(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Price v. State, 303 Ga.App. 859, 865(4)(a), 694 S.E.2d 712 (2010). In the case sub judice, Officer Jody Stafford testified that at the time of the crime in question, she worked for the Statesboro Police Department as part of a special drug investigation unit targeting drug sales in Statesboro. During the direct examination of Stafford, the following exchange occurred:

We affirmed his convictions on appeal. See Price v. State, 303 Ga.App. 859 (694 S.E.2d 712) (2010). In 2018, Price filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence, arguing that his recidivist sentence is void in light of a 2015 amendment to OCGA § 17-10-7 (c).

Pittman v. State , 286 Ga. App. 415, 416, 650 S.E.2d 302 (2007). See Price v. State , 303 Ga. App. 859, 861 (1), 694 S.E.2d 712 (2010). This means that the reviewing court generally must accept the trial court's findings as to disputed facts unless they are clearly erroneous, although the reviewing court may also consider facts that definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility, such as facts indisputably discernible from a videotape.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Price v. State , 303 Ga.App. 859, 866 (4) (b), 694 S.E.2d 712 (2010). Here, the State could not establish that McCrory had actual possession of the cocaine found in the Vehicle on May 25. McCrory had no drugs on his person at the time of arrest, was not the owner of the Vehicle, and was not in possession of the vehicle.

See Trammell v. State, 328 Ga.App. 45, 49(2)(b), 761 S.E.2d 470 (2014) (finding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove venue when, inter alia, the crime occurred less than a block from a house located in the relevant county); Perkins v. State, 319 Ga.App. 651, 654(2), 738 S.E.2d 106 (2013) (noting that establishing the venue of a nearby site does not establish venue of the crime scene, but finding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove venue when there was a close proximity between those two locations and a police detective who on the case was employed by the relevant county).See Chapman v. State, 275 Ga. 314, 317(4), 565 S.E.2d 442 (2002) (noting that, in holding that the state proved venue, it is a “well-settled principle that public officials are believed to have performed their duties properly and not to have exceeded their authority unless clearly proven otherwise”); accord Price v. State, 303 Ga.App. 859, 865(4)(a), 694 S.E.2d 712 (2010). But see In the Interest of B.R., 289 Ga.App. 6, 9(2), 656 S.E.2d 172 (2007) (explaining that “the investigating officers' county of employment does not, in and of itself, constitute sufficient proof of venue to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard”).

"If the defendant is proven to be the perpetrator of another drug crime and the facts of that crime are sufficiently similar or connected to the facts of the crime charged, the separate crime will be admissible to prove identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, or course of conduct." See Price v. State, 303 Ga. App. 859, 863 (2) ( 694 SE2d 712) (2010). See generally id.

We find that the search warrant sufficiently identified the recreational vehicle located at the street address as property to be searched such that "it enable[d] a prudent officer executing the warrant to locate the ... place definitively and with reasonable certainty," and sufficiently limited the searching officer's discretion. Day v. State, 304 Ga.App. 195, 197, 695 S.E.2d 719 (2010) (punctuation and citation omitted); Reaves v. State, 284 Ga. 181, 187–188, 664 S.E.2d 211 (2008) ; Price v. State, 303 Ga.App. 859, 862, 694 S.E.2d 712 (2010) ; Felix v. State, 234 Ga.App. 509, 511, 507 S.E.2d 172 (1998), vacated on other grounds, 271 Ga. 534, 523 S.E.2d 1 (1999). The warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity; the search did not exceed the scope of the warrant; and the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress.