Proctor v. Andrews

101 Citing cases

  1. Wilson v. Andrews

    10 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. 1999)   Cited 43 times
    Noting that "we overstated our position" in Proctor v. Andrews , 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex. 1998), when Proctor Court in dicta agreed with court of appeals that city lacked standing to raise due process and equal protection challenges because municipalities do not enjoy due process rights

    Because we conclude that the Civil Service Act and the subsequent amendments control, we agree with the court of appeals' holding that subsection 143.057(d) governs Lubbock's civil service disciplinary matters. 972 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1998). Tex. Loc. Gov't Code 143.001-.143.

  2. FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin

    22 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2000)   Cited 1,104 times
    Holding that a summary judgment can be affirmed on any one ground alleged in the motion

    If possible, we interpret a statute in a manner that renders it constitutional. See Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 115 (Tex. 1999); Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 735 (Tex. 1998). In a facial challenge to a statute's constitutionality, we consider the statute as written, rather than as it operates in practice.

  3. City of Garland v. Byrd

    97 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. App. 2002)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that there are no limitations on who may appeal a hearing examiner's decision

    All eight factors must be considered when reviewing the delegation, and no one factor is necessarily determinative. See Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 735 (Tex. 1998). Furthermore, we must, if possible, interpret the language of the statute in a manner that renders it constitutional.

  4. Brazos River Auth. v. City of Hous.

    628 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. App. 2021)

    We respectfully decline to do so because neither appellant argues that Houston's status as a municipal corporation affected the nature of its right. And we are not required to address it because the rule announced in these cases does not necessarily implicate standing. SeeWilson v. Andrews , 10 S.W.3d 663, 669 (Tex. 1999) (repudiating dicta in Proctor v. Andrews , 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex. 1998), which had agreed with court of appeals that city lacked standing to raise due process and equal protection challenges because municipalities do not enjoy due process rights); Stop the Ordinances Please v. City of New Braunfels , 306 S.W.3d 919, 929 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (noting that "plaintiff is not required to allege the deprivation of a ‘vested right’ constituting a due-process violation to demonstrate the requisite infringement of a ‘legally protected interest’ "). Instead, we evaluate the case as it has been presented to us by the parties.

  5. City of Galveston v. State

    217 S.W.3d 466 (Tex. 2007)   Cited 173 times
    Concluding that absent clear and unambiguous consent from Legislature, State could not sue home-rule city for damages for negligence resulting in damage to State property

    Again, the State asserts no such statute here. See TEX. CONST, art. XI, § 5; Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tex. 1998) (citing Lower Colorado River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. 1975)).Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at 733.

  6. Sansom v. Tex. R.R. Comm'n

    NO. 03-19-00469-CV (Tex. App. May. 20, 2021)

    But as the Supreme Court of Texas has explained, a complaint of impermissible private delegation is not an alleged violation of Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution. See Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 732-33 (Tex. 1998) ("[W]e note that all parties erroneously rely on Article II, Section I of the Texas Constitution as the source for the constitutional prohibition of delegations of legislative authority to private entities."). Instead, "the constitutional provision that would be violated by an impermissible delegation is [a]rticle III, Section 1," see id. at 733, which provides that "[t]he Legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives," see Tex. Const. art. III, § 1. Where a litigant erroneously brings a private-delegation complaint under Article II, Section 1, courts are to analyze the claim as though it had been properly pleaded under the correct constitutional provision.

  7. Texas R. Barges v. San Antonio

    21 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. App. 2000)   Cited 72 times
    Holding that trial court correctly concluded that river was navigable

    As such, it derives its powers not from the legislature, but from the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5; Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Tex. 1998). A home rule city has all the powers of the state not inconsistent with the Texas Constitution, the general laws, or the city's charter.

  8. City of Pasadena v. Smith

    292 S.W.3d 14 (Tex. 2009)   Cited 60 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Observing that the nondelegation doctrine is "the Texas Constitution's restrictions on the delegation of governmental power"

    Id. § 143.057.See Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 736 (Tex. 1998) ("It is likely a perception of bias in favor of the City, on the part of the Civil Service Commission, that prompts officers to request that their appeal be heard under section 143.057 [by an independent hearing examiner]."). Amicus curiae, the Texas State Association of Fire Fighters, confirms that fire fighters have a "strong desire . . . to appeal . . . to independent hearing examiners . . . rather than to civil service commissions whose members are appointed solely by the cities' chief executives."

  9. City of Houston v. Clark

    197 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. 2006)   Cited 43 times
    Holding municipality, as well as employee, has right to appeal hearing examiner’s award in district court

    According to the City, construing the statutory scheme to foreclose any right of appeal would indicate an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. See, e.g., Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 472 (Tex. 1997) (designating eight factors to consider in determining whether a delegation of legislative power is constitutional, including whether a private examiner's decision is subject to meaningful review); see also Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 735 (Tex. 1998) (holding that the Legislature can delegate authority to private entities if there is protection against the arbitrary exercise of power). The City further claims the hearing examiner in this case exceeded his jurisdiction by, in effect, issuing a declaratory judgment that an acting fire chief must be appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council in order to suspend fire department personnel under Section 143.117 of the Code.

  10. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission v. Patient Advocates of Texas

    136 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. 2004)   Cited 311 times
    Holding no due-process violation when there was "no evidence presented to show that [agency] rules . . . prevent[ed] [a party] from taking advantage of these defined procedures to challenge the reimbursement amounts paid for medical services."

    The Legislature may delegate its powers to administrative agencies established to carry out legislative purposes as long as the Legislature establishes reasonable standards to guide the agencies in exercising those powers. FM Props., 22 S.W.3d at 873; Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex. 1998) ; Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 467; Lone Star Gas, 844 S.W.2d at 689. Likewise, the Legislature may delegate its powers to private entities "`if the legislative purpose is discernible and there is protection against the arbitrary exercise of power.'"