Federal Life Insurance Company v. Whitehead, 73 Okla. 71, 174 P. 784, 790, 792, 793; Pritchard v. American National Insurance Company, 139 Okla. 248, 281 P. 774, 775; Atlas Life Insurance Company v. Sullivan, 172 Okla. 595, 52 P.2d 28, 31;
Where the agent of a life insurance company, acting within the scope of his authority is informed by the applicant that the person to be insured is at the time in bad health, such knowledge is imputable to the company, and where, in such case, the agent, notwithstanding such knowledge, prepares an application for insurance showing the person to be in good health, accepts the premium and delivers the application and premiums to his company, and on such application, policy is issued and the premium retained, and the company continues to collect the premiums as they fall due until the death of the insured, the defense that the policy was forfeited by reason of false statements contained in the application to the insurer is not available in a suit to collect on the policy. Pritchard v. American National Ins. Co. of Galveston, Tex., 139 Okla. 248, 281 P. 774. 2.
The decision of the trial court on this subject is sustained by competent evidence and will not be disturbed by this Court on appeal. National Life Accident Ins. Co. v. Roberson, 180 Okla. 265, 68 P.2d 796; Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Trumbley, 170 Okla. 639, 41 P.2d 913; National Life Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ford, 169 Okla. 102, 36 P.2d 25. Where the agent of a life insurance company possesses knowledge that an applicant for life insurance is in bad health and notwithstanding such knowledge countersigns, delivers the policy, collects the premiums thereon, remitting the premiums to the insurance company, the knowledge of the agent is imputed to the company and it is estopped to deny liability upon the grounds the applicant was in bad health and an uninsurable risk. Pritchard v. American National Ins. Co., 139 Okla. 248, 281 P. 774; Security Life Ins. Co. v. Woods, 118 Okla. 156, 247 P. 356; Security Benefit Ass'n. v. Green, 103 Okla. 284, 229 P. 1061; Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Whitehead, 73 Okla. 71, 174 P. 784. The defendant accepted the premium on the policy issued and retained same for several months, and neither attempted to refund the premium nor cancel the policy until after insured's death.
" In Pritchard v. American Nat. Ins. Co. of Galveston, Tex., 139 Okla. 248, 281 P. 774, the defendant insurance company contended that no obligation existed by reason of the terms of the policy reading "That no obligation is assumed by the company prior to the date hereof nor unless on said date the insured is alive and in sound health." In other words, the contention was that since the evidence showed the insured was not in good health at the time of application and delivery of the policy, the contract by its terms never became effective, but always was conditioned upon the fact of sound health.
Therefore, the authorities cited by petitioner with reference thereto have no application to the case now under consideration. Although the State Industrial Commission is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction (Wilson Drilling Co. v. Beyer, 139 Okla. 248, 289 P. 846), and jurisdiction, where none exists, cannot be conferred on it by agreement, waiver, or conduct (Hardy Sanitarium v. DeHart, 164 Okla. 29, 22 P. [2d] 379; Frates v. State Industrial Commission, 164 Okla. 60, 22 P. [2d] 905), yet, when its jurisdiction exists and has been invoked, it is thereafter exclusive and continuing. See Commercial Casualty Ins Co v. E. B. Cooke Service Station, 165 Okla. 36, 24 P.2d 1007; Wilkerson v. Devonian Oil Co., 114 Okla. 84, 242 P. 531.
The disease, whatever it may have been, had manifested itself and the disability had clearly occurred before the policy issued, and the policy exempted the defendant of liability for any disease and disability occurring prior to the issuance of the policy. The plaintiff relies upon a number of authorities, among which are Priest v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co. (Kan.) 227 P. 538; National Life Insurance Co. v. Grady, 185 N.C. 348, 117 S.E. 289; American National Insurance Co. v. Hale (Ark.) 291 S.W. 82; National Life Accident Insurance Co. v. Shermer, 161 Okla. 77, 17 P.2d 401; Pritchard v. American National Insurance Co. of Galveston, Tex., 139 Okla. 248, 281 P. 774; Federal Life Insurance Co. v. Whitehead, 73 Okla. 71, 174 P. 784. In such cases it was held that the insurer waived certain policy conditions, or that the conditions of the insured's health was not warranted. The cases have no application here, for the same reasons as pointed out by the Tennessee court in the Dees Case, supra.
The phrase "sound health," as used, means a state of health unimpaired by any serious malady of which the insured or applicant had knowledge. If an insurance company desires to exclude from the coverage of the policy latent and unknown bodily conditions, they should use more apt language for that purpose. National Life Accident Insurance Co. v. Shermer, 161 Okla. 77, 17 P.2d 401; Pritchard v. American National Insurance Company of Galveston, Tex., 139 Okla. 248, 281 P. 774. In the case of Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. v. Brown, 94 Okla. 277, 221 P. 1017, this court quoted with approval from the case of Greenwood v. Royal Neighbors. 118 Va. 329, 87 S.E. 581, wherein it was said: