Pringle v. State

10 Citing cases

  1. Brown v. State

    266 P.2d 988 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954)   Cited 9 times

    An accomplice is one who may be informed against for the offense for which the defendant is being tried, one culpably implicated in the commission of the particular crime charged. Cudjoe v. State, 12 Okla. Cr. 246, 154 P. 500, L.R.A. 1916F, 1251; Hendrix v. State, 8 Okla. Cr. 530, 129 P. 78, 43 L.R.A., N.S., 546; Pringle v. State [ 32 Okla. Cr. 187], 239 P. 932; Brownell v. State [ 33 Okla. Cr. 323], 244 P. 65. "One who purchases intoxicating liquor from a bootlegger is not an accomplice of the seller.

  2. State v. Coroles

    74 Utah 94 (Utah 1929)   Cited 19 times

    "Following the general rule of law, it has been several times held by this court that a thief who steals property is not an accomplice of the person who receives it from him, knowing it to have been stolen, but that the thief and the receiver of the stolen goods are independent criminals. Mayes v. State, 11 Okla. Cr. 61, 142 P. 1049; Pringle v. State (Okla.Cr.App.) 239 P. 932. There is, however, an exception to the rule announced to the effect that where the thief and the receiver of the stolen property conspire together to steal property, with a prearranged plan for the one who actually commits the theft to deliver it to the other at an agreed time and place, and pursuant to such plan does steal property and deliver it to the receiver, the receiver is an accomplice of the thief and the thief is an accomplice of the receiver in the commission of the offense of receiving stolen property.

  3. State v. Keithley

    271 P. 452 (Mont. 1928)   Cited 16 times

    The general test to determine whether a witness is or is not an accomplice is: Could he himself have been informed against for the offense, either as principal or accessory? If he could, then he is an accomplice. ( State v. Lawlor, 28 Minn. 224, 9 N.W. 702; Mayes v. State, 11 Okla. Cr. 61, 142 P. 1049; Motsenbocker v. State, 29 Okla. Cr. 305, 233 P. 487; Pringle v. State (Okla.Cr.App.), 239 P. 932.) And the rule generally recognized is that one who is guilty of larceny cannot be adjudged guilty of receiving the property stolen.

  4. Dickey v. State

    266 P.2d 480 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954)   Cited 4 times

    This rule has been followed in a number of cases of receiving stolen property in Oklahoma. Mason v. State, 60 Okla. Cr. 427, 65 P.2d 203; Holloway v. State, 58 Okla. Cr. 100, 52 P.2d 109; Heglin v. State, 56 Okla. Cr. 364, 40 P.2d 41; Lordi v. State, 47 Okla. Cr. 102, 287 P. 1083; Paramore v. State, 47 Okla. Cr. 140, 286 P. 811; Winfield v. State, 44 Okla. Cr. 232, 280 P. 630; Pringle v. State, 32 Okla. Cr. 187, 239 P. 932. We are of the opinion that herein, the record on knowledge and intent had been made as of right, it should have been under the state's case in chief.

  5. Wilkerson v. State

    265 P.2d 739 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954)   Cited 5 times

    The foregoing rule has been followed in a number of receiving stolen property cases in Oklahoma, and evidence of other similar crimes was admitted on the foregoing theory. Mason v. State, 60 Okla. Cr. 427, 65 P.2d 203; Holloway v. State, 58 Okla. Cr. 100, 52 P.2d 109; Heglin v. State, 56 Okla. Cr. 364, 40 P.2d 41, wherein it was held, contemporaneous possession of other stolen property is admissible on the question of intent and guilty knowledge, where the charge is receiving stolen property; Lordi v. State, 47 Okla. Cr. 102, 287 P. 1083; Paramore v. State, 47 Okla. Cr. 140, 286 P. 811; Winfield v. State, 44 Okla. Cr. 232, 280 P. 630; Pringle v. State, 32 Okla. Cr. 187, 239 P. 932. In Walker v. State, 82 Okla. Cr. 352, 170 P.2d 261, 262, this court said:

  6. Finkelstein v. State

    99 P.2d 167 (Okla. Crim. App. 1940)   Cited 5 times

    The cases from other jurisdictions cited by defendant, State v. Keithley, 83 Mont. 177, 271 P. 449, and, State v. Coroles, 74 Utah 94, 277 P. 203, are to the same effect. The cases from this court which uphold the doctrine announced as the general rule are: Buttry v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 330, 194 P. 286; Brownell v. State, 33 Okla. Cr. 323, 244 P. 65; Pringle v. State, 32 Okla. Cr. 187, 239 P. 932. The contention that the judgment and sentence is based upon perjured testimony cannot be sustained. It is true that after the trial and conviction of this defendant, the witnesses, Jimmie Wilson and James Ross, made affidavits that part of the evidence which they gave at the trial, that they had told defendant that the property was stolen, was false, but there was no denial of any other part of their testimony.

  7. Key v. State

    259 P. 659 (Okla. Crim. App. 1927)   Cited 21 times

    It is generally held that the person who steals property is not an accomplice of the one who receives the property knowing it to be stolen, that the larceny and the receiving are independent crimes. Mayes v. State, 11 Okla. Cr. 61, 142 P. 1049; Pringle v. State, 32 Okla. Cr. 187, 239 P. 932. The exception to this general rule is that, where the thief and the receiver of stolen property conspire together in a prearranged plan for one to steal and deliver the property to the other, and pursuant to such plan one does steal and deliver to the other, the receiver is an accomplice of the thief, and the thief is an accomplice of the receiver.

  8. Leigh v. State

    246 P. 667 (Okla. Crim. App. 1926)   Cited 13 times

    An accomplice is one who may be informed against for the offense for which the defendant is being tried, one culpably implicated in the commission of the particular crime charged. Cudjoe v. State, 12 Okla. Cr. 246, 154 P. 500, L.R.A. 1916F, 1251; Hendrix v. State, 8 Okla. Cr. 530, 129 P. 78, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 546; Pringle v. State, 32 Okla. Cr. 187, 239 P. 032; Brownell v. State, 33 Okla. Cr. 323, 244 P. 65. One who purchases intoxicating liquor from a bootlegger is not an accomplice of the seller.

  9. Brownell v. State

    33 Okla. Crim. 323 (Okla. Crim. App. 1926)   Cited 12 times

    Following the general rule of law, it has been several times held by this court that a thief who steals property is not an accomplice of the person who receives it from him, knowing it to have been stolen, but that the thief and the receiver of the stolen goods are independent criminals. Mayes v. State, 11 Okla. Cr. 61, 142 P. 1049; Pringle v. State, 32 Okla. Cr. 187, 239 P. 932. There is, however, an exception to the rule announced to the effect that where the thief and the receiver of the stolen property conspire together to steal property, with a prearranged plan for the one who actually commits the theft to deliver it to the other at an agreed time and place, and pursuant to such plan does steal the property and deliver it to the receiver, the receiver is an accomplice of the thief and the thief is an accomplice of the receiver in the commission of the offense of receiving stolen property.

  10. Jefferson v. State

    34 Okla. Crim. 56 (Okla. Crim. App. 1926)   Cited 6 times

    See, also, White v. State, 23 Okla. Cr. 198, 214 P. 202. In Pringle v. State, 32 Okla. Cr. 187, 239 P. 932, it was said: "If witness could not have been indicted or informed against for offense for which defendant is being tried, he is not an accomplice."