The state district court denied the state habeas petition (ex. 54). The district court determined that the Nevada case of Prince v. State, 55 P.3d 947 (Nev. 2002), in which the Nevada Supreme Court held that the IAD does not apply to sentencings, controlled the outcome of petitioner's state habeas petition. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the denial of the state habeas petition on that basis (ex. 67 at 2).
Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005). The district court determined Barlett's claims of ineffective assistance were not well-founded because the Interstate Agreement on Detainers' 180–day dispositional requirement does not apply to sentencing hearings, see Prince v. State, 118 Nev. 634, 640, 55 P.3d 947, 950 (2002), and Bartlett failed to adequately demonstrate that he was entitled to credit for time served in the California prison, see Griffin v. State, 122 Nev. 737, 745, 137 P.3d 1165, 1170 (2006). Bartlett claims that the district court's reliance on Prince was misplaced and that the district court should have instead relied on Tinghitella v. State of California, 718 F.2d 308 (9th Cir.1983).
We conclude that this claim is without merit. See NRS 176.015(1) ; Prince v. State, 118 Nev. 634, 641, 55 P.3d 947, 951 (2002) ; Dressier v. State, 107 Nev. 686, 697, 819 P.2d 1288, 1295 (1991). To the extent that Burnham claims that the district court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his other proper person motions, he failed to demonstrate that an evidentiary hearing was warranted.
Having considered Hooks' speedy-trial claim, we conclude that his right to a speedy trial was not violated. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); see also Prince v. State, 118 Nev. 634, 641, 55 P.3d 947, 951 (2002).DISCUSSION
He caused the delay of which he complains. It seems unfair to require the State to potentially incur two expenses: [the defendant's] transportation to Nevada for sentencing and then back again to Arizona for completion of his sentence of imprisonment, all in order to timely sentence him when he is the source of his own problems.Prince v. State, 118 Nev. 634, 640, 55 P.3d 947, 950 (2002). In addition to finding that incarceration in another jurisdiction is a justified reason for delay, courts have generally found that delay due to incarceration is not prejudicial to a defendant.
Under NRS 178.405, whenever "doubt arises as to the competence of the defendant, the court shall suspend the trial . . . until the question of competence is determined." Prince v. State, 118 Nev. 634, 637, 642, 55 P.3d 947, 949, 952 (2002) (holding that the IAD does not apply to a defendant awaiting sentencing). NRS 178.620, Art. I.
As noted by the State, almost every court considering this issue has concluded that the IAD does not apply to sentencing detainers. See, e.g., State v. Sills, 317 P.3d 307, 314 (Or. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Jimenez, 808 N.W.2d 352, 357 (Neb. 2012); State v. Bates, 689 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004); Painter v. State, 848 A.2d 692, 705 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004); Prince v. State, 55 P.3d 947, 949-51 (Nev. 2002); State v. Miller, 4 P.3d 570, 575 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000); Lancaster v. Stubblefield, 985 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Mo.Ct.App. 1998); State v. Grzelak, 573 N.W.2d 538, 584 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Leyva, 906 P.2d 910, 910-11 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437 (2016); Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1369 (Colo. 1993); State v. Barefield, 756 P.2d 731, 733 (Wash. 1988). Many of those cases involved situations like Defendant's, where the prisoner pleaded guilty to charges but was never sentenced because the prisoner failed to appear for a sentencing hearing.
Further, it appears that any prejudice resulting from the delay was minimal. See Prince v. State, 118 Nev. 634, 641, 55 P.3d 947, 951 (2002). Having concluded that appellant's claims lack merit, we
When faced with the question of whether the Interstate Agreement on Detainers applies when a defendant has been convicted of a crime in another jurisdiction but not yet sentenced, the majority of courts have concluded that it does not. See Stephenson v. State, 801 So.2d 34, 37-40 (Ala.Crim.Ct.App. 2000); State v. Burkett, 179 Ariz. 109, 876 P.2d 1144, 1146-48 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1993); People v. Mahan, 111 Cal.App.3d 28, 168 Cal.Rptr. 428, 431 (1980); People v. Castoe, 86 Cal.App.3d 484, 150 Cal.Rptr. 237, 238-40 (1978); Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1358-59, 1367-72 (Colo. 1993); Bogue v. Fennelly, 705 So.2d 575, 581 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1997); Lancaster v. Stubblefield, 985 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Mo.Ct.App. 1998); Prince v. State, 118 Nev. 634, 55 P.3d 947, 950-51 (2002); State v. Sparks, 104 N.M. 62, 716 P.2d 253, 255 (N.M.Ct.App. 1986), cert. denied, 103 N.M. 798, 715 P.2d 71 (1986); People v. Randolph, 85 Misc.2d 1022, 381 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193-94 (1976); State v. Barnes, 14 Ohio App.3d 351, 471 N.E.2d 514, 516 (Ohio Ct.App. 1984); State v. Leyva, 906 P.2d 910, 911-12 (Utah Ct.App. 1995); State v. Barefield, 110 Wash.2d 728, 756 P.2d 731, 732-34 (1988); State v. Grzelak, 215 Wis.2d 577, 573 N.W.2d 538, 539-41 (Wis.Ct.App. 1997). The minority view is articulated in Tinghitella v. California, 718 F.2d 308, 309-11 (9th Cir. 1983).
See also Stephenson v. State, 801 So.2d 34, 40 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000); People v. Castoe, 150 Cal.Rptr. 237, 239 (Cal.Ct.App. 1978); Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1372 (Colo. 1993); Bogue v. Fennelly, 705 So.2d 575, 581 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1997); State v. Miller, 4 P.3d 570, 575 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000); Lancaster v. Stubblefield, 985 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Mo.Ct.App. 1998); State v. Barns, 471 N.E.2d 514, 516 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Prince v. State, 55 P.3d 947, 950-51 (Nev. 2002); State v. Sparks, 104 N.M. 62, 716 P.2d 253, 256 (N.M.Ct.App. 1986); People v. Randolph, 381 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1978); State v. Leyva, 906 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. Barefield, 756 P.2d 731, 734 (Wash. 1988); State v. Grzelak, 215 Wis.2d 577, 573 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Wis.Ct.App. 1997).