Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 30-2009-00125574, Robert J. Moss, Judge.
Printemps & Kaufman, Edwin Printemps and Nancy Kaufman for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Thomas P. Aplin for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
ARONSON, J.
Plaintiff Ethan Printemps-Herget (Herget) sued defendants Joseph Liburdi, Matthew Liburdi, and Liburdi’s Scuba Center, Inc. (Liburdi’s Scuba) based on alleged promises to train and employ Herget as a scuba diving instructor. Herget appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted Joseph’s summary judgment motion. On the motion, Joseph argued Herget’s causes of action lacked merit because Joseph sold his interest in Liburdi’s Scuba to Matthew approximately three years before Matthew made the alleged promises.
We refer to Joseph and his sons, Matthew and Marlon Liburdi, by their first names to avoid any confusion. No disrespect is intended. (Fazzi v. Klein (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1282, fn. 1.)
Herget contends the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment motion because Joseph’s moving papers failed to address his joint venture liability theory. Specifically, Herget alleged Joseph was vicariously liable for Matthew’s acts and omissions because Joseph and Matthew engaged in a joint venture at the time Matthew failed to perform on his promises to Herget.
We conclude Joseph failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy his initial burden to negate Herget’s joint venture liability theory. Accordingly, we reverse.
I
Facts and Procedural History
In the early 1990’s, Joseph and his two sons, Matthew and Marlon, formed Liburdi’s Scuba. Liburdi’s Scuba operated a retail “dive shop” selling scuba diving supplies and underwater photography equipment, providing scuba diving instruction, and organizing scuba diving travel trips. Joseph is a well-known underwater photographer who also offered instruction on underwater photography.
On January 1, 2005, Joseph sold his interest in Liburdi’s Scuba to Matthew. Some time thereafter Marlon also left the family business, leaving Matthew as the sole owner and operator of Liburdi’s Scuba. After selling his interest in Liburdi’s Scuba, Joseph continued to organize scuba diving trips and provide underwater photography instruction through his own corporation, Underwater Exposures, Inc. Joseph also continued to frequent the Liburdi’s Scuba dive shop to share his expertise with the employees and customers.
The parties do not identify when Marlon left the business. Herget did not name Marlon as a defendant in this action.
The parties presented conflicting evidence regarding Joseph’s role with the Liburdi’s Scuba dive shop after he sold his interest to Matthew. Joseph offered evidence showing he had no operational control or authority over the business and merely visited the dive shop because he enjoyed talking about scuba diving and underwater photography. Herget offered evidence showing Joseph continued to participate in the business and have some operational control or authority.
In August 2007, Herget lived in Oregon and e-mailed Liburdi’s Scuba “looking for some specialty certification classes” to take during an upcoming trip to Newport Beach. Matthew e-mailed Herget, stating “we can help you” and “I can have my pop, Joe come down and teach your [sic] system” regarding underwater photography. Matthew asked Herget to phone him for further details. Herget eventually took two classes from Liburdi’s Scuba in August 2007.
In December 2007, Herget received an e-mail advertisement from Liburdi’s Scuba about becoming a certified dive instructor during a trip to Fiji in March 2008. Herget alleged “Defendants” induced him to relocate to Southern California by representing the training sessions in Fiji would qualify him for certification as a dive instructor and, if he completed that certification, “Defendants” would hire him as a dive instructor. In January 2008, Herget relocated to Southern California to “train in preparation for the Instructor Training.”
After Herget moved, Matthew informed Herget he could not be certified as a dive instructor during the March 2008 Fiji trip unless he also went on a February 2008 trip to Palau. Matthew explained Herget needed to go on both trips to log enough dive time for certification as a dive instructor. This added requirement and its costs surprised Herget because Matthew did not mention it before Herget moved to Southern California. Herget nonetheless went on the Palau trip, which Joseph organized through Underwater Exposures, Inc., even though Herget paid the trip’s $5,000 cost to Liburdi’s Scuba.
Although Herget paid a deposit for the Fiji trip, the trip did not take place in March 2008 as planned — or at any other time. Herget therefore did not complete all the required training to obtain his dive instructor certification by the end of March 2008, as “Defendants” had represented. As a result, Herget alleged, “Defendants” offered him a job in the Liburdi’s Scuba dive shop while he continued to work toward his dive instructor certification. “Defendants” paid Herget an hourly rate for certain work he performed in the dive shop, but did not pay him for other work he performed as part of an “‘apprentice[ship].’” Herget continued to pay for and take classes toward his dive instructor certification through Liburdi’s Scuba, but Matthew allegedly failed to provide Herget with all the certifications he earned. In September 2008, Matthew closed Liburdi’s Scuba without notice and Liburdi’s Scuba filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection in April 2009.
After Liburdi’s Scuba closed, Herget filed a complaint with the California Labor Commissioner, asserting Matthew and Liburdi’s Scuba failed to pay Herget back wages. Matthew and Liburdi’s Scuba did not appear at the hearing on Herget’s complaint and the Labor Commissioner awarded Herget more than $4,000 in unpaid wages and penalties.
Herget requested we judicially notice the Labor Commissioner’s decision on his complaint. We deny that request because the complaint is irrelevant to the issues presented in this appeal. (Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 [“Although a court may judicially notice a variety of matters [citation], only relevant material may be noticed”], overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.)
Herget filed this action in July 2009, naming Matthew, Joseph, and Liburdi’s Scuba as defendants. Herget’s complaint asserted four causes of action and alleged that, “[a]t all times relevant herein, Matthew Liburdi and Joseph Liburdi were engaged in a joint venture to solicit students to participate in a training tour run by [Liburdi’s Scuba].” The first cause of action alleged “Defendants” breached a contract between Herget and Matthew, both individually and on behalf of Liburdi’s Scuba, for “Defendants” to train Herget as a dive instructor and then employ him in that capacity. The second cause of action alleged “Defendants’ acts and omissions” violated the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.). The third cause of action alleged a common count for work, labor, services, and materials rendered at “Defendants’” special instance and request. Finally, the fourth cause of action alleged “Defendants” fraudulently induced Herget to move to Southern California, pay for dive instructor training classes and trips, purchase “required [scuba diving] equipment, ” and provide free labor and services to “Defendants” as part of his training.
Joseph filed a motion seeking summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication on the ground all causes of action lacked merit because he had no interest in Liburdi’s Scuba at the time the underlying events occurred, he made no promises or representations to Herget, and he had no contract with Herget. Joseph also argued Herget’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act claim failed because Herget did not qualify as a “consumer” and did not satisfy the act’s prefiling requirements. The trial court posted a tentative ruling denying the motion on the ground Joseph failed to meet his initial burden to show Herget’s claims lacked merit because Joseph failed to address Herget’s allegation Matthew and Joseph engaged in a joint venture. The trial court’s tentative ruling also denied Joseph’s summary adjudication request because Joseph failed to properly request that relief.
At the hearing on his motion, Joseph explained his reply brief addressed the joint venture allegations and the trial court took the matter under submission. Later that same day, the trial court issued a minute order simply stating, “MOTION is GRANTED.” The trial court did not enter any other order explaining its ruling on Joseph’s motion. Nor did the judgment explain why the court awarded Joseph judgment on Herget’s claims. Herget timely appealed.
II
Discussion
A. Relevant Summary Judgment Standards
“‘“The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to permit a party to show that material factual claims arising from the pleadings need not be tried because they are not in dispute.” [Citation.]’” (Affholder, Inc. v. Mitchell Engineering, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 510, 516 (Affholder).) A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden to show the plaintiff’s action has no merit. (Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 168-169 (Teselle).) The defendant can meet that burden by either showing one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Id. at p. 169; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To meet this burden, the defendant must present evidence sufficient to show he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Eriksson v. Nunnink (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 826, 847-848 (Eriksson).)
Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence establishing a triable issue exists on one or more material facts. (Teselle, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 168-169; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff opposing the motion has no burden to present any evidence until the defendant meets his or her initial burden. (Teselle, at p. 169; see also Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 940 (Hawkins) [“‘Where the evidence presented by defendant does not support judgment in his favor, the motion must be denied without looking at the opposing evidence, if any, submitted by plaintiff’”].)
We review a trial court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion de novo. (Hawkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 939-940.) “‘Our review of the summary judgment motion requires that we apply the same three-step process required of the trial court. [Citation.] “First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond by establishing a complete defense or otherwise showing there is no factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by the opponent’s pleading. [Citations.] [¶] Secondly, we determine whether the moving party’s showing has established facts which negate the opponent’s claim and justify a judgment in movant’s favor. [Citations.]... [¶]... [T]he third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Eriksson, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 848.)
B. Joseph’s Procedurally Defective Separate Statement Prevents Consideration of His Summary Adjudication Motion
Either separately or in the alternative to summary judgment, a party may seek summary adjudication on one or more causes of action alleged in a complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) When summary adjudication is sought on a particular cause of action, the cause of action “must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b).) Moreover, the separate statement must individually identify each cause of action on which summary adjudication is sought and each allegedly undisputed material fact on each cause of action. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d).) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(h), provides a sample regarding this required format for separate statements on a summary adjudication motion. The trial court has discretion to deny summary adjudication based on the moving party’s failure to comply with these separate statement requirements. (Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 102, 118.)
Joseph’s notice of motion requested summary judgment against Herget or, in the alternative, “summary adjudication of issues as to the first, second, third and fourth causes of action of the Complaint, and each of them....” Joseph’s separate statement, however, provided a single list of 17 facts. It did not “specifically” identify any cause of action on which Joseph sought summary adjudication and made no attempt to relate specific facts to each cause of action.
The trial court’s tentative ruling denied Joseph’s summary adjudication request based on these failures, but the trial court made no final ruling on the summary adjudication request because it granted Joseph’s summary judgment request. When a trial court neither exercises nor declines to exercise its discretion to deny a summary adjudication motion based on a defective separate statement, that discretion to deny the motion passes to the appellate court because the appellate court reviews the entire record de novo. (See Fenn v. Sherriff (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1481.) If the trial court actually exercises its discretion, or clearly declines to exercise its discretion, the appellate court reviews that decision for abuse of discretion. (See Whitehead v. Habig (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 896, 900-901.)
As explained below, Joseph sought summary judgment based on his contention that all causes of action lacked merit because he had no involvement in the events giving rise to this lawsuit. In addition, Joseph argued the second cause of action under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act lacked merit because Herget did not qualify as a “consumer” under the act and failed to satisfy the act’s prefiling requirements. Joseph, however, failed to link the facts in his separate statement to the second cause of action. We therefore decline to speculate which, if any, facts apply to his request to summarily adjudicate this cause of action.
Because Joseph failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a separate statement necessary to consider his summary adjudication request, and the trial court did not exercise its discretion to overlook the defective separate statement, we limit our review in this case to whether Joseph established he was entitled to summary judgment against Herget. We therefore reject his request for summary adjudication.
C. Joseph Failed to Meet His Initial Burden to Negate All Liability Theories Alleged in Herget’s Complaint
According to Joseph, Herget’s causes of action arose when Matthew and Liburdi’s Scuba promised to train and employ Herget as a dive instructor. Joseph’s summary judgment motion asserted he had no involvement with the events underlying Herget’s claims. Specifically, Joseph presented evidence to show he sold his interest in Liburdi’s Scuba well before Matthew made any promises to Herget, Joseph had no authority or control over Liburdi’s Scuba or its business after he sold his interest to Matthew, Joseph made no promises or representations to Herget, and Joseph had no contract with Herget regarding dive instructor training or employment.
Joseph, however, failed to recognize the principal basis alleged for his liability was not that he made any promises to Herget or that he was liable for the obligations of Liburdi’s Scuba. Rather, Herget sought to hold Joseph vicariously liable on the theory he engaged in a joint venture with Matthew. Specifically, Herget’s complaint alleged “Matthew Liburdi and Joseph Liburdi were engaged in a joint venture to solicit students to participate in a training tour run by [Liburdi’s Scuba].”
“A joint venture is ‘an undertaking by two or more persons jointly to carry out a single business enterprise for profit. [Citations.]’” (Weiner v. Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 482 (Weiner).) “‘There are three basic elements of a joint venture: the members must have joint control over the venture (even though they may delegate it), they must share the profits of the undertaking, and the members must each have an ownership interest in the enterprise. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘Whether a joint venture actually exists depends on the intention of the parties. [Citations.]’” (Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 370.) “A joint venture... may be formed orally [citations] or ‘assumed to have been organized from a reasonable deduction from the acts and declarations of the parties.’ [Citation.]” (Weiner, at pp. 482-483.)
“The distinction between joint ventures and partnerships is not sharply drawn. A joint venture usually involves a single business transaction, whereas a partnership may involve ‘a continuing business for an indefinite or fixed period of time.’ [Citation.] Yet a joint venture may be of longer duration and greater complexity than a partnership. From a legal standpoint, both relationships are virtually the same. Accordingly, the courts freely apply partnership law to joint ventures when appropriate. [Citation.]” (Weiner, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 482.) One characteristic a joint venture shares with a partnership is that all joint venturers are jointly and severally liable for the venture’s obligations in the same manner all partners are jointly and severally liable for the partnership’s obligations. (Myrick v. Mastagni (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1091; see also CACI No. 3712.)
Consequently, if Herget establishes his joint venture liability theory, he may hold Joseph liable for Matthew’s acts and omissions to further the alleged joint venture. The joint venture’s existence would render Joseph’s arguments he had no involvement in the underlying events and no interest in or control over Liburdi’s Scuba irrelevant.
“‘“The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues: the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” [Citations.] The complaint measures the materiality of the facts tendered in a defendant’s challenge to the plaintiff’s cause of action.’ [Citation.]” (Affholder, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 516.)
A defendant moving for summary judgment therefore must negate all liability theories the plaintiff alleged in the complaint. If a defendant fails to do so, the defendant fails to meet his or her initial burden to show the plaintiff’s action lacks merit, and the summary judgment motion must be denied. (Hawkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 945; see also Teselle, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 173 [defendant’s summary judgment motion “fatal[ly] flaw[ed]” because it failed to address all liability theories alleged in plaintiff’s complaint]; Lopez v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 705, 717 [“As the party moving for summary judgment, [defendant] had the burden to show that it was entitled to judgment with respect to all theories of liability asserted by [plaintiff]”]; Cox v. State of California (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 301, 310 [“‘Thus a plaintiff who has pleaded a cause of action on either of two theories will not be subject to defeat by summary judgment because the defendant has established by an uncontradicted affidavit that one of the two theories (but not necessarily the other) cannot be established. The burden is upon defendant to rule out all possible merit’” (original italics)].)
The Hawkins decision illustrates this rule. In Hawkins, the apartment manager and security guard who lived at the plaintiff’s apartment complex shot and injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the apartment complex’s owner, alleging four separate liability theories: (1) the owner was liable on a respondeat superior theory as the manager and security guard’s employer; (2) the owner was negligent in hiring and retaining the manager and security guard; (3) the owner was negligent in failing to protect tenants from the manager and security guard’s foreseeable criminal activity; and (4) the owner was negligent in allowing a dangerous tenant to remain in possession. The plaintiff alleged the owner knew the manager and security guard had a prior manslaughter conviction, frequently used methamphetamine, carried numerous loaded firearms around the apartment complex, and threatened a tenant with those firearms, but the owner nonetheless hired and retained the manger and security guard and allowed him to live in the apartment complex. (Hawkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 940-941.)
The trial court granted the owner’s summary judgment motion because the plaintiff failed to present evidence showing the manager and security guard was an employee or tenant at the time he shot the plaintiff. (Hawkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 942.) The Court of Appeal reversed because the trial court improperly shifted the burden to the plaintiff to prove his case without first requiring the owner to present evidence negating all liability theories the plaintiff alleged in his complaint. The owner failed to present any evidence negating the plaintiff’s respondeat superior theory and therefore the trial court should have “stopped there” and denied the motion without considering the plaintiff’s evidence. (Id. at pp. 942-945.)
Similarly, Joseph’s summary judgment motion made no effort to address the joint venture liability theory Herget alleged in his complaint. Herget’s trial court opposition emphasized this failure and argued the court should deny the motion on that ground. In his trial court reply brief, Joseph addressed the joint venture theory for the first time and argued the theory lacked merit because he and Matthew did not engage in a joint venture. After posting a tentative ruling denying Joseph’s motion because it failed to negate the joint venture theory, the trial court ultimately granted the motion. Unfortunately, the trial court did not make any order identifying the grounds or evidence it relied on in granting the motion.
Our independent review reveals the trial court should have denied the motion because Joseph failed to meet his initial burden to negate the joint venture liability theory. Joseph may not wait until the reply to attack a liability theory clearly alleged in the complaint. (See San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 316 (San Diego Watercrafts) [reversing summary judgment because moving party did not present evidence necessary to meet initial burden until reply brief]; Balboa Ins. Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010 [“The salutory rule is that points raised in a reply brief for the first time will not be considered unless good cause is shown for the failure to present them before”].)
As noted above, Herget’s complaint alleged Joseph and Matthew engaged in a joint venture for a specific purpose — to solicit students for training tours run by Liburdi’s Scuba. Joseph does not argue he was unaware of Herget’s joint venture theory. Joseph’s moving papers expressly acknowledged the possibility Herget might attempt to use a “derivative liability” theory to hold Joseph liable for acts or omissions by Matthew or Liburdi’s Scuba. Those papers, however, addressed a derivative liability theory Herget did not allege, that is, that Liburdi’s Scuba was Joseph’s alter ego, rather than the derivative liability theory Herget actually alleged. By waiting until the reply to address the joint venture theory — and offering no excuse for the failure to address the theory in the moving papers — Joseph deprived Herget of any meaningful opportunity to respond to Joseph’s challenge. (Cf. San Diego Watercrafts, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 316 [“Where a remedy as drastic as summary judgment is involved, due process requires a party be fully advised of the issues to be addressed and be given adequate notice of what facts it must rebut in order to prevail”].)
Even if we consider Joseph’s challenge to the joint venture theory, he failed to present sufficient evidence to negate that theory. Joseph first argued the theory lacked merit because “there was simply no evidence at all to support a joint venture.” Joseph, however, cannot meet his initial burden by simply arguing an absence of evidence showing he and Matthew engaged in a joint venture. Joseph must present evidence showing either a joint venture did not exist or Herget had no evidence, and could not reasonably obtain any evidence, that a joint venture existed. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854-855, fn. 23 [defendant does not meet its burden on summary judgment “simply” by pointing out “‘an absence of evidence to support’ an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action” (original italics)]; Hawkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 940 [“defendant must ‘present evidence and not simply point out through argument’ the facts to support summary judgment” (original italics)].)
Joseph made no attempt to present evidence demonstrating a joint venture like the one Herget alleged did not exist. Neither his declaration nor any other evidence Joseph submitted addressed whether he and Matthew engaged in a joint venture. Instead, Joseph sought to shift the burden to Herget to establish a triable issue on whether a joint venture existed without ever presenting his own evidence showing a joint venture did not exist. As explained above, Herget had no burden to present any evidence until Joseph presented evidence sufficient to support a judgment in his favor on the joint venture liability theory. (Hawkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 940.)
Joseph also argued he and Matthew could not have engaged in a joint venture because a joint venture could not exist separate from the corporation Liburdi’s Scuba. According to Joseph, all business activities giving rise to Herget’s claims were conducted through Liburdi’s Scuba and therefore a joint venture allegedly conducting that same business could not exist. In an attempt to show he could not be part of any joint venture conducting the same business as Liburdi’s Scuba, Joseph pointed to the evidence showing he sold his interest in Liburdi’s Scuba.
This argument, however, misses the mark. Herget does not allege a joint venture to engage in the business of Liburdi’s Scuba. Rather, as Joseph acknowledged in his trial court reply, the joint venture Herget alleged had a limited purpose — “to solicit students to participate in a training tour run by [Liburdi’s Scuba].” In other words, Joseph and Matthew engaged in the alleged joint venture merely to act as referral or marketing agents soliciting potential students to purchase spots on travel scuba diving trips organized by Liburdi’s Scuba.
Herget’s trial court opposition and opening brief on appeal both sought to argue a joint venture much broader in scope than the complaint alleged. Specifically, Herget argued a joint venture “to market goods and services relating to underwater sports and photography.” A plaintiff, however, may not defeat summary judgment on a theory the complaint did not allege. If Herget seeks to pursue a joint venture theory different than he alleged, he must seek leave to amend his complaint. (Distefano v. Forester (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1264-1265 [“To create a triable issue of material fact, the opposition evidence must be directed to issues raised by the pleadings. [Citation.] If the opposing party’s evidence would show some factual assertion, legal theory, defense or claim not yet pleaded, that party should seek leave to amend the pleadings before the hearing on the summary judgment motion”].)
Evidence Joseph sold his interest in the corporation Liburdi’s Scuba approximately three years before the events underlying Herget’s claims does nothing to negate that Joseph and Matthew engaged in the joint venture Herget alleged — or even a broader joint venture to conduct the dive shop business. Likewise, Joseph’s assertion he had no operational authority or control over the corporation Liburdi’s Scuba does not negate the existence of the alleged joint venture. Declarations supporting a summary judgment motion must be strictly construed (Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 761) and Joseph’s declarations simply do not address whether a joint venture existed.
Whether the joint venture Herget actually alleged is broad enough to hold Joseph liable for all damages Herget seeks is a question we need not reach. The alleged joint venture is broad enough to hold Joseph liable for at least some damages Herget alleged, such as the deposit Herget paid for the Fiji trip that never occurred. To meet his initial burden and obtain summary judgment, Joseph must negate all causes of action in their entirety. He failed to do so and therefore the trial court erred in granting Joseph’s motion.
Our conclusion the trial court should have denied Joseph’s motion for failure to meet the initial burden eliminates the need to address Herget’s procedural challenges regarding Joseph’s failure to serve the summary judgment motion on Matthew and the trial court’s failure to enter an order satisfying Code of Civil Procedure, section 437c, subdivision (g). We nonetheless note the trial court’s minute order — stating simply, “MOTION is GRANTED” — fell well short of its obligation to “specify the reasons for its determination” and “specifically refer to the evidence proffered in support of, and if applicable in opposition to, the motion which indicates that no triable issue exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (g).) A trial court’s failure to provide a proper statement of reasons for granting a summary judgment motion “is not automatic grounds for reversal, ” but it may be grounds for reversal when it precludes meaningful appellate review. (Santa Barbara Pistachio Ranch v. Chowchilla Water Dist. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 439, 448-449.)
III
Disposition
The judgment is reversed. Herget shall recover his costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P.J., MOORE, J.