Opinion
No. COA10-924
Filed 15 March 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 29 March 2010 by Judge Phyllis M. Gorham in New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 December 2010.
Marcari, Russotto, Spencer Balaban, P.C., by Donald W. Marcari and R. Brad Balaban, for plaintiff-appellant. Cranfill Sumner Hartzog LLP, by Melody J. Canady and Carolyn C. Pratt, for defendant-appellee Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company.
New Hanover County No. 09 CVS 1104.
On or about 10 March 2006, defendant Joshua Price ("Price") rented a Chevrolet pickup from an Enterprise Rent-a-Car in Fuquay, North Carolina. Price signed a rental agreement in which he was designated as the "renter" and plaintiff, Edith Dyker-Price, Price's wife at the time, was designated as an "additional authorized driver."
Price also purchased Supplemental Rental Liability Insurance Protection ("SLP") issued by defendant Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company ("Empire"). The SLP provided liability coverage in the amount of the difference between the $1,000,000.00 combined single-limit, each-accident coverage for bodily injury and property damage and the minimum financial responsibility limits of applicable state law. The SLP policy contained an exclusion of liability for an "insured," including any "additional authorized drivers" and family members or relatives of the renter who reside in the same household. The SLP further stated that "[i]f valid automobile liability insurance or self insurance is available on any basis to Renter, [Additional Authorized Drivers], or any other driver and such insurance or self insurance satisfies the applicable state motor vehicle financial responsibility law, then Owner extends none of its motor vehicle financial responsibility."
The following day, defendant Price and plaintiff intended to drive the rented Chevrolet from their home in Lillington, North Carolina to Fairfax, Virginia to attend plaintiff's grandmother's funeral. Unfortunately, before reaching Virginia, defendant Price ran off the road at about 80 miles per hour, causing the vehicle to overturn, and resulting in severe injuries to plaintiff. She has incurred about $287,000.00 in medical bills as a result of the accident.
At the time of the accident, plaintiff was covered by a personal automobile liability policy issued by GMAC for at least the minimum liability limits required by North Carolina Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act of 1953 ("Financial Responsibility Act"), N.C.G.S. § 20-279.1. GMAC tendered its policy limit to plaintiff.
On 6 March 2009, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment that Empire had an obligation to provide liability insurance coverage for damages she suffered in the accident, up to an amount of $1,000,000.00, under the SLP. Empire answered by denying that plaintiff's damages were covered by the SLP. Empire and plaintiff both filed motions for summary judgment, which were heard on 2 March 2010. In an order filed 29 March 2010, summary judgment was granted in Empire's favor. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it granted defendant Empire's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The applicable standard of review of a grant or denial of a summary judgment motion is de novo. E.g., Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. North Main Const. Ltd., 361 N.C. 85, 88, 637 S.E.2d 528, 530 (2006). Summary judgment is granted by the trial court when there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. E.g., id.
Plaintiff concedes that, if valid, the exclusions in the SLP bar coverage for plaintiff on its face as plaintiff was both an additional authorized driver and was also a family member of the renter, defendant Joshua Price. Plaintiff however argues that the family member exclusion in the SLP violates the purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act and therefore is void as against the public policy of our state. Therefore, the only issue before this Court is whether the SLP violates public policy as our legislature has enumerated in the Financial Responsibility Act. We hold that it does not.
The Financial Responsibility Act requires that a motor vehicle owner carry an insurance policy providing a minimum insurance of:
thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident and, subject to said limit for one person, sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident[.]
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b)(2) (2005). The primary purpose of statutorily compelling motorists to carry these minimal levels of "automobile liability insurance, as mandated by the Financial Responsibility Act, is to compensate innocent victims who have been injured by financially irresponsible motorists." Jeffreys v. Snappy Car Rental, Inc., 128 N.C. App. 171, 172, 493 S.E.2d 767, 769 (1997), disc. review denied, 348 N.C. 73, 505 S.E.2d 872 (1998).
With that purpose in mind, this Court has consistently upheld exclusions similar to the SLP in the present case if the minimum requirements of the Financial Responsibility Act are satisfied by another liability insurance policy. See e.g., id.; United Serv.s Auto. Ass'n. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 333, 334, 420 S.E.2d 155, 156 (1992) ("[A]n insurer by the terms of its policy [can] exclude liability coverage under a . . . policy if the driver of a vehicle . . . [is] covered under his own policy for the minimum amount of liability coverage required by the . . . Financial Responsibility Act.").
Furthermore, the Financial Responsibility Act itself permits:
[a]ny policy which grants the coverage required for a motor vehicle liability policy may also grant any lawful coverage in excess of or in addition to the coverage specified for a motor vehicle liability policy and such excess or additional coverage shall not be subject to the provisions of this Article. With respect to a policy which grants such excess or additional coverage the term "motor vehicle liability policy" shall apply only to that part of the coverage which is required by this section.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(g) (2005). Thus policies providing excess coverage above the minimum requirements of the Financial Responsibility Act are not governed by the Financial Responsibility Act for that part of the coverage beyond the minimum requirements. In the present case, the Financial Responsibility Act requires that the motor vehicle owner carry an insurance policy providing a minimum insurance of $30,000 in the event of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b)(2) (2005). Here, that requirement was complied with as GMAC tendered to plaintiff $30,000.00.
In support of her contention that the exclusion in the SLP violates the Financial Responsibility Act, plaintiff cites to Cartner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. where this Court held that if:
a person is injured through the negligence of an insured family member while riding with that family member in an insured vehicle, North Carolina's Financial Responsibility Act prevents the operation of a family member exclusion in the policy's liability section to bar coverage. To reach any other result would be to deny plaintiff's decedent a means of recovering under the Policy for her injuries caused by her husband's negligence.
123 N.C. App. 251, 255, 472 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1996). However, Cartner is distinguishable from the present case in an important way. The policy at issue in Cartner was a primary policy and the exclusion at issue was serving to completely exclude a husband from recovering when his wife was killed in an accident. That is not the case here. The SLP is a voluntary, supplemental policy and all parties admit that plaintiff received coverage equal to the minimum amount required by the Financial Responsibility Act from GMAC. See also Sproles v. Greene, 329 N.C. 603, 613, 407 S.E.2d 497, 503 (1991) ("When coverage provided in the policy is in addition to the mandatory statutory requirements, the additional coverage is not subject to the statutory provisions in the Financial Responsibility Act."); Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. Younts, 84 N.C. App. 399, 406, 352 S.E.2d 850, 853-54 ("In general, liability insurance coverage in excess of the amounts required under [the Financial Responsibility Act] is voluntary and not controlled by the provisions of the Act."), disc. review denied, 319 N.C. 671, 356 S.E.2d 774 (1987). Thus, we must look to the terms of the policy. See Sproles, 329 N.C. at 613, 407 S.E.2d at 503. All parties agree, that under the terms of the policy, plaintiff may not collect under the SLP.
Affirmed.
Judges McGEE and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).