The plaintiffs' cause of action arose in Indiana, the Kansas conflict of laws rule refers to Indiana law as the substantive basis for the rights of the parties, and we are not persuaded that a strong Kansas public policy calls for the rejection of the Indiana statute of repose which is a part of Indiana's substantive law. The plaintiffs rely on Price v. Grimes, 234 Kan. 898, 677 P.2d 969 (1984), and Wolf v. Brungardt, 215 Kan. 272, 524 P.2d 726 (1974), as support for their claim that the public policy of Kansas mandates that Beech's alleged fraud be treated as tolling the commencement of the statute of repose. Price and Wolf, however, are both cases which involved civil fraud actions and the specific statutory provision, Kan.Stat. Ann. Β§ 60-513(a)(3), which provides for the statute of limitations regarding fraud actions not to begin running until the fraud is discovered. Price, 677 P.2d at 972; Wolf, 524 P.2d at 733.
No breach of any legal duty owed to the Hansens by FICB is stated. 6. Fraud must be pled with particularity. Price v. Grimes, 234 Kan. 898, Syl. ΒΆ 5, 677 P.2d 969 (1984). The conclusionary allegations of fraud contained in the third-party petition relative to FICB are wholly lacking in particularity.
In other words, if the party committing fraud covers up the initial fraud with additional lies, omissions, or misrepresentations, the statute of limitations is not triggered. See Price v. Grimes, 234 Kan. 898, 900, 677 P.2d 969 (1984). Here, whether Mid-Kan failed to file suit within the applicable statute of limitations is a disputed point of fact fatal to the Co-op's argument on appeal.
Generally, the question of whether a contract was formed is a question of fact for the jury. Price v. Grimes, 677 P.2d 969, 974 (Kan. 1984). But defendants' motion for summary judgment presents a threshold issue for the courtβwhether the language utilized in plaintiff's quote specified a permissive or exclusive manner of acceptance.
Steele v. Harrison, 552 P.2d 957, 962 (Kan. 1976).Price v. Grimes, 677 P.2d 969, 974 (Kan. 1984) (quoting Steele, 552 P.2d at 962). 519 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2008).
Steele v. Harrison, 552 P.2d 957, 962 (Kan. 1976).Price v. Grimes, 677 P.2d 969, 974 (Kan. 1984) (quoting Steele, 552 P.2d at 962). 519 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2008).
Mere suspicion of wrongdoing will not suffice where the plaintiff foregoes further investigation by virtue of having been lulled into confidence by the offending party. Price v. Grimes, 234 Kan. 898, 900, 677 P.2d 969, 972 (1989); Augusta Bank Trust v. Broomfield, 231 Kan. 52, 63, 643 P.2d 100, 108 (1982). The issue of when a plaintiff discovered or should have discovered alleged fraud is a question of fact.
See Sutton v. Sutton, 118 P.3d 700, 703 (Kan.Ct.App. 2005) (citing Armstrong v. Cities Serv. Gas. Co., 502 P.2d 672, 682 (1972)).Price v. Grimes, 677 P.2d 969, 972 (Kan. 1984) (quoting Augusta Bank Trust v. Broomfield, 643 P.2d 100, 108 (Kan. 1982)); see also Dodson Int'l Parts, Inc. v. Hiatt, No. 02-4042-SAC, 2003 WL 22327176, at *7 (D. Kan. Sept. 25, 2003). The basis for the fraud claim against Mr. He in the Amended Counterclaim is that Mr. He's February 15, 2001 email to Mr. Davis, stating that Guang Dong had agreed to the Joint Venture Agreement, was either a knowingly false representation, or a representation that he recklessly made without knowledge of the fact that Guang Dong did not agree to the Joint Venture Agreement. The Amended Counterclaim further alleges that Mr. He sent the email intentionally and for the purpose of inducing ACI to act upon it. Mr. He argues that the fraud claim accrued on February 15, 2001, when he sent the email, while ACI argues that the claim did not accrue until March of 2006 when Guang Dong disclosed the information about Mr. He returning to the United States to form ATTA and contract with Paramount. According to ACI,
Mere suspicion of wrongdoing will not suffice where the plaintiff foregoes further investigation by virtue of having been lulled into confidence by the offending party. Price v. Grimes, 234 Kan. 898, 900, 677 P.2d 969, 972 (1989); Augusta Bank Trust v. Broomfield, 231 Kan. 52, 63, 643 P.2d 100, 108 (1982). The issue of when a plaintiff discovered or should have discovered alleged fraud is a question of fact.
"The term `clear and convincing evidence' means: The witnesses to a fact must be found to be credible, the facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the details in connection with the contract must be narrated exactly and in order; the testimony must be clear, direct and weighty, and the witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to the facts at issue."Price v. Grimes, 234 Kan. 898, 902-03, 677 P.2d 969, 973 (1984) (quoting Nordstrom v. Miller, 227 Kan. 59, Syl. ΒΆΒΆ 6-8, 605 P.2d 545 (1980)). Kansas law further provides that: