Walston v. Boeing Co. , 181 Wash.2d 391, ¶ 26, 334 P.3d 519, 525 (2014) ("The gradations of tortious conduct can best be understood as a continuum.") citing Woodson v. Rowland , 329 N.C. 330, 341-42, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991) (discussing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A & cmt. b (1965) and W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 8, at 35 (5th ed.1984).Fox v. Memorial Hospital, see note 3, supra at ¶7; Flanders v. Crane Co., 1984 OK 88, ¶10, 693 P.2d 602, 605 (Okla. 1984) ; Prickett v. Sulzberger & Sons Co., 1916 OK 387, ¶51, 57 Okl. 567, 157 P. 356, 365 (1916).Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. , 579 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1923, 1933, 195 L.Ed.2d 278 (2016) (observing "culpability is generally measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time of the challenged conduct" with citations including, but not limited to, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965) ("intent" denotes state of mind in which "the actor desires to cause consequences of his act" or "believes" them to be "substantially certain to result from it"), and W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 34, p. 212 (5th ed. 1984) (describing willful, wanton, and reckless as "look[ing] to the actor's real or supposed state of mind"), and Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr , 551 U.S. 47, 69, 127 S.Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007), (a person is reckless if he acts "knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize" his actions are unreasonably
[3] The Iowa court indicated that such is a jury question. Furthermore, in Prickett v. Sulzberger Sons Co., 57 Okla. 567, 157 P. 356, the court held: "As to the necessity, character, and amount of light which ought to be furnished it is invariably held to be a question for the jury to determine whether the defendant was negligent. . .. "
These are nondelegable duties resting upon the master. Choctaw Electric Co. v. Clark, 28 Okla. 399, 114 P. 730; Prickett v. Sulzberger Sons, 57 Okla. 567, 157 P. 356. It is true that the master has discretion concerning the kind of machinery he will use, and may use, either new or old, but there is a further duty resting upon the master. He must select and use the type and kind of machinery, and conduct his work in such a method as not to throw an undue danger on his employees.
Although I consider these omissions unfortunate, I dissent because of questions which must be resolved by the trier of fact — the existence of material questions of fact, the resolution of the issues of negligence and the degrees thereof. Issues of negligence and the degrees thereof are questions for the trier of fact. Fox v. Oklahoma Memorial Hosp., 774 P.2d 459 462 (Okla. 1989); Flanders v. Crane Co., 693 P.2d 602, 605 (Okla. 1984); Prickett v. Sulzberger Sons Co., 57 Okla. 567, 157 P. 356, 365 (1916). FACTS
This reluctance should be even more pronounced in negligence cases because negligence is so much a question of fact which varies from one situation to another. See Prickett v. Sulzberger Sons Co., 157 P. 356, 357 (Okla. 1916); Smith v. American Flyers, Inc., 540 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Okla. App. 1975) . . . Under Oklahoma law, questions concerning negligence, contributory negligence and assumption of the risks are for the trier of fact." Flanders, supra at 605, 606.
Buckner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 760 P.2d 803, 812 (Okla. 1988).Flanders v. Crane Co., 693 P.2d 602, 605 (Okla. 1984); Prickett v. Sulzberger Sons Co., 57 Okla. 567, 157 P. 356, 365 (1916). AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART
Flanders v. Crane Co., 693 P.2d 602, 605 (Okla. 1984); Prickett v. Sulzberger Sons Co., 57 Okla. 567, 157 P. 356, 365 (1916).
This reluctance should be even more pronounced in negligence cases because negligence is so much a question of fact which varies from one situation to another. See Prickett v. Sulzberger Sons Co., 57 Okla. 1567, 157 P. 356, 357 (1916); Smith v. American Flyers, Inc., 540 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Okla.Ct. App. 1975). Thus, despite its usefulness in terms of judicial economy, summary judgment must not be allowed to deprive a litigant of a jury trial of disputed issues of fact.
W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 80 at 546 (3d ed. 1964); 41 Am.Jur.2d, Independent Contractors §§ 24, 25, 27 (1968); Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1375 (1953); 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 603 (1948); see generally, Whatley v. Delta Brokerage Warehouse Co., 248 Miss. 416, 159 So.2d 634 (1964); May v. Vardaman Mfg. Co., 244 Miss. 261, 142 So.2d 18 (1962). Moreover, this duty to use reasonable care to furnish the employees of a subcontractor a reasonably safe place to work includes that of furnishing light when necessary to make the place where the work is being done reasonably safe. Greenleaf v. Puget Sound Bridge Dredging Co., 58 Wn.2d 647, 364 P.2d 796 (1961); Crawford v. Duluth Missabe Iron Range Co., 220 Minn. 225, 230, 19 N.W.2d 384, 388 (1945); Prickett v. Sulzberger Sons Co., 57 Okla. 567, 157 P. 356 (1916); Burns v. Northern Iowa Brick Tile Co., 152 Iowa 61, 130 N.W. 1083 (1911); Annot., 44 A.L.R. 932 (1926). (228 So.2d at 367).
W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 80 at 546 (3d ed. 1964); 41 Am.Jur.2d, Independent Contractors §§ 24, 25, 27 (1968); Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1375 (1953); 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 603 (1948); see generally, Whatley v. Delta Brokerage Warehouse Co., 248 Miss. 416, 159 So.2d 634 (1964); May v. Vardaman Mfg. Co., 244 Miss. 261, 142 So.2d 18 (1962). Moreover, this duty to use reasonable care to furnish the employees of a subcontractor a reasonably safe place to work includes that of furnishing light when necessary to make the place where the work is being done reasonably safe. Greenleaf v. Puget Sound Bridge Dredging Co., 58 Wn.2d 647, 364 P.2d 796 (1961); Crawford v. Duluth Missabe Iron Range Co., 220 Minn. 225, 230, 19 N.W.2d 384, 388 (1945); Prickett v. Sulzberger Sons Co., 57 Okla. 567, 157 P. 356 (1916); Bruns v. Northern Iowa Brick Tile Co., 152 Iowa 61, 130 N.W. 1083 (1911); Annot., 44 A.L.R. 932 (1926). The evidence and reasonable inferences from it were sufficient to justify the jury in finding that Ingalls, in control of the vessel, failed to exercise reasonable care to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work, by its undisputed failure to have the aft deck of the vessel lighted, and that this negligence was a proximate cause of McDougald's injuries.