Opinion
No. 2003-CA-002452-MR.
October 1, 2004.
Appeal from Morgan Circuit Court, Honorable Samuel C. Long, Judge, Action No. 03-CI-00163.
Mark Price, Pro Se, West Liberty, Kentucky, Brief for Appellant.
Emily Dennis, Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, Frankfort, Kentucky, Brief for Appellee.
Before: COMBS, Chief Judge; MINTON and VANMETER, Judges.
OPINION
Mark Price appeals pro se from an order entered by the Morgan Circuit Court dismissing his complaint seeking declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction relating to a prison disciplinary proceeding. The circuit court concluded that Price failed to demonstrate the loss of any constitutionally protected liberty interest, that he was afforded adequate due process during the disciplinary proceeding, and that he failed to adequately state an equal protection claim. We affirm.
Price was a prisoner at the Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex at all times relevant to this proceeding. According to the record, on September 23, 2002, a fight broke out between inmates in the Phase I recreational field. Price and three other inmates ignored repeated directives from prison officials and ran from the Dorm 4 bullpen toward the scene of the ongoing fight. After an investigation and hearing, the prison Adjustment Committee (Committee) found him guilty of an attempt to commit or incite a riot. He was assigned to 60 days of disciplinary segregation with credit for time served, and his appeal to Warden John Motley was denied. Price then filed a complaint in the Morgan Circuit Court seeking declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction, based on his allegation that he was deprived of notice and that there was no evidence to support the charge against him. The complaint was dismissed on Motley's motion and this appeal followed.
In his complaint Price claimed he was denied adequate notice and due process. The circuit court held that Price did not state a claim upon which to base this allegation. We agree.
This court recently addressed inmates' rights to make due process claims as follows:
In order to prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, a party must establish (1) that he enjoyed a protected "liberty" or "property" interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, and (2) that he was denied the process due him under the circumstances. A protected liberty interest may arise from two sources — the Due Process Clause itself and state law or regulations. Challenges to prison conditions including segregation or removal from the general prison population are based on a potential "liberty" interest, but not all deprivations of an interest trigger the procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause. For example, disciplinary segregation typically does not implicate a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause itself because it is the sort of confinement an inmate can reasonably anticipate receiving.
Marksberry v. Chandler, Ky.App., 126 S.W.3d 747, 749-50(2004). (footnotes omitted). Here, Price failed to demonstrate that his disciplinary segregation implicated a protected liberty interest.
A court may only review the decision of an Adjustment Committee. Yates v. Fletcher, Ky.App., 120 S.W.3d 728, 731 (2003). When an inmate makes accusations of unjust treatment the court must weigh carefully the rights of the inmate versus the responsibilities of the Corrections Department. In a case involving review of a Committee's fact finding the court does not form its own judgment as to the facts of the situation, but rather, acts only to ensure that the inmate's rights are protected. Smith v. O'Dea, Ky.App., 939 S.W.2d 353 (1997). Price claims that his prison disciplinary hearing was devoid of evidence to support a finding of attempt to commit or incite a riot. However, the officers' reports and even Price's own letter to the warden indicate that at least some evidence was presented to support the charge against him. The circuit court did not err by finding there was sufficient evidence to support the charge. Finally, we address Price's allegation that the enforcement of prison rules was arbitrary and discriminatory. The circuit court characterized this as an equal protection claim. Price claims the charge was discriminatory because, typically, inmates who are discovered in a restricted area are charged only with being in a restricted area. However, the record indicates that Price was charged and found guilty of the same offense as three other inmates who were with him. Clearly, the decision to charge Price was not discriminatory or violative of equal protection. Further, while it may be the prison's policy to charge an inmate who is found in an off-limits area only with being in a restricted area, the circumstances here are substantially different. Price admitted in a letter to the warden that, before he was stopped, he was running to become a member of the group surrounding a yard fight. Due to the highly charged atmosphere of a prison and the need to maintain order, prison disciplinarians are given great latitude and the court need not set aside decisions that have some basis in fact. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-57, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2774-75, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). The charging of an inmate is a decision best left in the hands of the charging authority, based on the particularized circumstances of each situation. Yates v. Fletcher, Ky.App., 120 S.W.3d 728 (2003). Price has not identified that the charge brought against him violated the broad discretion afforded to prison officials.
The court's order is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.