Defendant next claims qualified immunity, and she is entitled to a threshold or early determination of this claim. See Price v. Sasser, 65 F.3d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 1995). Prison officials performing discretionary functions enjoy qualified immunity if their conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
. The Fourth Circuit recently described these cases in Price v. Sasser, 65 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 1995). After discussing the standards articulated in Ruefly, the court noted that "the Sixth Circuit adopted a similar 'specific risk' requirement in . . . Marsh."
Therefore, to state a cognizable "failure to protect" claim the prisoner (in this case the plaintiff) must show that (1) he was "incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm" and (2) that the official was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's health or safety. Id. at 822; see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991) (holding the deliberate indifference standard to be the appropriate standard in cases involving conditions of confinement); Price v. Sasser, 65 F.3d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 1995); Pressly v. Hutto, 816 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1987).
"Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Price v. Sasser, 65 F.3d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Whether qualified immunity applies depends on "whether a constitutional violation occurred and . . . whether the right violated was clearly established."
The Eighth Amendment provides prisoners with a right to be free from violence at the hands of other inmates. Price v. Sasser, 65 F.3d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). Although the Eighth Amendment does not apply to pre-trial detainees, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides the same protections to pre-trial detainees that is provided to convicted prisoners pursuant to the Eighth Amendment.
Id. (citing S.P. v. City of Takoma Park, 134 F.3d 260, 266 (4th Cir. 1998)). In Price v. Sasser, 65 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 1995), the court held that pre-Farmer law governs qualified immunity when the facts in issue occurred prior to Farmer. Price, 65 F.3d at 342.
Prior to Farmer, the Fourth Circuit employed a "specific threat" test: to establish an Eighth Amendment violation related to an inmate-on-inmate assault, a prisoner had to demonstrate that prison officials knew the assailant presented a specific risk to that particular prisoner. See Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Price v. Sasser, 65 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 1995). Farmer, however, did not clarify all the obligations that prison officials owe to inmates, Solesbee v. Witkowski, 56 F.3d 62, 1995 WL 323941, at *2 (4th Cir. May 31, 1995), nor did it clarify the standards for Eighth Amendment claims in this Circuit.
Farmer applies with "obvious clarity": the case clearly establishes that the Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from violence perpetrated by other inmates. See Price v. Sasser, 65 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that "the law governing failure to protect [inmates] . . . was unclear in some important respects" prior to Farmer). Other circuits similarly agree that Farmer, and similar cases, clearly established that the Eighth Amendment is violated when an inmate commits violence against another inmate.
Our holding also accords with Fourth Circuit precedent, which has consistently limited entitlement to qualified immunity to "[g]overnment officials who perform discretionary functions." Bonner v. Anderson, 81 F.3d 472, 475 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); see also Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347, 353 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[O]fficials . . . [are] accorded qualified immunity . . . in the performance of discretionary duties."); Price v. Sasser, 65 F.3d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 1995) ("government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded") (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818); Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 1991) (Powell, J.) ("[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from civil liability"); Bright v. McClure, 865 F.2d 623, 625 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[P]ublic officials . . . are clothed with qualified immunity in the performance of discretionary functions."). We emphasize that public officials seldom use their offices to engage in conduct that is entirely beyond their discretionary authority.
The standard for deliberate indifference "is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result." Id. at 1978; see also Price v. Sasser, 65 F.3d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, "an Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm."