We have previously treated the question of whether an insurer is required to plead and prove its policy limits as a question of law, and we also apply that standard to the present issue. See Price v. Hart, 166 Wis.2d 182, 189, 480 N.W.2d 249 (Ct.App.1991). Additionally, whether a circuit court had authority to enter a judgment against an insurer for the full amount of a verdict is a question of law.
CLASSIFIED'S POLICY LIMITATIONS Carla and Susanne contend that Classified's failure to prove its policy limitations at trial entitles Carla to recovery of the entire amount of the judgment from Classified. They argue that the trial court was without authority to reopen the evidence and allow proof of Classified's policy limits, citing Jansa v. Milwaukee Auto.Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Wis.2d 145, 118 N.W.2d 149 (1962), and Price v. Hart, 166 Wis.2d 182, 480 N.W.2d 249 (Ct. App. 1991). We reject their argument because Jansa is inapposite, and Carla and Susanne misapply Price by ignoring the language that recognizes the trial court's discretion to reopen evidence to allow proof of insurance policy limits.
In Bennett v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, supra, 230 Conn. 803-804 n. 17, our Supreme Court also noted that other jurisdictions have acknowledged "the prejudice that may result from the jury's consideration of the policy's undisputed [underinsured] motorist limits," and have concluded that the jury should not consider such evidence and that the trial court should reduce the jury verdict to make it conform with the terms of the policy. See, e.g., Alfa Mutual Ins. Co. v. Moreland, 589 So.2d 169 (Ala. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller, 315 Md. 182, 553 A.2d 1268 (1989); see also Price v. Hart, 166 Wis.2d 182, 480 N.W.2d 249 (1991). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant's motion in limine.
We will independently determine, however, whether an insurer has met its burden of pleading and proving its policy limits. Price v. Hart, 166 Wis.2d 182, 189, 480 N.W.2d 249, 251 (Ct.App. 1991). Timeliness of Answer.
"Excusable neglect," as that term is used in § 806.07, Stats., is "that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances, and is not synonymous with neglect, carelessness or inattentiveness." Pricev. Hart, 166 Wis.2d 182, 194-95, 480 N.W.2d 249, 254 (Ct.App. 1991). Relief will not be granted because in hindsight a party believes the agreement to have been a bad bargain.
Other courts, in acknowledgement of the prejudice that may result from the jury's consideration of the policy's undisputed uninsured motorist limits, have also concluded that evidence of such limits should not be considered by the jury and, instead, that the trial court, on proper motion, should reduce a jury verdict in excess of the policy limits so that the judgment complies with the terms of the policy. See, e.g., Alfa Mutual Ins. Co. v. Moreland, 589 So.2d 169 (Ala. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller, 315 Md. 182, 553 A.2d 1268 (1989); see also Price v. Hart, 166 Wis.2d 182, 480 N.W.2d 249 (1991). We also agree with the defendant that its failure to raise as a special defense the settlement agreement that it had entered into with Bennett did not preclude the trial court from granting the defendant's request for a remittitur.
Such a contract is for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise under the Statute of Fraud, and must be in writing, and any modification of same must also be in writing. Price v. Hart, 29 Mo. 171; Houston v. Mahoney, 219 S.W. 128; Hewson v. Peterman Mfg. Co., 136 Pac. (Wash.) 1158; Hightower v. Ansley, 126 Ga. 8; Warren v. Mayer, 161 Mo. 112; Eastern States Refrigerating Co. v. Teasdale Co., 211 S.W. 693; Devor v. Devor, 138 Mo. 181. (5) The court erred in permitting the jury to return a joint verdict against the individual defendant.
¶11 "A trial court has wide discretion in ruling on a motion to vacate a judgment." Price v. Hart , 166 Wis. 2d 182, 195, 480 N.W.2d 249 (Ct. App. 1991). "A [trial] court properly exercises its discretion when it examines the relevant facts, applies a proper standard of law, and using a demonstrated rational process reaches a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach."
¶11 "A trial court has wide discretion in ruling on a motion to vacate a judgment." Price v. Hart, 166 Wis.2d 182, 195, 480 N.W.2d 249 (Ct. App. 1991). "A [trial] court properly exercises its discretion when it examines the relevant facts, applies a proper standard of law, and using a demonstrated rational process reaches a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach."
A. Standard of Review.¶ 30 A circuit court has wide discretion in deciding whether to grant relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.07 ; Price v. Hart, 166 Wis.2d 182, 195, 480 N.W.2d 249 (Ct.App.1991). Reversal is not appropriate in this context unless the court erroneously exercises its discretion.