Proctor v. East Central Arkansas EOC

5 Citing cases

  1. Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc.

    690 F. Supp. 134 (D.R.I. 1988)   Cited 16 times
    Recognizing a claim based on the employee's whistleblowing activity or other conduct exposing the employer's wrongdoing

    In twenty-eight of those thirty-five states, it has been held that the cause of action exists where the employee-at-will is discharged for reporting or refusing to participate in employer conduct that violates a specific expression of public policy. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985); Proctor v. East Central Arkansas EOC, 291 Ark. 265, 724 S.W.2d 163 (1987); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); MacNeil v. Minidoka, 108 Idaho 588, 701 P.2d 208 (1985); Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 109 Ill.2d 65, 92 Ill.Dec. 548, 485 N.E.2d 359 (1985); McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., 517 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. 1988); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Phipps v. Clark Oil Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1985); Keneally v. Orgain, 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1979); Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 228 Neb. 85, 421 N.W.2d 755 (1988); Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984); Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980) (arguably altering the nature of the action created from one in contract as in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 31

  2. Crain Industries, Inc. v. Cass

    305 Ark. 566 (Ark. 1991)   Cited 69 times
    Cautioning that the phrase "meeting of the minds" must be understood under the "objective theory" of Arkansas contract law

    While confronted with a number of opportunities since Gauldin and Jackson to jettison the employment at will doctrine, the court has refused to do so. Smith v. American Greetings Corp., 304 Ark. 596, 804 S.W.2d 683 (1991); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988); Gladden v. Arkansas Childrens' Hospital, 292 Ark. 130, 728 S.W.2d 501 (1987); Proctor v. East Central Arkansas EOC, 291 Ark. 265, 724 S.W.2d 163 (1987); Bryant v. Southern Screw Machine Products Co., 288 Ark. 602, 707 S.W.2d 321 (1986). However, in Gladden the court modified the at will rule in two respects, viz., (1) where an employee relies upon a personnel manual that contains an express provision against termination except for cause, he or she may not be arbitrarily discharged in violation of such a provision and (2) an employment agreement that contains a provision that the employee will not be discharged except for cause is cognizable even if it has an unspecified term.

  3. Kimble v. Pulaski Co. Special Sch. Dist

    53 Ark. App. 234 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 7 times

    In Tackett v. Crain Automotive, 321 Ark. 36, 899 S.W.2d 839 (1995), the supreme court recognized that, by Act 796 of 1993, the General Assembly had eliminated the cause of action for retaliatory discharge described in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, supra. Griffin v. Erickson was also cited in City of Green Forest v. Morse, 316 Ark. 540, 873 S.W.2d 154 (1994); Smith v. American Greetings Corp., supra; Proctor v. East Central Arkansas EOC, 291 Ark. 265, 724 S.W.2d 163 (1987); Bryant v. Southern Screw Machine Products Co., 288 Ark. 602, 707 S.W.2d 321 (1986); and Riceland Foods, Inc. v. Director of Labor, 38 Ark. App. 269, 832 S.W.2d 295 (1992). We do not believe that the Public School Employee Fair Hearing Act has modified the employment-at-will doctrine.

  4. Country Corner Food Drug, Inc. v. Reiss

    22 Ark. App. 222 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 20 times
    In Country Corner Food Drug, Inc. v. Reiss, 22 Ark. App. 222, 225-26, 737 S.W.2d 672 (1987), we held that the statute of frauds did not apply to the employment contract in question because it was for an indefinite duration.

    Clearly, the employment contract in question was terminable at will by either party because appellee was not bound to serve for a specified period of time. Proctor v. East Central Arkansas EOC, 291 Ark. 265, 724 S.W.2d 163 (1987). Because the contract was terminable at will by either party and was for an indefinite duration, it did not run afoul of the statute of frauds.

  5. Opinion No. 1989-088

    Opinion No. 1989-088 (Ops.Ark.Atty.Gen. Jul. 7, 1989)

    And Section 1 of Act 822 requires a stated "duration of employment." These requirements would appear to effectively remove the contracts from the "at will" category, due to the inclusion of a definite term. See, Griffin v. Rickson, supra; see also, Gaulden v. Emerson Electric co., 284 Ark. 149, 680 S.W.2d 92 (1984); Proctor v. East Central Arkansas EOC, 291 Ark. 265, 724 S.W.2d 163 (1987). While the terms of each particular contract must, of course, be considered, it is my opinion that the answer to your second question is, generally, "no."