4. Appellant contends the trial court erred by failing to affirmatively place on the record appellant's decision to testify in his own behalf. He failed to make this objection at trial, however, and has waived the right to assert this alleged error on appeal. See Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193(3), 625 S.E.2d 397 (2006). Even assuming the issue is properly before the Court, we find no error. Because the decision whether to testify in one's own defense is a “tactical decision to be made by the defendant himself after consultation with trial counsel,” there is no general requirement that a trial court interject itself into the decision-making process.
4. Appellant contends the trial court erred by failing to affirmatively place on the record appellant's decision to testify in his own behalf. He failed to make this objection at trial, however, and has waived the right to assert this alleged error on appeal. SeePrice v. State, 280 Ga. 193 (3) ( 625 SE2d 397) (2006). Even assuming the issue is properly before the Court, we find no error. Because the decision whether to testify in one's own defense is a "tactical decision to be made by the defendant himself after consultation with trial counsel," there is no general requirement that a trial court interject itself into the decision-making process.
This evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Gibson guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 ( 99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193 (2) ( 625 SE2d 397) (2006). 2. Gibson argues that, by referring to the appellate process in its answer to a question from jurors during deliberations, the trial court erred.
Thus, the logs introduced on behalf of the defense did not result in the impeachment about which Nichols complained and could not show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if Nichols' attorney had not introduced any driver's logs. See Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193, 198 (5) (a) ( 625 SE2d 397) (2006), disapproved on other grounds, Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 413 (2), fn. 2 ( 651 SE2d 55) (2007). (b) Nichols further contends that he was denied effective assistance when trial counsel failed to communicate Nichols' decision to accept a plea offer even though he informed counsel of that decision during voir dire.
[Cit.]" Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193, 195 (3) ( 625 SE2d 397) (2006), disapproved on other grounds, Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 413, fn. 2 ( 651 SE2d 55) (2007). See also Barron v. State, 264 Ga. 865, 866, fn. 2 ( 452 SE2d 504) (1995); Finch v. State, 287 Ga. App. 319, 321 ( 651 SE2d 478) (2007).
[Cit.]" Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193, 195 (2) ( 625 SE2d 397) (2006), disapproved on other grounds, Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 413 (2), fn. 2 ( 651 SE2d 55) (2007). Furthermore, the evidence that Robinson and the victim fought over a MARTA card did not require that Robinson be found guilty of voluntary manslaughter instead of felony murder.
Doctor v. State, 275 Ga. 612, 615 (5) (d) ( 571 SE2d 347) (2002), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. State, 279 Ga. 854, 858 (3) ( 622 SE2d 1) (2005). See also Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193, 198 (5) (b) ( 625 SE2d 397) (2006), disapproved on other grounds, Patel v. State, 282 Ga. 412, 413 (2), fn. 2 ( 651 SE2d 55) (2007). Davenport also urges that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to state even once during closing argument that Davenport was justified in shooting Steven Tanks.
Thus, any alleged violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 "must be reviewed in accordance with the `plain error' rule, [cit.]" Berry v. State, 282 Ga. 376 (___ SE2d ___) (2007), and we disapprove Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193 (4) (a) ( 625 SE2d 397) (2006) and Raheem v. State, 275 Ga. 87 (10) ( 560 SE2d 680) (2002), to the extent the analysis therein is inconsistent with our holding in Division 3 of Paul, supra. The transcript reflects the following:
The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to reject Bolston's theory that he shot Turner in self-defense and to find him guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193 (2) ( 625 SE2d 397) (2006). 2.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193, 195 (2) ( 625 SE2d 397) (2006). 2.