There is a conclusive absence of any basis for constructive knowledge because there is nothing to show that anything else was on the floor for a sufficient time to impute knowledge to defendant. Pritchard v. Wilson, 170 Ga. App. 313 (1) ( 316 S.E.2d 604) (1984); Jiffy Store v. Bishop, 190 Ga. App. 716 ( 379 S.E.2d 602) (1989). Important as well is that plaintiff had equal or superior knowledge of the floor's condition and the absence of mats, since he traversed it three times before he fell.

See Fort v. Boone, 166 Ga. App. 290, 292 ( 304 S.E.2d 465). There is a total absence of evidence to show defendant knew or should have known of the presence of the foreign substance because of the lack of sufficient time to discover the presence of the water upon the floor. Pritchard v. Wilson, 170 Ga. App. 313, 314 ( 316 S.E.2d 604). Accordingly, we find no error in the grant of summary judgment to Sears. Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1 ( 126 S.E.2d 442).

The affidavits executed by the hospital security and housekeeping personnel effectively negate recovery on that theory. Pritchard v. Wilson, 170 Ga. App. 313 ( 316 S.E.2d 604) (1984); Food Giant v. Richardson, 169 Ga. App. 517 ( 313 S.E.2d 781) (1984). Each potential theory of recovery having been nullified by appellant's deposition and the affidavits submitted, it was not error to grant summary judgment to the hospital authority.