Price v. Reed

37 Citing cases

  1. Hunsucker v. Fallin

    408 P.3d 599 (Okla. 2017)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that Okla. Const. art. 2, § 7 "provide . . . less protection for those rights which are also protected by its federal counterpart in the [fourteenth] [a]mendment"

    An Oklahoma driver's license is an interest protected by both State and Federal Due Process Clauses.Price v. Reed , 1986 OK 43, 725 P.2d 1254, 1260 (notes omitted). Okla. Const. Art. 2, § 7 provides that: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

  2. Hunsucker v. Fallin

    2017 OK 100 (Okla. 2017)   Cited 7 times

    An Oklahoma driver's license is an interest protected by both State and Federal Due Process Clauses. Price v. Reed, 1986 OK 43, 725 P.2d 1254, 1260 (notes omitted). Okla. Const. Art. 2, § 7 provides that: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

  3. State v. Hooley

    269 P.3d 949 (Okla. Crim. App. 2012)   Cited 14 times

    The ultimate issues to be resolved in a driver's license revocation appeal and a criminal prosecution are not the same. In Price v. Reed, 1986 OK 43, 725 P.2d 1254, the Oklahoma Supreme Court said that a driver's license revocation hearing assesses a person's continued fitness and eligibility for a driver's license while a criminal trial exacts a personal penalty from a convicted defendant in the form of a fine or incarceration. 1986 OK 43, ¶ 9, 725 P.2d at 1259. Finding that a driver's license revocation hearing is not the equivalent of a criminal trial, the Oklahoma Supreme Court explained:

  4. Kane v. State

    915 P.2d 932 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996)   Cited 8 times

    We find double jeopardy is not implicated by this process because an administrative driver's license revocation procedure pursuant to the implied consent statutes (47 O.S. 1991 §§ 751[ 47-751] -761 [ 47-761]) does not constitute "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Price v. Reed, 725 P.2d 1254, 1259 (Okla. 1986) (holding administrative revocation procedure does not constitute "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause). Appellant was arrested on May 29, 1994, in Rogers County on suspicion of driving while under the influence of alcohol.

  5. Hedrick v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Pub. Safety

    315 P.3d 989 (Okla. 2013)   Cited 5 times

    In sum, the DPS administrative record must be before the District Court. Price v. Reed, 1986 OK 43, 725 P.2d 1254, 1261. Price noted language in the 1982 version of § 754(5)(a) which discussed the scope of issues at an administrative hearing. Price, 725 P.2d at 1256, n. 2.

  6. Burris v. Dept. of Public Safety

    785 P.2d 332 (Okla. Civ. App. 1989)   Cited 7 times
    Stating burden of proof in license revocation proceedings is preponderance of the evidence

    The statutes concerning implied consent to testing for intoxicants are part of a statutory framework, and their purpose must be kept in mind when interpreting the provisions of the statutes. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, commenting upon the license revocation procedures outlined in 47 O.S.Supp. 1982 § 754[ 47-754], stated, in Price v. Reed, 725 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Okla. 1986): The state's interest here is to foster safety by temporarily removing from public thoroughfares those licensees who have exhibit dangerous or erratic behavior.

  7. Trusty v. State, ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety

    2016 OK 94 (Okla. 2016)   Cited 6 times

    A person's "claim to a driver's license is indeed a protectable property interest that may not be terminated without due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Price v. Reed, 1986 OK 43, ¶ 11, 725 P.2d 1254, 1260. ¶13 Under this administrative scheme, two statutory prerequisites are fundamental to DPS' power to revoke a license: 1) a blood or breath test report or the driver's refusal of such a test; and 2) the officer's sworn report that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was driving under the influence.

  8. Pierce v. State

    327 P.3d 530 (Okla. 2014)   Cited 18 times

    See also, Civil Service Commission of the City of Tulsa v. Gresham, 1982 OK 125, ¶¶ 38–40, 653 P.2d 920.Price v. Reed, 1986 OK 43, ¶ 19, 725 P.2d 1254.Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112, 103 S.Ct. 3513, 3516, 77 L.Ed.2d 1267(1983); Price v. Reed, see note 23, supra.

  9. Ryan v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Pub. Safety

    2016 OK Civ. App. 49 (Okla. Civ. App. 2016)

    ¶4 First, it is clear our Courts recognize a person's claim to a driver's license is a protected property interest entitled to application of due process standards. Price v. Reed, 1986 OK 43, ¶11, 725 P.2d 1254 (citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589 [1971]). We also recognize the state interest in depriving drunk drivers of permission to continue operating an automobile is particularly strong.

  10. Ryan v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Pub. Safety

    377 P.3d 1255 (Okla. Civ. App. 2016)   Cited 2 times

    ¶ 4 First, it is clear our Courts recognize a person's claim to a driver's license is a protected property interest entitled to application of due process standards. Price v. Reed , 1986 OK 43, ¶ 11, 725 P.2d 1254 (citing Bell v. Burson , 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589 [29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971) ] ). We also recognize the state interest in depriving drunk drivers of permission to continue operating an automobile is particularly strong.