Opinion
2023-CA-0584-MR
09-06-2024
STEPHEN D. PRICE APPELLANT v. MATTHEW WELCH APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Stephen D. Price, pro se BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: John M. Sosbe
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE KATHRYN H. GABHART, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CI-00773.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Stephen D. Price, pro se
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: John M. Sosbe
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND L. JONES, JUDGES.
OPINION
JONES, L., JUDGE:
Stephen Price, pro se, appeals an order of the Scott Circuit Court that dismissed his complaint for lack of standing in his attempt to prevent Matthew Welch from constructing a parking lot on Welch's property in the city of Georgetown. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
On December 2, 2022, Price filed a complaint in the Scott Circuit Court seeking a restraining order to prevent Welch from tearing down three structures and various vegetation on Welch's property in order to install a parking lot. Price referred to the Scott County Comprehensive Plan for his argument that the buildings should be preserved and repaired, rather than demolished. However, the complaint did acknowledge that Welch had received the required permits from the Scott County Planning and Zoning Office, as well as from the Kentucky Division of Water due to the planned construction taking place on a floodplain. Price also stated that he requested an administrative hearing with the Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet regarding the permit from the Kentucky Division of Water; however, that hearing had not taken place prior to the date Price filed his complaint.
Shortly after filing his complaint, Price filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. Rather than file an answer to the complaint, Welch filed a response to the motion, in which he argued Price had failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, loss, damage, or anything other than a generalized grievance. The circuit court conducted a hearing and denied Price's motion. Less than one month later, Welch filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing. The circuit court again conducted a hearing and Price argued he had standing because he was born and raised in the neighborhood where the parking lot was going to be (although he no longer lived there), and because a parking lot would result in increased traffic which, because Price did not drive, would result in an increased risk to him as a pedestrian. He also stated that he grew crops in the area. The circuit court granted Welch's motion and dismissed the complaint. Price filed a motion to vacate, which was denied. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
The question before us on review is whether Price has constitutional standing to bring an action against Welch to stop the construction of a parking lot on Welch's property. "Matters of constitutional standing are reviewed de novo."
Kasey v. Beshear, 626 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Ky. App. 2021) (citation omitted).
Analysis
Unfortunately, although Price's complaint was dismissed for lack of standing, he fails to argue standing on appeal. Rather, he argues people should drive less and reduce waste. While his sentiments and conviction are admirable, Price fails to address the issue at hand. Accordingly, we shall do so only briefly.
We agree that Price lacked standing to bring the lawsuit against Welch.
[F]or a party to sue in Kentucky, the initiating party must have the requisite constitutional standing to do so, defined by three requirements: (1) injury, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. In other words, [a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.Commonwealth Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Department for Medicaid Services v. Sexton by and through Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc., 566 S.W.3d 185, 196 (Ky. 2018) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
Further, "[prevailing Kentucky authority establishes the standard for standing to sue as a judicially recognizable interest in the subject matter. The interest may not be remote and speculative, but must be a present and substantial interest in the subject matter." City of Louisville v. Stock Yards Bank &Tr. Co., 843 S.W.2d 327, 328-29 (Ky. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Price failed to demonstrate injury, causation, or redressability. Any interest he had in Welch's construction of the parking lot was remote and speculative at best. In fact, during the hearing on Welch's motion to dismiss the complaint, Price stated, "The point of me litigating this case is to reduce motor traffic." Price does not live near the area; therefore, his hypothetical scenario that the parking lot would cause more traffic which would result in greater risk to himself and other pedestrians does not confer a "present and substantial interest" to survive the motion to dismiss.
Although Price cites Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 100.183 regarding the requirement of a comprehensive plan for cities, counties, and other local units, as well as KRS 224.43-010 regarding solid waste management practices in Kentucky, neither of these statutes confers statutory standing. Finally, Price also points to the Kentucky Driver's Manual and Scott County's Comprehensive Plan, neither of which confer standing for Price to bring the instant action.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Scott Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.