re apparent); Funez v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, No. 1:12-CV-0259-WSD, 2013 WL 123566, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 2013) (denying plaintiff's request to have her attorney attend and videotape defendant's Rule 35 medical examination because plaintiff did not show that such special conditions were necessary); Mantel, 2009 WL 3247225 at *1 (denying plaintiff's motion for a protective order to allow her lawyer to attend and videotape defendant's Rule 35 medical examination in light of the "majority view" amongst federal courts); Tomlinson v. Landers, No. 07-CV-1180J-TEM, 2009 WL 2496531, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2009) (denying plaintiff's motion to permit a videographer to attend defendant's Rule 35 medical examination because plaintiff did not offer any evidence that defendant's doctor would not conduct a fair examination). While Plaintiff cites Florida state case law permitting the presence of an attorney and videographer at a Court-ordered medical examination, see (ECF No. 26 at 4) (citing Prince v. Mallari, 36 So. 3d 128 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) and U.S. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Cimino, 754 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 2000)), as shown above, "[t]here is substantial case law within the Federal Courts that expressly excludes third parties and any recording devices from a Rule 35 physical or mental examination." Mantel v. Carnival Corp., No. 09-CV-20042, 2009 WL 3247225, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2009) (King, J.) (citations omitted).
The party who moves for the examination of the other party does not have the right to have counsel present at the examination. Prince v. Mallari, 36 So.3d 128, 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). The party being examined has a privacy interest that deserves protection; the party seeking the examination already is represented by the examiner.
The party who moves for the examination of the other party does not have the right to have counsel present at the examination. Prince v. Mallari, 36 So. 3d 128, 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). The party being examined has a privacy interest that deserves protection; the party seeking the examination already is represented by the examiner.Id. at 132.
" We agree with and adopt the reasoning and holding of our sister court in Prince v. Mallari, 36 So. 3d 128 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010), and accordingly hold that the trial court's order departed from the essential requirements of law by compelling petitioner to submit to an IME that was to be videotaped by respondents. We grant the petition and quash the order insofar as it compels petitioner to submit to an IME videotaped by or on behalf of respondents.
SAWAYA, J. Petitioners seek certiorari review of a circuit court order requiring Petitioner, Amparo R. De Larocha, to submit to a compulsory medical examination in the presence of a videographer hired by and acting on behalf of counsel for Respondents. Pursuant to this court's recent decision in Prince v. Mallari, 36 So.3d 128 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010), we conclude that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law and that Petitioners will suffer irreparable harm. We note, parenthetically, that Respondents confess error based on Prince.
PER CURIAM. We grant Petitioner's application for review of the trial court's order permitting Respondents to videotape Petitioner's compulsory medical exam. Prince v. Mallari, 36 So.3d 128 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). That portion of the order that permits Respondents to videotape the exam is quashed. PETITION GRANTED.