted Jason McQuiston permission to operate her car, the appellants showed the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether or not Jones had constructively consented thereto ( see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388; Murdza v. Zimmerman, 99 N.Y.2d 375; Leotta v. Plessinger, 8 N.Y.2d 449, 461; Lancer Ins. Co. v. Republic Franklin Ins. Co., 304 A.D.2d 794; Stewart v. Town of Hempstead, 204 A.D.2d 431). Accordingly, the respondents' motions for summary judgment should have been denied ( see generally Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320).

FLORIO, J.P., FEUERSTEIN, CRANE and RIVERA, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Weyant

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Oct 6, 2003
309 A.D.2d 739 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
Case details for

Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Weyant

Case Details

Full title:PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN INSURANCE COMPANY, respondent, v. SUSAN WEYANT…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Oct 6, 2003

Citations

309 A.D.2d 739 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
765 N.Y.S.2d 258

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