Opinion
Civ. No. 03-6174 (RHK/AJB)
March 26, 2004
Lee Seham, Stanley J. Silverstone, Seham, Seham, Meltz Petersen, LLP, New York, for Plaintiff
Karen L. Dingle, Seham, Seham, Meltz Petersen, LLP, Minnesota, for Plaintiff
Timothy R. Thornton, Briggs and Morgan, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Defendant
John J. Gallagher, Margaret H. Spurlin, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky Walker, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Introduction
In June 2003, the flight attendants of Northwest Airlines, Inc. ("NWA") elected the Professional Flight Attendants Association ("PFAA") to replace the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("Teamsters") as their collective bargaining representative. Prior to PFAA's election, NWA had deducted union dues and fees from flight attendants' pay, which it remitted to the Teamsters pursuant to the NWA-Teamsters collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). After PFAA became the flight attendants' representative, NWA refused to deduct the dues and fees, relying upon a "drop dead" provision of the CBA which provides that this procedure was in effect only so long as the Teamsters was the collective bargaining representative. PFAA then sued. Presently before the Court is NWA's Motion to Dismiss and PFAA's Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, for a Preliminary Injunction. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant NWA's motion and deny PFAA's.
Background
Since June 20, 2003, PFAA has been the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the NWA flight attendants. (Meek Decl. ¶ 2.) Prior to the PFAA, the flight attendants were represented by the Teamsters. (Id. ¶ 3.) The Teamsters and NWA entered into the CBA, which became effective June 1, 2000, covering the NWA flight attendants. (Showers Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. A (CBA).)
Section 24 of the CBA contains the Union Shop and Dues Check-Off provisions. (Id. Ex. A (CBA § 24).) The Union Shop provision requires each flight attendant, as a condition of continued employment, to become a member of the union and pay dues. (Id. Ex. A (CBA § 24(A)(1)).) The Dues Check-Off provision requires NWA to deduct membership dues and initiation fees from the pay of flight attendants who are members of the union, in accordance with the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") and the union's constitution and bylaws, provided that the flight attendant voluntarily executes a "Check-Off" form. (Id. Ex. A. (CBA § 24(B)(1)).) The Check-Off form is entitled "TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 2000, ASSIGNMENT AND AUTHORIZATION FOR CHECK-OFF, UNION DUES AND INITIATION FEES," and states that by signing the flight attendant "pledge[s] my honor to faithfully observe the Constitution and laws of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters." (Id.) The Union Shop and Dues Check-Off section concludes with a so-called "drop dead" provision: "This section shall be in force only so long as the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Airline Division, continues as the recognized bargaining representative of the Company's Flight Attendants." (Id. Ex. A (CBA § 24(C)(3)).)
Virtually identical language has been in the NWA flight attendant agreement since 1961, during which time four unions have represented the flight attendants: the Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association, the Air Line Pilots Association, the Teamsters, and PFAA. (Showers Decl. ¶ 6.)
Section 27 contains the CBA's grievance procedures. (Id. Ex. B (CBA § 27).) For contract grievances, the CBA provides for an investigation, an internal appeals process, and a further appeal to the system board of adjustment. (Id. Ex. B (CBA § 27(A)(1)-(5)).) Section 28 provides for the system board of adjustment, in compliance with RLA § 204, 45 U.S.C. § 184. (Id. Ex. B (CBA § 28).) The system board of adjustment consists of three members-one appointed by NWA, one appointed by the union, and one neutral member-and has "jurisdiction over disputes between any Flight Attendant covered by this Agreement and the Company growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of any terms of this Agreement." (Id. Ex. B (CBA § 28(B), (D)).)
In 2002-03, PFAA began a campaign to replace the Teamsters as the flight attendants' representative. An election was set for June 19, 2003. On June 6, 2003, nearly two weeks before the election, PFAA's Executive Administrator, Kevin F. McCormick, wrote to NWA's Senior Vice President, Robert A. Brodin, requesting a meeting and soliciting comments on PFAA's proposed Dues Check-Off Form. (Showers Decl. Ex. C.) PFAA's letter to Brodin states, in pertinent part:
In anticipation of a successful result of the vote count on June 19, 2003, the Interim Executive Board would like to request a meeting with you for Monday June 23, 2003 at your offices. The primary agenda item is the orderly transfer of union business to PFAA. . . .
Attached is a draft of PFAA's Dues Check Off Form that we will be distributing to the membership after our certification. We are sending this to you in advance in the event you have any comments prior to our having them printed.
Please advise if the date for a meeting would be acceptable to you and any comments you may have on the Dues Check Off Form.
(Id.)
On June 11, 2003, NWA's Vice President of Labor Relations-Flight, Julie Hagen Showers, responded that scheduling a meeting prior to election was premature and advised PFAA that the CBA's Union Shop and Dues Check-Off provisions would not be in effect should the Teamsters not be the flight attendants' representative. (Id. ¶ 8, Ex. D.) NWA's letter to McCormick states, in pertinent part:
Senior Vice President Robert Brodin has asked me to reply to your letter of June 6, 2003, requesting a meeting with the Company on June 23, 2003.
First, while we will be happy to meet with the PFAA and its representatives if elected, it is premature to schedule those meetings before the election results are known. Should the PFAA be successful in the representation election, we will make every effort to schedule the requested meeting on an expedited basis. Second, I received the Dues Check Off Form attached to your letter, along with your representation that it would be distributed to Northwest Flight Attendants "after [the PFAA's] certification." In this regard, please be aware that Section 24.C. of the Flight Attendant Agreement (Union Shop and Dues Check-Off) provides as follows:
This section shall be in force only so long as the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Airline Division, continues as the recognized representative of the Company's Flight Attendants.
In the event the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Airline Division is no longer the recognized representative of Northwest Flight Attendants, there would be no Union Shop and Dues Check-Off provisions in the Agreement.
(Id. Ex. D.)
NWA's June 11, 2003 letter was copied to a Teamsters representative, Mollie Reiley. (See id.) The Teamsters posted NWA's letter on its website and used the prospect of losing the Union Shop and Dues Check-Off provisions in its campaign against PFAA. (Meek Decl. ¶ 18, Ex. E.)
After PFAA's certification, the Teamsters posted a statement on its website under the heading, "Dues-What Are Your Rights?," stating, in pertinent part:
Many Northwest Flight Attendants have called or emailed asking for clarification about the legal status of the PFAA's claim that you must now pay dues to their organization. As we stated frequently during the election period, the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the Teamsters and Northwest Airlines regarding Union Security and Dues Check Off were specific to the Teamsters and did not carry over to PFAA. FACT: There is no longer a union shop at Northwest Airlines for Flight Attendants.
(Meek Decl. ¶ 21, Ex. G.)
The June 19, 2003 election resulted in a victory for PFAA, and on June 20, 2003 the National Mediation Board ("NMB") certified PFAA as the designated and authorized representative of the NWA flight attendants under the RLA. (Meek Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. F.)
On June 23, 2003, PFAA and NWA met to discuss the transition from Teamsters to PFAA. (Showers Decl. ¶ 9; Meek Decl. ¶ 25.) At the meeting, PFAA requested that NWA withhold dues and fees from the flight attendants' pay; NWA refused, citing the so-called "drop-dead" provision of the CBA-Section 24(C)(3). (Showers Decl. ¶ 9; see Meek Decl. 125.)
On July 14, 2003, PFAA initiated this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California; the suit was then transferred to this Court on November 17, 2003 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may move to dismiss a pleading for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Such a motion may challenge the sufficiency of the pleading on its face or may challenge the factual truthfulness of its averments.See Titus v. Sullivan 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993);Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1990). Whether a Rule 12(b)(1) motion presents a "factual challenge" to subject matter jurisdiction depends not on whether the movant has submitted matters outside the pleading for the district court's consideration, but rather on whether the district court must inquire into and resolve factual disputes. See Faibisch v. University of Mina, 304 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2002). In a factual challenge, the court considers matters outside the pleadings. Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n. 6. "Jurisdictional issues, whether they involve questions of law or fact, are for the court to decide." Id. "[T]he trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Id. at 730,quoted in Faibisch, 304 F.3d at 801. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Osborn, 918 F.2d at 730.
Analysis
Two motions are now before the Court: (1) NWA's Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss; and (2) PFAA's Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, for a Preliminary Injunction. The Court will begin with the motion to dismiss.
Congress' purpose in enacting the RLA, extended in 1936 to cover the airline industry, was to promote stability in union-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes.Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248, 252 (1994); see 45 U.S.C. § 151a, 181-88. The RLA divides labor disputes into two categories-major and minor. Major disputes relate to the formation of collective bargaining agreements or efforts to secure them. Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 252. Minor disputes involve controversies over the meaning of existing collective bargaining agreements in a particular fact situation. Id. at 253. "Thus, major disputes seek to create contractual rights, minor disputes to enforce them." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
The terms "major" or "minor" dispute do not appear in the RLA itself; they are judicially-created nomenclature for the statutory categories. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'nv. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 893 F.2d 199, 202 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1990).
To classify a dispute as major or minor, the Supreme Court has summarized the test as follows: "Where an employer asserts a contractual right to take the contested action, the ensuing dispute is minor if the action is arguably justified by the terms of the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. Where, in contrast, the employer's claims are frivolous or obviously insubstantial, the dispute is major."Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 307 (1989); see Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 893 F.2d 199, 203-04 (8th Cir. 1990). If a dispute is minor, it must be resolved through the RLA mechanisms, including the carrier's internal dispute-resolution processes and a system board of adjustment established by the employer and the union.Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 253; Jenisio v. Ozark Airlines, Inc. Retirement Plan for Agent and Clerical Employees, 187 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1999); see 45 U.S.C. § 184. The system board of adjustment "has mandatory, exclusive, and comprehensive jurisdiction over minor disputes, and the remedies provided by the [b]oard are the complete and final means for settling minor disputes."Jenisio, 187 F.3d at 973 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
NWA argues that PFAA's Complaint must be dismissed because this matter is a "minor" dispute regarding the interpretation of the CBA and therefore subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of arbitration before the system board of adjustment. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 1-2, 8-11.) PFAA responds that NWA's failure to honor the Union Shop and Dues Check-Off provisions presents a "major" dispute subject to this Court's jurisdiction. (Pl's Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 2-8.)
This case is controlled by Int'l Ass'n of Machinists Aerospace Workers. AFL-CIO (JAM) v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 843 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 854 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1988) (hereinafter, "IAM v. Northwest"). In IAM v. Northwest, the Eighth Circuit determined that a dispute over a nearly identical "drop dead" provision constituted a minor dispute. 843 F.2d at 1122. NWA had refused to honor union shop and dues check off provisions and argued that they "dropped dead" and were not binding after the union had been replaced. Id. at 1121. The successor union sued, seeking to require NWA to honor the provisions. Id. Finding a "clear example of a minor dispute," the court found NWA's argument "plausible, and in any event not frivolous or obviously insubstantial." Id. at 1122, 1123. Because the union shop and dues check off provisions were "purely a creature of contract," it was improper "for a federal court to disrupt the collective bargaining process by issuing a status quo injunction artificially extending a contractual right." Id. at 1123.
One of the two "drop dead" provisions involved in that case stated: "This article shall be in force only so long as the Union continues as the recognized representative of the employees under this Agreement." IAM v. Northwest, 843 F.2d at 1121 (quoting CBA at issue). The CBA specifically defined the "Union" as the entity that had previously represented the employees and negotiated the CBA.Id.
The court further reasoned that because the "drop dead" provision was "nothing more than a durational clause," it would be an impermissible restriction on the parties' ability to contract if it were "[t]o hold that any durational clause embodied in a collective bargaining agreement [was] inoperable as a matter of law." Id. at 1123.
The present case is a mirror-image of IAM v. Northwest. NWA asserts a contractual right under Section 24(C)(3) to refuse to deduct union dues and fees from the flight attendants' pay because PFAA has replaced the Teamsters as the recognized bargaining representative. Section 24(C)(3) of the CBA states: "This section [Union Shop and Dues Check Off] shall be in force only so long as the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Airline Division, continues as the recognized bargaining representative of the Company's Flight Attendants." (Showers Decl. Ex. A (CBA § 24(C)(3)).) NWA's argument is justified by the plain language of the CBA and is neither frivolous nor obviously insubstantial. IAM v. Northwest, 843 F.2d at 1123; see Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 307. NWA is not seeking to create contractual rights; rather, it is attempting to enforce them. Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 252. Although PFAA stresses that the majority's analysis in IAM v. Northwest was incorrect, and that this Court should adopt the dissent's position in that case (Pl's Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 4-8), it almost goes without saying that this Court is bound by the majority opinion. In relying so heavily upon the dissent, PFAA highlights that IAM v. Northwest is on all fours with this case. Furthermore, PFAA does not suggest that anything has occurred subsequent to that decision that would cause the Eighth Circuit to change course. This matter therefore presents a minor dispute and is within the mandatory, exclusive, and comprehensive jurisdiction of the system board of adjustment. Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 253; IAM v. Northwest, 843 F.2d at 1123; Jenisio, 187 F.3d at 973.
PFAA's remaining arguments are unavailing. First, it asserts that NWA's failure to honor the Union Shop and Dues Check Off provisions violates the NMB's longstanding position that a change in union representation does not alter or cancel any existing agreement made on behalf of the employees by their previous representatives. (Pl's Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) This argument, however, was rejected in IAM v. Northwest. The court did
not believe that giving effect to the "drop dead" clause violates the principles announced by the NMB. Giving effect to the "drop dead" clause will honor the CBA as negotiated by the prior representative with the clause left intact. For us to accept [the successor union's] argument in support of excising the "drop dead" clause, however, would violate these principles announced by the NMB.IAM v. Northwest, 843 F.2d at 1123 n. 5.
Second, PFAA argues that NWA's conduct violates the status quo provisions of the RLA. (Pl's Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 3-4, 7-9.) The court disagrees. "[O]nce the court finds that an employer's actions are arguably justified under the terms of existing agreements, the status quo issue is mooted." Bhd. Ry. Carmen of the U.S. Canada, Div. of Transp. Communications Union v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 944 F.2d 1422, 1428 (8th Cir. 1991) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 303-04 ("A minor dispute . . . is subject to compulsory and binding arbitration before the [adjustment board]. . . . [T]his Court never has recognized a general statutory obligation on the part of an employer to maintain the status quo pending the [board's] decision."); Sheet Metal Workers', 893 F.2d at 202 ("If the dispute between a carrier and its employees is characterized as minor . . . the carrier is not required to maintain the status quo."); Chicago N.W. Transp. Co. v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 908 F.2d 144, 151 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) ("A union cannot freeze the status quo by demanding negotiations over something that the carrier is entitled to do unilaterally either because the collective bargaining agreement authorizes the carrier to do it or because it is within the carrier's `management prerogatives'. . . .") (quoted in Bhd. Ry. Carmen. 944 F.2d at 1428).
Finally, PFAA argues that NWA's motion should be denied because NWA has interfered with the flight attendants' choice of representatives by copying its June 11, 2003 letter to the Teamsters and by refusing to deduct dues and fees, in violation of 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third and Fourth. (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 10-11.)
Section 152, Third provides that "neither party shall in any way interfere with, influence, or coerce the other in its choice of representatives." 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third. Section 152, Fourth states that it is "unlawful for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees . . . or to influence or coerce employees in an effort to induce them to join or remain or not to join or remain members of any labor organization." Id. § 152, Fourth.
"[J]udicial intervention in RLA procedures [is] limited to those cases where `but for the general jurisdiction of the federal courts there would be no remedy to enforce the statutory commands which Congress had written into the Railway Labor Act.'" Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 440 (1989) (interpreting the 1934 amendments to the RLA, which included Paragraphs Third and Fourth) (citations omitted) (hereinafter, "TWA v. IFFA")): see Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 26 F.3d 787, 795 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Paragraphs Third and Fourth of § 2 are part of the 1934 amendments to the RLA. . . ."). Thus, "jurisdiction over RLA violations is quite narrow" and courts are reluctant to expand their jurisdiction under the RLA. Bhd. of Ry., Airline Steamship Clerks. Freight Handlers. Express Station Employees v. Atchison. Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 847 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing cases) (hereinafter, "Atchisori"). InAtchison, the Seventh Circuit observed that
[t]he courts' reluctance to expand their jurisdiction is particularly well founded where, as here, the employer argues that its actions are allowed by a collective bargaining agreement. When an employer-carrier answers a charge that it has violated the RLA by preferring a defense of contractual justification, a court must address the merits of the dispute to determine jurisdiction. . . . Answering the question of jurisdiction therefore requires the court to interpret the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Because the RLA confers that duty on the [adjustment board], we hesitate to intrude unless action by a federal court is clearly required.Id. (citations omitted).
Here, the present dispute is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the system board of adjustment. It is therefore not a case where "but for the . . . federal courts there would be no remedy," which would warrant judicial interference. NWA v. IFFA, 489 U.S. at 441;Atchison, 847 F.2d at 409. This is especially true here where NWA's alleged interference was its interpretation of the CBA-an interpretation that came at PFAA's request. That NWA also communicated its interpretation to the Teamsters does not strike the Court as the type of interference, influence, or coercion that the RLA prohibits. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Transamerica Airlines, Inc., 817 F.2d 510, 515 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding actionable interference where airline sought to establish a nonunion replacement subsidiary in order to transfer to it work being performed by an existing subsidiary that was unionized and bound by an existing CBA); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers. AFL-CIO v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 892, 896 (D.D.C. 1990) (finding actionable coercion where air carrier mailed a poll to flight attendants requesting that they indicate whether they wanted to be represented by the certified union);Adams v. Fed. Express Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1356, 1362-63 (W.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd 654 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding actionable interference where employees were transferred or discharged for not removing union buttons). PFAA has cited no case law holding justifiable contractual interpretations to be actionable interference, influence, or coercion.
PFAA's reliance on Tenet Healthsvstem Hosps., Inc., 2002 NLRB LEXIS 517 (Oct. 16, 2002) is misplaced. (Pl's Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. at 17, as adopted by reference in Pl's Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 11.) In Tenet, the National Labor Relations Board was called upon to determine whether an employer's statements made during an employee meeting were coercive and in violation of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 2002 NLRB LEXIS 517, at *29. The NLRA, however, "cannot be imported wholesale into the railway labor arena. Even rough analogies must be drawn circumspectly with due regard for the many differences between the statutory schemes." TWA v. IFFA, 489 U.S. at 439 (citation and internal quotations omitted). The facts in the instant case, and the differences in the RLA's resolution of minor disputes and RLA case law regarding actionable coercion, counsel against an analogy to Tenet.
PFAA also relies upon Pan Am. World Airways. Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 275 F. Supp. 986, 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 404 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1969), for the proposition that "[a]ny conduct on the part of the carrier, however motivated, which tends to enhance or detract from the prestige of one of the competing organizations may constitute `influence' if not `interference' or `coercion.'" (Pl's Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. at 19, as adopted by reference in Pl's Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 11.)Pan Am is factually distinguishable. The issue there was whether the RLA prohibited the airline from negotiating with one union while proceedings were pending before the NMB to determine which of two unions would represent the employees. Pan Am, 275 F. Supp. at 989, 998. The present matter presents issues not contemplated by thePan Am court.
It is clear that the primary acts PFAA complains of "lie at the very heart of the contractual interpretation dispute to be referred to the Adjustment Board. It is therefore doubtful that this Court has the jurisdiction to issue the relief requested." Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters. Chauffeurs. Warehousemen and Helpers of Am. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 609, 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (footnote and citations omitted). In fact, "[i]t would be an all too easy evasion of the major purpose of the RLA-to keep federal courts out of certain labor related contract disputes-by simply adding a claim" that NWA's CBA interpretation, and its communication of that interpretation to the Teamsters, unlawfully interfered with the flight attendants' choice of representation. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Delta Airlines, Inc., Civ. No. 99-2351, 1999 WL 684169, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 1999).
Although PFAA also alleges that NWA's conduct "undermines the functioning of [the] PFAA" (Pl's Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 11 (citing Local Union No. 2000. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 21 F. Supp.2d 751, 756 n. 6 (E.D. Mich. 1998)), the Eighth Circuit has observed that "the RLA was not enacted to ensure the continued financial stability of any union, and the law does not purport to guarantee a particular level of member support," Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 26 F.3d at 794. This is particularly evident here because Union Shop and Dues Check Off provisions are "purely a creature of contract." IAM v. Northwest, 843 F.2d at 1123; see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 809 F.2d 483, 491 (8th Cir. 1987).
The Local Union No. 2000 court stated that, "[C]ourts should not exercise jurisdiction over post-certification disputes absent a showing of anti-union animus or the presence of circumstances that significantly undermine the functioning of the union." Local Union No. 2000. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 21 F. Supp.2d 751, 756 n. 6 (E.D. Mich. 1998). Without determining whether this is an accurate statement of the law in this Circuit, the Court notes that PFAA alleges only that NWA has undermined its functioning, and does not allege, nor provided any evidence of, NWA's anti-union animus. See also Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 26 F.3d at 795 ("[I]n a postcertification case, . . no cause of action lies under § 2 Third [or Fourth] when the complaining party fails to present adequate evidence that [the airline's] actions have been motivated by anti-union animus or that [the airline's] actions were an attempt to interfere with its employees' choice of their collective bargaining representative. . . . Moreover, [the union's] argument that [the employer] is favoring one union over another belies any suggestion that [the employer] harbors hostility toward unions in general.) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Grouping all of its arguments together, PFAA also argues in its motion for summary judgment that the "drop dead" provision is void as contrary to public policy because it: (1) "violates the ["NMB's"] well-defined principle of contractual continuity," (2) violates "the RLA's status quo requirements," (3) "changes the terms and conditions" of the CBA, and (4) "influence[s]" employees to join or not to join the union. (Pl's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 15-16.) Although PFAA did not raise this argument, or adopt it by reference, in response to NWA's motion to dismiss, out of an abundance of caution the Court addresses and rejects this argument for the reasons previously stated. Although CBAs, as with any contracts, cannot be enforced if contrary to public policy, "[s]uch a public policy . . . must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests." W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (citation and internal quotations omitted). PFAA has shown no "well defined and dominant" public policy contrary to the "drop dead" provision.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendant NWA's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 50) is GRANTED and Plaintiff PFAA's Complaint (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
2. Plaintiff PFAA's Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 52) is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.