Opinion
3:23-cv-01195-HZ
02-12-2024
EMILY PRODAN, an individual, JACLYN O. RISEN, an individual, JILL BABCOCK, an individual, and NICOLE M. HUNTER, an individual. Plaintiffs, v. LEGACY HEALTH, A Public Benefit Corporation, and DOES 1 THROUGH 50, Inclusive. Defendants.
Ray D. Hacke Attorneys for Plaintiffs Brenda K. Baumgart Megan S. Bradford Stoel Rives LLP Attorneys for Defendants
Ray D. Hacke
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Brenda K. Baumgart
Megan S. Bradford
Stoel Rives LLP
Attorneys for Defendants
OPINION AND ORDER
MARCO A. HERNÁNDEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiffs bring religious discrimination claims against their former employer, Defendant Legacy Health, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030. Defendant moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the claims of Plaintiffs Nicole M. Hunter and Emily Prodan for failure to state a claim for relief. The Court denies Defendant's motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant Legacy Health. Compl. ¶¶ 1, ECF 1. As relevant to this motion,Defendant hired Plaintiff Prodan in 2008 and she worked as a floor nurse, charge nurse, and clinical nurse educator at Randall Children's Hospital and Legacy Emanuel Medical Center in Portland, Oregon. Id. ¶ 2. Defendant hired Plaintiff Hunter in 2011 as a surgical technician at Legacy Emanuel Medical Center. Id. ¶ 5.
Defendant does not move to dismiss the claims by Plaintiffs Risen and Babcock. Def. Mot. 3 n. 1, ECF 11. Accordingly, the Court confines its background discussion to the plaintiffs at issue in this motion.
In August 2021, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Oregon Health Authority issued a mandate that healthcare workers become vaccinated against COVID-19. Id. ¶ 14; see also Or. Admin. R. (“OAR”) 333-019-1010. The rule provided that “[h]ealth care providers and healthcare staff may not work, learn, study, assist, observe, or volunteer in a healthcare setting unless they are fully vaccinated or have provided documentation of a medical or religious exception.” OAR 333-019-1010(3)(a). Employers who granted religious exceptions to the vaccine mandate “must take reasonable steps to ensure that unvaccinated healthcare providers and healthcare staff are protected from contracting and spreading COVID-19.” OAR 333-0191010(4). In compliance with that mandate, Defendant required all employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by September 20, 2021, but allowed employees to seek religious or medical exemptions. Compl. ¶¶ 16-17. Prior to the vaccine mandate, Plaintiffs had continued to work in their positions during pandemic while taking precautions including “masking, social distancing, temperature checks, limiting visitors, and regular cleaning.” Id. ¶ 26.
Plaintiffs Prodan and Hunter submitted religious exemption requests. Compl. Ex. B. Plaintiff Prodan's request noted a belief that her “body is a temple of God,” citing the Bible. Compl. Ex. B. She added that “[i]f a substance violates my conscience and I partake of that substance, it is sin to me,” and expressed a conviction that the COVID-19 vaccine violates her conscience. Id. Plaintiff alleges that her request included a letter from her pastor Josh Howeth which states that while some “that hold to faith in God find these vaccines to be morally acceptable, many other members of our church and others understand that taking these vaccines would be an affront to Biblical teaching that God values all of life and that condoning abortion in any way is a horrible sin.” Compl. ¶ 31. Although the Complaint notes that the letter from Pastor Howeth is attached as an exhibit, Plaintiff omitted the letter from the exhibit. Pl. Opp. 4 n. 3, ECF 12. In its reply in support of its motion to dismiss, Defendant asks the Court to incorporate a copy of what it represents is the letter by reference. The letter Defendant offers does not contain the abortion-related language referenced in the Complaint, instead stating more broadly that “as a Christian,” “you are commanded to not allow anything to enter your body that violates your conscience.” Bradford Decl. Ex. 1, ECF 14. The letter is unsigned and contains no reference to a pastor Howeth. Id.
Plaintiff Hunter's religious exemption request cites several portions of the Bible pertaining to a belief that the “body is a temple of the Holy Spirit” and stating Plaintiff Hunter's belief that God constructed the human body “to do amazing things, with the ability to heal ourselves with our precious immune system.” Compl. Ex. B. She notes that she has never taken a flu shot and “do[es] not believe injecting yourself with harmful chemicals and unknown substances is honoring our temples.” Id.
Plaintiffs' religious exemption requests were denied. Compl. ¶ 37. Plaintiffs were presented with three options: “(1) Receive a COVID-19 vaccine, and thereby violate their sincerely held religious beliefs as a condition of remaining employed; (2) take no action and be placed on unpaid administrative leave on October 1, 2021, with termination following on October 19, 2021; or (3) provide written resignation to their supervisor.” Id. ¶ 45. Plaintiffs chose the second option and were terminated on October 19, 2021. Id. ¶ 46.
STANDARDS
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the claims. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the court must accept all material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) will be granted if a plaintiff alleges the “grounds” of their “entitlement to relief” with nothing “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)[.]” Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In other words, a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief and contain “well-pleaded facts” that “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct[.]” Id. at 679.
DISCUSSION
Defendant Legacy moves to dismiss the claims by Plaintiffs Prodan and Hunter on the basis that they have failed to state plausible claims for religious discrimination under Title VII and Oregon law.
To establish religious discrimination under Title VII based on a failure to accommodate theory, a plaintiff must plead that: (1) she had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicts with an employment duty; (2) she informed her employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer discharged her because of her inability to fulfill the job requirement. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 606 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs' state-law claims are analyzed the same way. See Pullom v. U.S. Bakery, 477 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1100 (D. Or. 2007) (“Because O.R.S. 659A.030 is modeled after Title VII, plaintiff's state law discrimination claim can be analyzed together with her federal discrimination claim.”) (citing Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1437 n. 2 (9th Cir.1993); Winnett v. City of Portland, 118 Or.App. 437, 847 P.2d 902, 905 (1993)). Defendant's motion to dismiss argues that Plaintiffs fail to plead facts sufficient to establish the first element.
With regard to establishing a bona fide religious belief in conflict with an employment duty, “[a] religious belief need not be consistent or rational to be protected under Title VII, and an assertion of a sincere religious belief is generally accepted.” Keene v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 22-16567, 2023 WL 3451687, at *2 (9th Cir. May 15, 2023) (citing Thomas v. Rev. Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)). Indeed, the court may not “question the legitimacy of [an individual's] religious beliefs regarding COVID-19 vaccinations.” Doe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 19 F.4th 1173, 1176 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado C.R. Comm'n, 138 S.Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018)). While the burden to allege a conflict between religious beliefs and an employment duty is “minimal,” courts need not “take plaintiffs' conclusory assertions of violations of their religious beliefs at face value.” Bolden-Hardge v. Off. of California State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2023). In addition, the court must distinguish between conflicts that are “rooted in religious belief” as opposed to ones based on “‘purely secular' philosophical concerns.” Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965)).
In support of Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs fail to plead a bona fide religious belief in conflict with its COVID-19 vaccine mandate, Defendants cite to numerous cases inside and outside of this district which have addressed the question of what allegations are sufficient to establish a sincere religious belief in conflict with an employment duty in the context of religious exemptions to COVID-19 vaccine and testing mandates. In reviewing the case law, the Court notes that these cases generally fall into three categories: (1) those in which plaintiffs merely allege a general statement of religious conflict without identifying a conflicting belief; (2) those in which plaintiffs allege a religious belief coupled with a secular objection; and (3) those in which plaintiffs allege a religious belief and a general statement that acquiring the vaccine is in conflict with that belief.
In the first category of cases, courts appear to be in agreement that a general allegation of religious conflict without identifying a conflicting belief is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. For example, in Kather v. Asante Health Sys., No. 1:22-CV-01842-MC, 2023 WL 4865533, at *5 (D. Or. July 28, 2023), several plaintiffs alleged that the defendant “exalts itself in purporting to place an unbeliever in a position to judge the Word of God, it is blasphemy, satanic, sinful, untruth, and insultive [sic] trespass.” Judge McShane concluded that “this allegation only generally emotes religious opposition to Defendant's authority to mandate vaccines” and that the plaintiffs “allege facts that hint at religious beliefs but do not specify how those beliefs conflict with receiving a COVID-19 vaccine.” Id. Accordingly, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to sufficiently allege religious beliefs in conflict with obtaining the mandated COVID-19 vaccine. Other courts have concluded the same when evaluating similar allegations. See, e.g., Stephens v. Legacy-GoHealth Urgent Care, No. 3:23-CV-00206-SB, 2023 WL 7612395 (D. Or. Oct. 23, 2023) (general allegation that the plaintiff was a “devout Christian” and “did not believe it was consistent with her faith to take the vaccine” insufficient), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Stephens v. Legacy Health, No. 3:23-CV-00206-SB, 2023 WL 7623865 (D. Or. Nov. 14, 2023).
In the second category of cases, many courts have held that allegations of a religious belief coupled with a secular objection fails to plead a bona fide religious belief in conflict with an employment duty because the objection itself is secular. For example, in this district, Judge Russo dismissed a claim by a plaintiff who alleged that she had a Christian belief that her body was a “temple of God” and that COVID-19 antigen testing requirements conflicted with that belief because she believed the test was “dipped in ethylene oxide,” a “carcinogenic substance.” Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Med. Ctr., No. 3:22-CV-01306-JR, 2023 WL 7221458, at *6 (D. Or. Sept. 13, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:22-CV-01306-JR, 2023 WL 7220734 (D. Or. Nov. 2, 2023). Judge Russo explained that “the Court readily accepts that plaintiff ‘has a bona fide religious belief that that her body is a temple of the Holy Spirit' -however, plaintiff's specific determination of what is harmful (i.e., ethylene oxide) was not, in this case, premised on the Bible or any other religious tenet or teaching, but rather on her research-based scientific/medical judgments.” Id. at 6. In other words, because it was clear from the complaint that the plaintiff's belief about the harmfulness of the antigen testing was a secular one rather than a religious one, the plaintiff's objection and allegations of a conflict with her employment duties was not fundamentally religious in nature. See also, e.g. Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., No. 22-CV-287-JDP, 2023 WL 2455681, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 10, 2023) (“Because the pleadings show that [some of the plaintiffs'] objections to the COVID vaccine are medical, not religious, their claims will be dismissed with prejudice”).
As to the final category of cases this Court has reviewed, there appears to be disagreement among courts addressing motions to dismiss when plaintiffs allege a religious belief and a statement that obtaining the COVID-19 vaccine conflicts with that belief. For example, in Kather, one of the plaintiffs alleged that “Satan is at work with the whole forceful COVID-19 mandate” and that she had the “God-given right to refuse a vaccination that goes against everything [she] believe[s] in.” 2023 WL 4865533, at *5 (alterations in original). Judge McShane explained that “[d]espite not articulating her religious conflict with great clarity and precision, it can be inferred that [the plaintiff's] religious-based hostility toward the COVID-19 mandate informs a religious opposition to receiving a COVID-19 vaccine.” Id. Judge McShane denied the defendant's motion to dismiss that plaintiff's claim, finding it sufficient to satisfy the “minimal burden” to allege a religious-based employment conflict. Id. Other courts in the Ninth Circuit have done the same when evaluating similar allegations. See, e.g. Thompson v. Asante Health Sys., No. 1:23-CV-00486-CL, 2023 WL 7348812, at *5 (D. Or. Sept. 21, 2023) (allegation that the plaintiff's “body is sacred” and that “Buddhist mantras guide me in choosing what is best for me, reinforcing my belief that the vaccine is not suitable for me at this time” sufficient to state a claim), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-00486-CL, 2023 WL 7326496 (D. Or. Nov. 7, 2023); Rolovich v. Washington State Univ., No. 2:22-CV-0319-TOR, 2023 WL 3733894, at *3 (E.D. Wash. May 30, 2023) (allegations that the plaintiff's “study of the Bible, personal prayer, ... advice from a Catholic priest, and the teachings of the Church ... precluded him from receiving any available COVID-19 vaccine” sufficient to survive motion to dismiss); Camp v. L.A. Arena Co., LLC, No. EDCV222220JGBKKX, 2023 WL 4680797, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2023) (Plaintiff's allegation that his body is a “temple of the Holy Spirit” and that it was “against his religion to ingest or inject his body with possible harmful substances” sufficient to plead a bona fide religious belief for purposes of a failure to accommodate claim).
However, other courts have held that similar allegations are insufficient to state a claim. For example, in Ruscitti v. Legacy Health, the plaintiff alleged that “[a]s a devout Christian, [she] had serious objections to taking the vaccine because it would constitute violating her bodily integrity and tainting the purity of her body.” No. 3:23-CV-00787-JR, 2023 WL 8007620, at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 27, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:23-CV-00787-JR, 2023 WL 8006269 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2023). The court there reasoned that plaintiff's claim of a religious conflict was conclusory and failed to allege a religious opposition. Id. at *3. Other courts have held similarly. See, e.g. Trinh v. Shriners Hosps. for Child., No. 3:22-CV-01999-SB, 2023 WL 7525228, at *10 (D. Or. Oct. 23, 2023) (allegations that plaintiff's Christian and Buddhist beliefs in “bodily integrity” and “purity” insufficient to state a claim), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:22-CV-01999-SB, 2023 WL 7521441 (D. Or. Nov. 13, 2023); Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc., No. CV 23-11171-JCB, 2023 WL 7116739, at *4 (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 2023) (allegation that “what God has created is perfect” and that the vaccine would “defil[e] [the plaintiff's] perfectly created body” insufficient to state a claim).
As to this third category of cases, the Court agrees with those courts which have found allegations of an allegedly religious belief coupled with an assertion that the COVID-19 vaccine conflicts with that belief is enough to plead a prima facie case of religious discrimination. Such allegations are enough to “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” and is more than a “threadbare recital[] of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. Finding such allegations sufficient to state a claim is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's directive that the burden to plead this element is “minimal,” Bolden-Hardge, 63 F.4th at 1223, and the Supreme Court's warning in the Free Exercise context that “the resolution of [what is a ‘religious' belief] is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question.” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714. Accordingly, when a plaintiff alleges a religious belief-and alleges that complying with a COVID-19 vaccine mandate conflicts with that belief-that is enough to meet the minimal burden of pleading a bona fide religious belief in conflict with an employment duty.
Applying the above framework here, the Court finds that both Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to plead a bona fide religious belief in conflict with an employment duty. Plaintiffs' allegations are similar to those in the third category of cases illustrated above. Both Plaintiff Hunter and Prodan identify a religious belief-that the body is a “temple” of “God” or “the Holy Spirit”-and allege that obtaining the COVID-19 vaccine violates that belief. In that circumstance, for the reasons discussed above, the Court finds the allegations sufficient to state a claim.
Although the Court finds that Plaintiff Prodan's body-as-a-temple allegations are sufficient on their own, her allegations regarding her pastor's elaboration of the alleged belief as stemming from an objection to abortion provides further support for her claim. While Defendant seeks to undermine this allegation by asking the Court to incorporate a contradictory letter by reference, the Court declines to do so. Incorporation by reference is appropriate where “(1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff's claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion.” Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). Defendant did not include the letter with its motion, instead waiting until its reply. Plaintiff therefore did not have the opportunity to question the authenticity of the letter. In addition, the contents of the letter contradict the allegation in the Complaint about the contents of the letter. Therefore, the Court will not incorporate Defendant's exhibit by reference. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not the appropriate vehicle for this Court to resolve factual disputes about the contents of the alleged letter from Plaintiff's pastor.
Considering Plaintiff Prodan's allegations in the Complaint regarding the objections noted by her pastor, Courts are clear that an allegation of a religious-based abortion-related conflict with COVID-19 vaccine mandates adequately alleges this element of a religious discrimination claim. See, e.g., Kather, 2023 WL 4865533, at *4 (allegation of opposition to vaccine a s “originat[ing]from fetal cell lines” sufficient to allege religious conflict) (citing Keene, 2023 WL 3451687, at *2). This allegation therefore constitutes an additional basis to deny Defendant's motion as to Plaintiff Prodan.
Although Plaintiff Hunter's allegation that she “do[es] not believe injecting yourself with harmful chemicals and unknown substances is honoring our temples” is similar to the medicalbased beliefs at issue in Detwiler and the other cases in the second category identified above,
Plaintiff Hunter's alleged belief here is broader than those in the other cases. Unlike in Detwiler, Plaintiff Hunter also alleges that she never takes vaccines because of her belief that God constructed the human body to heal itself. Moreover, her allusion to “unknown substances” does not necessarily rely on a scientific or medical belief in the harmfulness of those substances. In the absence of a facially secular objection, discovery is the appropriate stage for inquiry into the nature of Plaintiff's specific beliefs about the harmfulness of the vaccine. It is enough for purposes of her Complaint to allege that her beliefs are grounded in religion and in conflict with the vaccine mandate.
In sum, both Plaintiffs have alleged a religious belief and a conflict between that belief and the COVID-19 mandate. That is sufficient to state a claim.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [11] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.