Prince George's County v. Vieira

39 Citing cases

  1. Bottini v. Dep't of Fin.

    450 Md. 177 (Md. 2016)   Cited 41 times
    Using dictionary definition to construe the meaning of the term "money" in a statute

    The measures that have been taken are not out of step with the great weight of authority. See also?Prince George's Cnty. v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 658, 667 A.2d 898, 901 (1995) (The forfeiture statute “is, and was intended to be, a harsh law.” (Citation omitted)).

  2. Howard County Maryland v. Connolley

    767 A.2d 926 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001)   Cited 1 times

    So I will for those reasons grant the Defendant's motion to dismiss.Prince George's County v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 667 A.2d 898 (1995). In Vieira, the Court of Appeals held that, pursuant to Art. 27, § 297(d)(2), when petitioning for the forfeiture of currency, an executed show case order, rather than a proposed one, must accompany the complaint for forfeiture. Failure to do so warranted dismissal.

  3. Helman v. Kim

    130 Md. App. 181 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000)   Cited 7 times

    Where, giving the words of the statute their ordinary and common meaning, the statute is clear and unambiguous, it usually is unnecessary to go further.Prince George's County v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 658, 667 A.2d 898 (1995) (citations omitted). The plain language in § 7-106(c)(1) provides a presumption of payment under specified conditions.

  4. Bottini v. Dep't of Fin.

    No. 1857 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 10, 2015)

    The forfeiture statute "is, and was intended to be, a harsh law." Prince George's Cnty. v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 658 (1995). The Court of Appeals has expressed, however, that although the law is harsh, "it has long been settled in this State that forfeitures are not favored in the law."

  5. Simpson v. Construction Services, Inc.

    143 Md. App. 606 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002)   Cited 7 times

    "We may, however, confirm the meaning reached by reference to the words of the statute by considering the purpose, goal or context of the statute." Prince George's County v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 658, 667 A.2d 898 (1995). "`[C]ontext may include related statutes, pertinent legislative history and `other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal. . . .'" Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 138, 647 A.2d 106 (1994) (quoting Geico v. Insurance Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 132, 630 A.2d 713 (1993)) (internal citations omitted).

  6. Carey v. Chessie Computer Services, Inc.

    141 Md. App. 228 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001)   Cited 1 times

    "[T]he cardinal rule is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent." Mayor of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 987 (2000); Prince George's County, Maryland v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 658 (1995). "`The primary source from which we glean this intention is the language of the statute itself.

  7. Reed v. Sears, Roebuck Co.

    934 F. Supp. 713 (D. Md. 1996)   Cited 9 times
    Finding the sealed container defense applicable to the sale of a storm door, in part because of Sears' assertion that it had no actual or constructive knowledge of any potential defect

    Ward v. Department of Pub. Saf. Cor. Servs., 339 Md. 343, 351-52, 663 A.2d 66, 70 (1995) (citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Prince George's County v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 658, 667 A.2d 898, 901 (1995) ("Where, giving the words of the statute their ordinary and common meaning, the statute is clear and unambiguous, it usually is unnecessary to go further.") (citations omitted). In the present case, the terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous.

  8. Rohrer v. Humane Soc'y of Wash. Cnty.

    454 Md. 1 (Md. 2017)   Cited 4 times

    As the District Court noted, the statute says nothing about transferring ownership of the animal.Prince George's County v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 659, 667 A.2d 898 (1995).

  9. In re Adoption/Guardianship Dustin R.

    445 Md. 536 (Md. 2015)   Cited 12 times

    Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass'n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 394–95, 761 A.2d 899, 911 (2000) (ellipsis in original) (citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). Although the Maryland Rules do not define "order," in Prince George's Cnty. v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 661, 667 A.2d 898, 903 (1995), we described an "order" as follows: "[A]n 'order' emanates from a court and, in fact, constitutes a command or decree of the court." For purposes of contempt of a court order, the Court of Special Appeals has stated that "the order must be sufficiently definite, certain, and specific in its terms so that the party may understand precisely what conduct the order requires."

  10. Stalker Brothers v. Alcoa Concrete Masonry

    422 Md. 410 (Md. 2011)   Cited 5 times

    This reading of § 8–315 is also consistent with the general principle that a construction of a statute that would result in a forfeiture is to be avoided whenever possible. See One 1995 Corvette v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 353 Md. 114, 139, 724 A.2d 680, 692, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 927, 120 S.Ct. 321, 145 L.Ed.2d 250 (1999); Prince George's County v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 659–60, 667 A.2d 898, 902 (1995); Commercial Credit Corp. v. State, 258 Md. 192, 199, 265 A.2d 748, 752 (1970). Further, the obligation under § 8–315 is on the payor, here, Stalker. It is not a reasonable construction of the statute to allow Stalker to withhold payment, now that Alcoa is licensed, on the ground that Alcoa previously was unlicensed when Stalker was violating the Act by making some payments during that period.