Saunders, 101 Ohio St.3d 125, 2004-Ohio-339, 802 N.E.2d 650, at ¶ 33. To illustrate this principle, Saunders examined Princeton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio State Bd. of Edn., 96 Ohio App.3d 558, 645 N.E.2d 773 (1st Dist.1994). Princeton involved a legislatively created statewide computer-information network for public schools. The state board of education established "guidelines" for the compilation, collection, and reporting of data in conjunction with the network.

{¶ 33} Documents that explain rather than expand, fall outside R.C. Chapter 119. In Princeton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio State Bd. of Edn. (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 558, 645 N.E.2d 773, controversy arose around the Educational Management Information System ("EMIS"), a legislatively created computer network for public schools. R.C. 3301.0714.

In determining it was not impossible to comply with both acts, the court stated: 645 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio App. 1 Dist. 1994). Princeton City Sch. Dist., 645 N.E.2d at 778.

The Chronicle cites several federal and state cases as support for its position. See, e.g., Tombrello v. U.S.X. Corp., 763 F. Supp. 541, 545 (N.D.Ala.1991); Girardierv. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267, 1267-77 (8th Cir. 1977); Bauer v. Kincaid, 759 F. Supp. 575, 590 (W.D.Mo.1991); Student Press Law Ctr. v. Alexander, 778 F. Supp. 1227, 1232 n. 13 (D.D.C.1991) Smith v. Duquesne Univ., 612 F. Supp. 72, 80 (W.D.Pa.1985); Price v. Young, 580 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D.Ark.1983); Student Bar Assoc. v. Byrd, 293 N.C. 594, 239 S.E.2d 415 (1977); Princeton City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio State Bd. of Educ., 96 Ohio App.3d 558, 566, 645 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio App. 1994). The Chronicle refers to the following language from FERPA as support for its argument: "No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice" of releasing or permitting the release of "education records" or any personally identifiable information contained therein.

The legislative power of the state is vested in the General Assembly by Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, and it may not transfer these vested legislative functions unless it has provided sufficient standards within which a board or administrative agency may make subordinate rules. Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. (1994), 143 Ohio St. 329, 28 O.O. 295, 55 N.E.2d 629, paragraphs one and three of the syllabus; Princeton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio State Bd. of Edn. (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 558, 645 N.E.2d 773. Statutes are presumed to be constitutional unless shown beyond a reasonable doubt to violate a constitutional provision.

The mere fact that the operation of the school at or about the time the tax was imposed, did not result in profit, is not controlling, since it appears that at other times it did result in profit and was and still is conducted for the purpose of making a profit, and had a commercial aspect. Princeton v. State Board, 96 N.J.L. 334; Bancroft School v. StateBoard, 10 N.J. Mis. R. 656. It paid interest on its mortgage, and interest on its notes was paid up to April 15th, 1931, whereby certain members of its board of trustees who owned the notes were receiving profit from their investments. The mere fact that the school is organized under the act to incorporate associations not for pecuniary profit is not conclusive, since the proofs show that it was nevertheless conducted for the purpose of making a profit.

No constitutional provision requires the legislature to expressly set forth each and every right afforded to an offender at every stage of proceedings created by statutory process. AMOCO v. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Release Comp. Bd., 89 Ohio St.3d 477, 480, 2000-Ohio-224, 733 N.E.2d 592 (the General Assembly may delegate rulemaking authority to an executive agency); State v. Schreckengost, 30 Ohio St.2d 30, 32, 282 N.E.2d 50 (1972); O'Neal, 2020-Ohio-506, 146 N.E.3d 605, at ¶ 50 (10th Dist.) ("the General Assembly constitutionally may delegate authority to promulgate rules, policies, and regulations to subordinate boards and agencies"), citing Princeton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio State Bd. of Edn., 96 Ohio App.3d 558, 560, 645 N.E.2d 773 (1st Dist.1994), and Belden, 143 Ohio St. at 342, 55 N.E.2d 629. For that, the legislature is free to delegate authority to the executive branch.

Given that limit, however, the General Assembly constitutionally may delegate authority to promulgate rules, policies, and regulations to subordinate boards and agencies. Princeton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio State Bd. of Edn. , 96 Ohio App.3d 558, 560, 645 N.E.2d 773 (1st Dist.1994), citing Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. , 143 Ohio St. 329, 342, 55 N.E.2d 629 (1st Dist.1994). {¶ 51} "Delegation of rulemaking authority is a necessary response to the increasing complexity of modern government."

The Supreme Court, moreover, has generally treated the grant of rule-making authority to local boards of education quite broadly. See Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp. v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Edn. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 300, 304; Princeton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio State Bd. of Edn. (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 558, 564. We find no convincing reason to believe that the State Board's rule-making authority under R.C. 3319.31(G) is somehow more constrained.

It is axiomatic that to constitute a proper delegation of rule-making authority, there must be clear standards spelled out to provide direction to the administrative agencies. Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. (1944), 143 Ohio St. 329, 28 O.O. 295, 55 N.E.2d 629, paragraph three of the syllabus; Matz v. J.L. Curtis Cartage Co. (1937), 132 Ohio St. 271, 8 O.O. 41, 7 N.E.2d 220; Princeton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio State Bd. of Edn. (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 558, 645 N.E.2d 773. As stated by then Judge Clifford Brown in his concurring opinion in A.B. Jac, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm. (1972), 31 Ohio App.2d 9, 60 O.O.2d 60, 285 N.E.2d 763, an administrative agency may not act arbitrarily or capriciously in the enactment of rules and regulations in the exercise of its delegated powers.