Nonetheless, what is very relevant to this Court's analysis is whether Plaintiff was non-compliant with Elmer's orders. See Martin for Estate of Webb v. City of Newark, 762 F. App'x 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting in part officer's actions were reasonable when faced with non-complaint driver); see also Alday v. Groover, No. 12-108, 2014 WL 1320093, n.5 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2014) (citing Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App'x 791, 793-94 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding the discharge of a prong—mode Taser to be reasonable against an arrestee at night who would not stand up from the road per the officer's requests); Proch v. DeRoche, No. 08-484, 2011 WL 6841319, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2011) ("[E]ven if [an arrestee] did not physically struggle, show overt aggression, or otherwise fight prior to being tased, the actions in which [the arrestee] admittedly engaged—including refusing to obey commands and placing his hands in front of him on a wall instead of behind him—amounted to active resistance to arrest."); Godman v. City of Largo, No. 08-333, 2009 WL 1651524, at *4 (M.D. Fla. June 10, 2009) (stating that use of pepper spray may be reasonable where an individual is "refusing police requests, such as requests to enter a patrol car or go to the hospital" (quoting Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir.2002))). Again though, factual disputes require finding this factor does not weigh in Elmer's favor.
The officers, moreover, provide no authority for the proposition that compliance with the statute necessarily satisfies the Fourth Amendment. See Proch v. DeRoche, No. 3:08cv484/MCR/EMT, 2011 WL 6841319, at *14 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2011), report and recommendation adopted (Feb. 9, 2012) (noting absence of caselaw on section 943.1717). Instead, to determine whether use of force comports with the Fourth Amendment, the question is still whether the officers' conduct was objectively reasonable.
To the extent Plaintiff relies upon 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Fla. Stat. § 943.1717, and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court finds that none provides a separate cause of action. See Vasconez v. Hansell, 871 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2012); Proch v. DeRoche, No. 3:08-cv-484, 2011 WL 6841319, *14 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2011); Ochoa v. City of Miami, No. 09-22455-Civ, 2010 WL 1882159, *3 (S.D. Fla. May 11, 2010). Additionally, Plaintiff does not specify how any analysis under Article 1, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution should differ from the Fourth Amendment.
Dkt. No. 73-3 at 6. See Proch v. DeRoche, No. 3:08-CV-484, 2011 WL 6841319, at *3 n.8 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2011) ("[E]xtrinsic evidence could demonstrate the period when the declaration was signed . . . ."). Besides, the declarations are not determinative of the present motion's outcome anyway.
Dkt. No. 71-10 at 6. See Proch v. DeRoche, No. 3:08-CV-484, 2011 WL 6841319, at *3 n.8 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2011) ("[E]xtrinsic evidence could demonstrate the period when the declaration was signed . . . ."). Besides, the declarations are not determinative of the present motion's outcome anyway.
Dkt. No. 73-3 at 6. See Proch v. DeRoche, No. 3:08-CV-484, 2011 WL 6841319, at *3 n.8 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2011) ("[E]xtrinsic evidence could demonstrate the period when the declaration was signed . . . ."). Besides, the declarations are not determinative of the present motion's outcome anyway.
Dkt. No. 81-11 at 6. See Proch v. DeRoche, No. 3:08-CV-484, 2011 WL 6841319, at *3 n.8 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2011) ("[E]xtrinsic evidence could demonstrate the period when the declaration was signed . . . ."). Besides, the declarations are not determinative of the present motion's outcome anyway.
Even if the Court analyzed Groover's use of a Taser under the Fourth Amendment, Groover would be entitled to qualified immunity. Although the severity of the crime, driving under the influence, and low threat posed by Alday would cut for finding the use of a Taser to be excessive, her noncompliance to an officer's orders would cut for reasonableness. See, e.g., Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App'x 791, 793-94 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding the discharge of a prong-mode Taser to be reasonable against an arrestee at night who would not stand up from the road per the officer's requests); Proch v. DeRoche, No. 3:08cv484/MCR/EMT, 2011 WL 6841319, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2011) ("[E]ven if [an arrestee] did not physically struggle, show overt aggression, or otherwise fight prior to being tased, the actions in which [the arrestee] admittedly engaged—including refusing to obey commands and placing his hands in front of him on a wall instead of behind him—amounted to active resistance to arrest."); Godman v. City of Largo, No. 8:08-cv-00333-JDW-TBM, 2009 WL 1651524, at *4 (M.D. Fla. June 10, 2009) (stating that use of pepper spray may be reasonable where an individual is "refusing police requests, such as requests to enter a patrol car or go to the hospital" (quoting Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002))).