Opinion
23A-CR-2794
08-19-2024
Christopher Alan Prince, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Andrew R. Rutz New Albany, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Courtney L. Staton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Floyd Superior Court The Honorable Carrie K. Stiller, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 22D01-2007-F3-1084
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Andrew R. Rutz New Albany, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Courtney L. Staton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
FOLEY, JUDGE.
[¶1] Christopher Alan Prince ("Prince") appeals the revocation of his probation. He presents the following restated issues for our review:
I. Whether there was fundamental error in the admission of documentary evidence regarding Prince's drug use;
II. Whether there was sufficient evidence that Prince violated a condition of his probation;
III. Whether Prince's challenge to the constitutionality of a probation condition related to attending rehabilitation programming is moot; and
IV. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the balance of Prince's previously suspended sentence.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] The State charged Prince with several criminal offenses in July 2020. Prince and the State reached a plea agreement, pursuant to which Prince pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine. On October 5, 2022, the trial court sentenced Prince to 1,460 days in the Indiana Department of Correction ("the DOC"), suspended the sentence to supervised probation, and required Prince to serve 1,092 days on home detention with Floyd County Community Corrections. One condition of probation was that Prince was to refrain from using drugs.
[¶4] In November 2022, a community corrections officer filed a notice alleging Prince violated conditions of his probation because Prince (1) had "[p]ositive drug screens on 10/6/22 and 10/20/22"; (2) "[s]igned admissions [to] positive drug screens on 10/13/22 and 10/27/22"; and (3) "[l]eft Sunrise Recovery inpatient treatment against medical advice on 11/4/22[.]" Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 122. In January 2023, the community corrections officer filed an amended notice, alleging Prince also violated the conditions of his probation by committing new criminal offenses. See id. at 134-38. In November 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Prince's alleged violations.
[¶5] At the evidentiary hearing, the State sought to admit State's Exhibits 1 and 2, which were two separate Rule Violation Forms in which Prince admitted to using methamphetamine while on probation. Prince objected to the admission of certain documents, but "lodg[ed] no objection" to the two Rule Violation Forms from October 2022. Tr. Vol. 1 pp. 22-23; see also id. at 32 (clarifying there was no objection to the October 2022 "signed admissions"). The first Rule Violation Form indicated that Prince used methamphetamine on October 1, 2022, which was before Prince was sentenced. See Ex. Vol. 1 p. 4. The second Rule Violation Form indicated that Prince used methamphetamine on October 23, 2022, which was after Prince was sentenced and placed on probation. See id. at 5. In addition to presenting the documents indicating that Prince used methamphetamine while on probation, the State presented evidence that Prince violated a condition of his probation by leaving a rehabilitation center against medical advice. See Tr. Vol. 1 p. 21. The State also referred to a new criminal case against Prince. The State presented the CCS, which the trial court admitted as State's Exhibit 3. The State also asked the court to "take judicial notice of those new charges," which it did. Id. at 36. The CCS reflected that, in January 2023, the State charged Prince with resisting law enforcement and possession of marijuana. As of the fact-finding hearing, that criminal matter was pending in Clark County.
[¶6] After the State presented its case, Prince testified on his own behalf. Prince admitted to regularly using methamphetamine prior to his arrest, and he explained that it was difficult to stop using methamphetamine. When defense counsel asked Prince whether he "freely admitted . . . that [he] used methamphetamine at least two (2) times," Prince said: "Yes, Sir." Id. at 44.
[¶7] During closing arguments, the State asserted that it "just ha[d] to prove one (1) violation for the trial court to revoke [Prince's] probation," and that the State had done so. Id. at 45. The State asked the court to revoke Prince's probation and "order that . . . the remainder of his suspended sentence . . . be executed at the DOC." Id. In Prince's closing argument, he did not dispute that he violated at least one condition of his probation. Indeed, Prince again "acknowledged methamphetamine use two (2) times . . . while on [c]ommunity [c]orrections[.]" Id. at 47. Prince conceded that, because of that methamphetamine use, "the [c]ourt would certainly . . . be well within its ability to determine he did violate terms of his probation." Id. Prince focused his closing argument on the potential sanction. See id. He ultimately sought "another shot at treatment," noting that "methamphetamine [use] [was] a very hard thing to shake." Id.
Prince also encouraged the trial court to obtain "a recommendation from [his community corrections officer] as to what the appropriate sanction should be here," noting that the officer was "versed with high risk offenders[.]" Id.
[¶8] Before ruling on the petition to revoke, the trial court asked Prince's community corrections officer what she thought "the appropriate sanction would be in this case" based on her "perspective" and "experience as a high risk supervisor[.]" Id. The community corrections officer said she "would ask that the [c]ourt . . . execute the max sentence to [the] DOC." Id. The court then asked, "So does that mean you do not believe that [Prince] would be served on probation or [c]ommunity [c]orrections further?" Id. The officer responded as follows:
I have given . . . Prince multiple opportunities to engage in treatment.... I have called him for random drug screens and he chose not to answer the phone or return the call or show up for the drug screens. He's currently on bi-weekly reporting in order to accommodate his work schedule. I feel that I've offered him several opportunities to get into compliance and he did not take it as seriously as he should have.Id. When the trial court gave Prince the opportunity to respond, Prince claimed that he "didn't receive the phone call" and had "apologized . . . for that." Id. at 48. Prince pointed out that his "last several drug screens ha[d] [come] back negative[.]" Id. Prince also noted that he was "enrolled in counseling." Id. He again asked the trial court to keep him on probation, seeking a chance "to let [him] show" he was going to "comply with the laws." Id. At that point, the trial court reflected on the evidence and remarked that it was "clear that there ha[d] been a violation." Id. The trial court specifically identified multiple violations, including a violation due to Prince's use of methamphetamine. Referring to "the signed admissions for a positive drug screen" in October 2022, the court expressed its "concern" that Prince had pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine on October 5, 2022, and then "almost immediately [Prince] w[as] not complying with the terms" of probation. Id. at 49. The trial court also identified two other violations: (1) "leaving . . . the treatment center against medical advice" and (2) "the commitment of a new criminal offense[.]" Id.
The court ultimately revoked the balance of Prince's previously suspended sentence and ordered Prince to serve 694 days in the DOC. Prince appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Evidentiary Challenge
[¶9] Prince challenges the admission of State's Exhibits 1 and 2, which were the Rule Violation Forms that Prince signed, wherein Prince admitted to using methamphetamine on two occasions in October 2022. See Ex. Vol. 1 pp. 4-5.
[¶10] To preserve a challenge to the admission of evidence, a litigant must lodge a timely objection or move to strike. See Ind. Evid. R. 103(a). Because Prince did not object to the admission of the Rule Violation Forms or move to strike them, Prince waived his challenge to the admission of the evidence. See id. Under the circumstances, our review is limited to whether the admission of the evidence amounted to fundamental error. Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010). Fundamental error is an "extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule" where a litigant bears the "heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to the defendant's rights as to 'make a fair trial impossible.'" Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. 2002)). In other words, there must be "'clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process'" that "'present an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.'" Id. (quoting Benson, 762 N.E.2d at 756). Moreover, to the extent we must engage in statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep't, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016). When interpretating a statute, our role is to give words their "plain meaning" and "consider the structure of the statute as a whole." Id.
[¶11] Here, Prince argues that the State obtained his signature on the challenged Rule Violation Forms without first offering him the opportunity to speak with an attorney. Prince contends this procedure was contrary to the following statute:
A person may admit to a violation of probation and waive the right to a probation violation hearing after being offered the opportunity to consult with an attorney. If the person admits to a violation and requests to waive the probation violation hearing, the probation officer shall advise the person that by waiving the right to a probation violation hearing the person forfeits the rights provided in subsection (f). The sanction administered must follow the schedule of progressive probation violation sanctions adopted by the judicial conference of Indiana under IC 11-13-1-8.I.C. § 35-38-2-3(e), (emphasis added).
[¶12] The foregoing statute applies only when a probationer seeks to (1) "admit to a violation," (2) bypass procedural safeguards by "waiv[ing] the right to a probation violation hearing," and (3) opt into a "schedule of progressive probation violation sanctions" that will be administered by the probation officer rather than imposed by the trial court. Id. But that was not the scenario in this case. By signing the Rule Violation Forms, Prince admitted he violated a condition of probation, but he did not waive the right to a hearing. Indeed, this appeal arose after a hearing on the violation. Thus, because Prince did not "admit to a violation of probation and waive the right to a probation violation hearing," there was no statutory entitlement regarding consultation with an attorney. I.C. § 35-38-2-3(e). We therefore conclude that Prince has not identified any error-let alone fundamental error-in the admission of the Rule Violation Forms.
II. Sufficiency of Evidence of a Violation
[¶13] Prince suggests that the trial court lacked the authority to revoke his probation because there was insufficient evidence that Prince violated a condition of his probation. The trial court has the authority to revoke a person's probation if the person violates a condition of probation. I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h). The State "must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence." I.C. § 35-38-2-3(f). Put differently, in this case, the State was obligated to prove that Prince "more likely than not" violated his probation. Escamilla v. Shiel Sexton Co., Inc., 73 N.E.3d 663, 670 (Ind. 2017). "[W]ith respect to probation revocation, we will only review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion." McKnight v. State, 787 N.E.2d 888, 892 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003). "An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances." Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007).
[¶14] Here, Prince directs us to the trial court's determination that "there was a violation" of a condition of probation based on "the commitment of a new criminal offense" in January 2023. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 49. Prince asserts-and the State concedes on appeal-that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Prince committed a new criminal offense. The State directs us to caselaw for the proposition that "the mere filing of a criminal charge against a defendant does not warrant the revocation of probation." Brown v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1179, 1183 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (quoting Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014)). And the State ultimately concedes that, "at most, the State presented evidence to show that Prince had been arrested and charged with resisting law enforcement and possession of marijuana," but the State "did not, however, meet [its] burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Prince actually committed those offenses." Appellee's Br. p. 24.
[¶15] But our inquiry does not end here. It is well-settled that "[o]ne violation of a condition of probation is enough to support a probation revocation." Pierce v. State, 44 N.E.3d 752, 755 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015). Thus, so long as there was sufficient evidence that Prince violated a different condition of his probation, the trial court had the authority to impose a sanction upon the violation. See id.
[¶16] As earlier discussed, Prince testified about his use of methamphetamine. Furthermore, in his closing argument, Prince acknowledged that he used "methamphetamine . . . two (2) times . . . while on [c]ommunity [c]orrections" and that, because of Prince's use of methamphetamine, "the [c]ourt would certainly . . . be well within its ability to determine he did violate terms of his probation." Tr. Vol. 2 p. 47. Based on the foregoing, we conclude there was sufficient evidence Prince violated his probation by using methamphetamine. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in identifying a violation.
III. Moot Challenge to Probation Condition
[¶17] Prince directs our attention to a probation condition that required him to attend rehabilitation programming. Prince claims this probation condition was unduly intrusive on his "right to refuse medical treatment," which Prince claims "is analogous to the right to confrontation, the right to due process, and the right to counsel." Appellant's Br. p. 31. However, we need not address this issue. As the Indiana Supreme Court explained, an issue is moot when we are unable to render effective relief. G.W. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ind. 2024). In this case, Prince is no longer on probation, and therefore, he is not subject to the challenged probation condition. Moreover, we have already determined that the trial court had authority to impose a sanction based on evidence indicating that Prince violated his probation by using methamphetamine. Thus, even if Prince prevailed on his constitutional claim, we would not be able to render effective relief. We therefore conclude that the constitutional claim is moot. Furthermore, although we have discretion to issue an advisory opinion on this issue under the public interest exception, in this case, we decline to exercise that discretion. Cf. E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. &Health Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 467 (Ind. 2022) (discussing the scope of our discretion as to moot issues). We therefore do not further address Prince's challenge to the probation condition.
IV. Sanction
[¶18] Prince claims the trial court abused its discretion by revoking the balance of his previously suspended sentence and ordering him to serve 694 days in the DOC. If the State proves a violation of probation, "the trial court must decide whether the violation warrants revocation of probation." May v. State, 58 N.E.3d 204, 206 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016). Our legislature gave the trial court several options:
(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.
(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.
(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h). In this case, the trial court chose the third option, ordering Prince to execute the balance of his previously suspended sentence in the DOC.
[¶19] The trial court's decision to revoke a person's probation is "within [its] sound discretion," and we review the trial court's decision "only for an abuse of that discretion." Trammell v. State, 45 N.E.3d 1212, 1215 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015). Our Supreme Court has emphasized that, "[o]nce a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed." Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188.
The Court added that, "[i]f this discretion were not afforded to trial courts" and its probation-related decisions were "scrutinized too severely on appeal," trial courts "might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants." Id.
[¶20] In challenging the sanction imposed, Prince argues that the goal of probation "is rehabilitation," and there was evidence indicating that "he was substantially succeeding in achieving that goal." Appellant's Br. p. 32. He points out that, in the eleven months preceding the revocation hearing, there was no additional notice of a violation. Prince asserts that "[o]ne could characterize that elevenmonth period as one in which [he] substantially complied with the conditions of probation." Id. at 33. Prince also directs us to three circumstances he claims "strongly argue in favor of extending [his] probation: (i) [his] full employment; (ii) [his] continued progress, although not without its occasional lapses, toward full addiction recovery; and (iii) [his] success at providing support for his son." Id. at 34. Prince asks us to "find that the[se] mitigators, when viewed in the totality of the evidence," lead "inexorably" to the conclusion that "an executed sentence was an abuse of discretion in lieu of extending [his] probation[.]" Id.
[¶21] In reviewing for an abuse of discretion, an appellate court's role is to "consider all the evidence most favorable to supporting the judgment of the trial court without reweighing that evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses." Smith v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1110, 1112 (Ind. 2012). In this case, the trial court obtained input from Prince's community corrections officer, who Prince acknowledged had valuable insight based on her experience as a "high risk" supervisor. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 47. And the community corrections officer recommended revoking the balance of Prince's suspended sentence, noting that her impression was that Prince was not taking his placement on probation "as seriously as he should have." Id. All in all, based on the nature of the violation, and the candid insight from the community corrections officer, we cannot say the trial court's sanction was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.
Conclusion
[¶22] Because a fair trial was not impossible due to the admission of the Rule Violation Forms, Prince has not established fundamental trial error. Further, having identified sufficient evidence Prince violated a condition of his probation by using methamphetamine, we conclude Prince's constitutional challenge to a different probation condition is moot and decline to further address the issue. Finally, we conclude that the sanction imposed was not an abuse of discretion.
[¶23] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.