Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-12551 No. 6808
07-17-2019
HAL WILLIAM PRISER, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Kevin Higgins, Law Office of Kevin Higgins, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Terisia K. Chleborad, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law, although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have. See McCoy v . State , 80 P.3d 757, 764 (Alaska App. 2002). Trial Court No. 1CR-15-00281 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the District Court, First Judicial District, Craig, David V. George, Judge. Appearances: Kevin Higgins, Law Office of Kevin Higgins, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Terisia K. Chleborad, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Jahna Lindemuth, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Allard, Chief Judge, Harbison, Judge, and Coats, Senior Judge. Judge HARBISON.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 11 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 23(a).
A jury convicted Hal William Priser of resisting arrest and assault in the fourth degree. Priser's convictions were based on events that occurred when Village Public Safety Officer Zachary West arrested him for violating a protective order. The issue raised by this appeal is whether the district court erred in denying Priser's request for a self-defense instruction. Priser contends that the court should have given an instruction regarding his right to use force against an arresting officer's use of excessive force even though he testified at trial that he did not recall using any force at all against the officer. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we reverse Priser's convictions.
AS 11.56.700(a)(1) and AS 11.41.230(a)(1), respectively. Priser was also convicted of violating a protective order, fourth-degree escape, and fifth-degree weapons misconduct. He does not challenge those convictions in his appeal.
Underlying incident
At trial, Officer West testified that Priser refused to submit to arrest — first, by walking away and refusing to obey West's commands, and then later by physically struggling against West and against bystanders who aided West. West testified that, during the struggle, Priser scratched him, causing minor injuries, attempted to bite and hit him, and may have attempted to pull a knife on him. West said that he had to pepper spray Priser, shock him with a taser, tackle him, and hit him with a baton in order to subdue him.
Priser, for his part, testified that he was patiently waiting to be handcuffed when West struck him and knocked him to the ground. According to Priser, after that the events were a "blur" for him. Priser testified that he had been kicked in the jaw and sustained blows to his head, and he did not remember portions of the events that occurred. Priser denied resisting the officer in any way, although he often equivocated by asserting that he had done nothing "to [his] knowledge."
At one point Priser indicated that he was afraid of West. According to Priser, West "could kill me and call it self-defense. I've seen it done. I mean, Rodney King, for God sakes." In spite of this, Priser asserted that his reaction to this fear was, "to the best of [his] knowledge," to comply with Officer West rather than to struggle with him. Priser also insisted that he had been in constant pain "from the abuse, brutal assault and battery."
At the conclusion of the evidence, Priser's attorney requested a jury instruction regarding his right to defend against excessive use of force by an officer who is effecting an arrest. The district court denied this request, holding that because Priser testified that he did not resist the arrest, he failed to offer some evidence that he subjectively believed he was acting in self-defense.
Whether the trial court was required to give a self-defense instruction
A trial court must give a jury instruction on self-defense when "some evidence" supports that the defendant acted in self-defense. The court must determine "whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the accused, would permit a rational fact-finder to conclude that a reasonable doubt had been established as to the existence of the defense."
See Snyder v. State, 930 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Alaska 1996).
Carson v. State, 736 P.2d 356, 359 (Alaska App. 1987).
While the "some evidence" test is not exacting in terms of the amount of evidence needed, the evidence must address all the legal elements of self-defense. Here, as an initial matter, Priser was required to show that there was evidence both that West used excessive force against him and that the force Priser used was reasonably necessary to defend against West's excessive force.
Ha v. State, 892 P.2d 184, 190 (Alaska App. 1995).
See AS 11.81.400(a)(1).
See AS 11.81.400(b) & AS 11.81.330(a).
As we explained, Priser testified that West used excessive force against him, but he denied any memory of using force in response to West's assault on him.
During the State's case, West testified that Priser scratched and kicked when West attempted to arrest him. This is evidence that Priser used force against West, in spite of Priser's testimony to the contrary. And during the defense case, Priser testified that West knocked him to the ground without provocation, striking him, breaking his leg, "bust[ing]" his jaw, and injuring his eye. This is evidence both that West used force in excess of what was necessary to effect the arrest and that a reasonable person would have acted in self-defense under the circumstances.
See Weston v. State, 682 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Alaska 1984).
In order to be entitled to a self-defense instruction, a defendant is obligated to identify that there is some evidence that a reasonable person would have acted in self-defense (the objective element of the defense) and also that the defendant subjectively believed that self-defense was necessary. The difficulty facing the trial court was that although Priser testified that he was subjectively afraid of West, Priser also testified that he believed that compliance, rather than forcible self-defense, was his best option. The court expressed confusion as to "how you can have 'some evidence' when the defendant denies the defense himself on the witness stand."
See Ha, 892 P.2d at 190; Weston, 682 P.2d at 1121.
For reasons we now explain, we conclude the trial court erred by not giving the instruction.
First, although the trial court characterized Priser's testimony as a "deni[al] that he was defending himself," in this case, Priser's testimony was not an unequivocal denial. Rather, Priser testified that he suffered impact to his head and that he did not remember portions of the events that occurred. And while he denied using force, his denials generally included a qualification.
Additionally, we note that while the questions posed by the objective and subjective standard are distinct, evidence that a reasonable person would believe it was necessary to use force also provides circumstantial evidence that the defendant subjectively held such a belief. Here, Priser's testimony that he was severely injured by West's unprovoked assault, along with West's testimony that he shocked Priser with a taser, pepper sprayed him, tackled him, and hit him with a baton, provide circumstantial evidence that Priser actually believed that it was necessary to use force in self-defense. And in this case there was also evidence regarding Priser's subjective fear of West, that Priser believed West "could kill [him] and call it self-defense."
Weston, 682 P.2d at 1122.
Even a weak or implausible self-defense claim must be submitted to the jury. Given this low bar, the Alaska Supreme Court has advised that trial courts should generally err on the side of giving the instruction. We therefore conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court's denial of Priser's request for a self-defense instruction was error.
Folger v. State, 648 P.2d 111, 113 (Alaska App. 1982).
Greenwood v. State, 237 P.3d 1018, 1022-23 (Alaska 2010). --------
Conclusion
Priser's convictions for resisting arrest and assault in the fourth degree are REVERSED.