ΒΆ 18 Since the supreme court's decision in Hobbs , this court has had several occasions to consider whether insurance policies containing similar to identical antistacking clauses were ambiguous when compared to the declarations page of such policies. See Profitt v. OneBeacon Insurance , 363 Ill. App. 3d 959, 300 Ill.Dec. 826, 845 N.E.2d 715 (2006) ; Johnson v. Davis , 377 Ill. App. 3d 602, 318 Ill.Dec. 290, 883 N.E.2d 521 (2007) ; Cherry , 2018 IL App (5th) 170072, 419 Ill.Dec. 851, 94 N.E.3d 1265. In Profitt , this court considered whether an insurance company's inclusion
Nor is a provision ambiguous because the parties can suggest creative possibilities for its meaning. See Midway Park Saver v. Sarco Putty Co., 364 Ill.Dec. 500, 976 N.E.2d 1063, 1069 (Ill.App.Ct.2012) ( βThe reviewing court will not strain to find ambiguity where none exists, and disagreements as to the interpretation of a contract must be reasonable.β); Profitt v. OneBeacon Ins., 363 Ill.App.3d 959, 300 Ill.Dec. 826, 845 N.E.2d 715, 718β19 (2006) (noting that creative possibilities may be suggested, but only reasonable interpretations will be considered). Both Lincoln Benefit and Dr. Norem insist that the unambiguous language of the policy supports their respective positions.
Our primary objective in construing the language of an insurance policy is to determine and give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed by the words of the policy. Rich, 226 Ill. 2d at 371; Profitt v. OneBeacon Insurance, 363 Ill. App. 3d 959, 962, 845 N.E.2d 715 (2006). "If the words used in a policy are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning [citation], and the policy will be applied as written, unless it contravenes public policy."
Under Illinois law, the "primary objective in construing the language of an insurance policy is to determine and give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed by the words of the policy." Wolfensberger v. Eastwood, 889 N.E.2d 635, 637-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (citing Rich v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 875 N.E.2d 1082 (Ill. 2007), and Profitt v. OneBeacon Insurance, 845 N.E.2d 715 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)). "If the words used in a policy are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning, and the policy will be applied as written, unless it contravenes public policy." Rich, 875 N.E.2d at 1090 (citing Central Ill. Light Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 821 N.E.2d 206 (Ill. 2004), and Hobbs v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 823 N.E.2d 561 (Ill. 2005)).
We do not find that the duplication of the declarations pages under these circumstances created an ambiguity with respect to the stacking of coverage. Profitt v. OneBeacon Insurance, 363 Ill.App.3d 959, 963 (2006). ΒΆ 26 Cambron's argument that the policy is ambiguous because the $1 million limit of liability coverage was printed next to each covered vehicle listed in the "Schedule of Covered Autos You Own" is likewise unpersuasive.
In Estate of Goben, the court relied upon the Bruder decision and found that, because the UIM coverage was set forth two times, once for each covered vehicle, there were two possible interpretations of the policy, which required the policy to be strictly construed against the insurer, so that stacking was allowed. Estate of Goben, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 648-49; see also Profitt v. OneBeacon Insurance, 363 Ill. App. 3d 959, 963 (2006) (the existence of two declarations pages attached to the insurance policy did not raise an ambiguity entitling the insured to stack the limits of liability provided on those two pages because the second declaration page was included only to show that one vehicle had been added to the policy to replace another, and the liability limits were identical and not listed separately for each vehicle). Even in cases such as this, where the UIM coverage limits are listed only once but the premiums for that coverage are listed separately with each covered vehicle, courts have found no ambiguity that allows for stacking.
In Estate of Goben, the court relied upon the Bruder decision and found that, because the UIM coverage was set forth two times, once for each covered vehicle, there were two possible interpretations of the policy, which required the policy to be strictly construed against the insurer, so that stacking was allowed. Estate of Goben, 303 Ill.App.3d at 648-49, 236 Ill.Dec. 689, 707 N.E.2d 1259; see also Profitt v. OneBeacon Insurance, 363 Ill.App.3d 959, 963, 300 Ill.Dec. 826, 845 N.E.2d 715 (2006) (the existence of two declarations pages attached to the insurance policy did not raise an ambiguity entitling the insured to stack the limits of liability provided on those two pages because the second declaration page was included only to show that one vehicle had been added to the policy to replace another, and the liability limits were identical and not listed separately for each vehicle). Even in cases such as this, where the UIM coverage limits are listed only once but the premiums for that coverage are listed separately with each covered vehicle, courts have found no ambiguity that allows for stacking.