Opinion
CASE NO. 4:14-CR-7-CDL-MSH-2 CASE NO. 4:19-CV-197-CDL-MSH
06-16-2020
KAYLA PRICE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Petitioner's motion to vacate her sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 126). For the hereinbelow reasons, the Court recommends that Petitioner's motion be denied.
BACKGROUND
On March 12, 2014, a federal grand jury indicted Petitioner and two co-defendants on five counts related to drug and firearm possession. Indictment 1-5, ECF No. 1. On December 8, 2014, Defendant pled guilty to count two of the indictment, possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii). Plea Agreement 3, ECF No. 68. Judgement was entered against Petitioner on April 7, 2015, and she was sentenced to 100 months' imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment. Judgement 1-5, ECF. No. 95. Petitioner did not appeal. On November 22, 2019, the court received Petitioner's pro se motion to vacate her sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF. No. 126). Respondent responded on January 3, 2020, arguing the Court should deny Petitioner's motion because (1) it is untimely, (2) Petitioner's claims are subject to procedural default, and (3) Petitioner's claims lack merit. Resp. to Mot. to Vacate 1-11, ECF No. 131. Petitioner's motion is ripe for review.
DISCUSSION
I. AEDPA Standards
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, enacted on April 24, 1996 (hereinafter "AEDPA") was created primarily to put an end to the unacceptable delay in the review of prisoners' habeas petitions by adding a one-year limitation period for the filing of habeas corpus petitions. "The purpose of the AEDPA is not obscure. It was to eliminate the interminable delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, and the . . . overloading of our federal criminal justice system, produced by various aspects of this Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence." Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 264-65 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) provides, in pertinent part, that:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
II. Petitioner's Claim
Judgement was entered against Petitioner on April 7, 2015. From that date, Petitioner had fourteen days to file a notice of appeal. Petitioner did not appeal. Therefore, her conviction became final on April 22, 2015. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). See Murphy v. United States, 634 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that, when a defendant does not appeal, their conviction becomes final when the time for seeking review expires).
Petitioner's one-year limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) began to run on April 23, 2015, and expired on April 25, 2016. Thus, when Petitioner filed her § 2255 motion on November 18, 2019, she was over three years past the one-year limitations period established by AEDPA. This Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of Petitioner's claims unless she establishes that the limitations period should instead be calculated under § 2255(f)(3) because the right that she asserts "has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(3).
Although the Court did not receive Petitioner's motion until November 22, 2019, Petitioner signed the motion on November 18, 2019. Mot. to Vacate 4, ECF No. 126. "Under the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner's court filing is deemed filed on the date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing." United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1205 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Unless there is evidence to the contrary, like prison logs or other records, we assume that a prisoner's motion was delivered to prison authorities on the day he signed it." Id. --------
In her motion to vacate, Petitioner argues that her conviction for conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii) is invalid in light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Deschamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013), Mathis v. United States, -- U.S. --, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), Sessions v. Dimaya, -- U.S. --, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), and United States v. Davis, -- U.S. --, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). Mot. to Vacate 3, ECF No. 126. By citing these Supreme Court decisions, Petitioner attempts to invoke 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) to alter the starting date of the applicable one-year limitations period in which to file her § 2255 petition under AEDPA. The United States contends these Supreme Court decisions are not applicable to Petitioner's case. Resp. to Mot. to Vacate 4.
The Court agrees that Deschamps, Mathis, Dimaya, and Davis are not applicable to Petitioner's conviction. None of these cases implicate 21 U.S.C. § 841, the statute under which Petitioner was convicted. Deschamps and Mathis address whether a conviction constitutes a "violent felony" within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Deschamps, 570 U.S. at 258; Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2253. Petitioner also cites Davis and Dimaya, but neither concerns her conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 841. In Dimaya, the Court held that the 18 U.S.C. § 16 residual clause definition of "crime of violence" was "impermissibly vague." 138 S. Ct. at 1210. In Davis, the Court similarly held that the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) definition of "crime of violence" was unconstitutionally vague. 139 S. Ct. at 2324.
While these Supreme Court cases apply retroactively, they do not provide Petitioner with any basis from which to alter the one-year limitations period for filing a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). The cases do not apply to her conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 841, and, therefore, the right she asserts in her motion to vacate was neither "newly recognized" nor "made retroactively applicable" by the Supreme Court. Petitioner's limitations period cannot be calculated under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Consequently, Petitioner's motion is untimely, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to review her case on the merits. It is thus RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's motion to vacate be DENIED as untimely.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts provides that "[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant." A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). If a court denies a collateral motion on the merits, this standard requires a petitioner to "demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). When a court denies a collateral motion on procedural grounds, this standard requires a petitioner to demonstrate that "jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Id. at 478. Petitioner cannot meet either of these standards and, therefore, a certificate of appealability in this case should be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Petitioner's motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 126) be denied. Additionally, a certificate of appealability should be denied. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Petitioner may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy hereof. The district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
Petitioner is hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, "[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice."
SO RECOMMENDED, this 16th day of June, 2020.
/s/ Stephen Hyles
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE