Opinion
1:23-CV-00190-SPB-RAL
07-19-2024
EDWARD JAMES PRICE, Plaintiff v. CITY OF ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Complaint (ECF No. 10) filed in the above-captioned case be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
II. REPORT
A. Introduction and Procedural History
Plaintiff Edward James Price, an individual formerly in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Erie based on his interaction with a police officer and another individual on December 26, 2021. See ECF No. 10. Based on this incident, Price avers that he was wrongfully imprisoned and that his First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution were violated. See id. For relief, Price seeks monetary damages. See id.
Price initiated this action by filing the Complaint and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on June 26, 2023. See ECF No. 1. On August 15, 2024, Price notified the Court that his address had been changed to the Mercer County Prison. See ECF No. 4. On September 14, 2023, Price filed a motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 5), Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statement (ECF No. 6), and second notice of his address change to Mercer County Prison (ECF No. 4).
On February 6, 2024, the Court dismissed the Complaint without prejudice and granted Price leave to file an amended complaint on or by March 7, 2024. See ECF No. 12. As of today's date, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or otherwise indicated his desire to proceed in this action. Indeed, Price has not communicated with the Court since his September 14, 2023 filings.
Although nothing on the docket indicates that Price did not receive the order to file an amended complaint, the most recent orders issued by the Court in his other open civil actions have been returned as undeliverable. See l:23-cv-00025, 1:23-cv-00027, 1:23-cv-00034.
B. Standard of Review
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has set out a six-factor balancing test to guide a court in determining whether a case or claim should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984). The court must consider: 1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; 2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; 3) a history of dilatoriness; 4) whether the conduct of the party or attorney was willful or in bad faith; 5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and 6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Id. at 868.
There is no “magic formula” or “mechanical calculation” to determine whether a case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute, Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992), and not all of the six factors need to weigh in favor of dismissal before dismissal is warranted. Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, the court must “properly consider and balance” each of the six factors based on the record. See Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868).
“[D]ismissal with prejudice is an ‘extreme' sanction” that should be employed as a “last, not first, resort.” Hildebrand, 2019 WL 1783540, at *3 (quoting Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976), and Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867, 869). Close calls should “be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits.” Id. (citing Adams v. Trs. of the N.J. Brewery Emps.' Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 870 (3d Cir. 1994)). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals “has not hesitated to affirm the district court's imposition of sanctions, including dismissals in appropriate cases.” Id. (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867 n. 1). And notably, a plaintiffs pro se status does not excuse his failure to prosecute his case. See Huertas v. City of Philadelphia, 139 Fed.Appx. 444 (3d Cir. 2003); Kamuck v. Shell Energy Holdings GP. LLC, 2015 WL 1345235 at * 10 (M.D. Pa. 2015).
The Poulis factors weigh decidedly in favor of dismissal of the instant action.
C. Discussion
The first Poulis factor considers the extent to which the dilatory party is personally responsible for the sanctionable conduct. See Adams, 29 F.3d at 873 (“[I]n determining whether dismissal is appropriate, we look to whether the party bears personal responsibility for the action or inaction which led to the dismissal.”). Because Price proceeds pro se, he is solely responsible for his own conduct, including his failure to properly adhere and respond to the Court's orders. See, e.g., Colon v. Karnes, 2012 WL 383666, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2012) (“Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and thus is responsible for his own actions.”). Moreover, the Plaintiff alone is responsible for providing the Court with his current address. See Smith, 2012 WL 4926808, at *2 (“During the pendency of any litigation, the parties are under a continuing obligation to keep the Court informed of their address.”). The change of address notices that Price submitted indicate his awareness and understanding of this requirement. See ECF Nos. 4, 7. This factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal.
The second Poulis factor assesses whether the adverse party has suffered prejudice because of the dilatory party's behavior. Relevant concerns include ‘‘the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories[,] the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party,” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874, and “the burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy.” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003). At this stage of the litigation, this factor weighs against Plaintiff because of the unexcused delay in permitting this action to proceed through service of the Complaint on the identified Defendants. Plaintiff s “continued failure to communicate with the Court and continued inaction [therefore] frustrates and delays resolution of this action.” Mack v. United States, 2019 WL 1302626, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2019) (“[F]ailure to communicate clearly prejudices the Defendants who seek a timely resolution of the case.”).
The third Poulis factor-a history of dilatoriness-also supports dismissal. Plaintiff s failure to file an amended complaint has led to an unexcused and prolonged, if not endless, delay. This conduct is sufficient to establish a history of dilatoriness.
The fourth Poulis factor, willfulness, considers whether the Plaintiff s conduct “involves intentional or self-serving behavior.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. Price has demonstrated his understanding of the litigation process through his numerous filings in this case and his five other open cases currently before this Court. See 1:23-cv-00025, 1:23-cv-00026, 1:23-cv-00027, 1:23-cv-00034. Price's protracted silence in each of his six open cases evidences that his inaction has been willful and that he has knowingly abandoned this case.
The fifth factor addresses the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869. It is well-established that monetary sanctions are ineffective where the Plaintiff is indigent. See, e.g., Brennan v. Clouse, 2012 WL 876228, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2012) (citing Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2002)) ("‘Alternative sanctions, such as monetary penalties, are inappropriate as sanctions with indigent pro se parties.”). Moreover, alternative sanctions are unlikely to be effective against a party with whom the Court cannot communicate and who refuses to communicate with the Court. See Mack, 2019 WL 1302626, at *2 (noting that the court was “incapable of imposing a lesser sanction” on a plaintiff who refused to participate in his own lawsuit). As such, this factor also weighs in favor of dismissal.
Finally, the Court must consider the potential merit of Plaintiff s claims. A claim will be deemed meritorious “when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70. The Court ordinarily requires a more developed record than is available at this early stage to assess the potential merits of a Complaint. Here, however, the Court has already concluded that Plaintiff s claims are subject to dismissal. See ECF No. 12. Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of dismissal.
On balance, the undersigned finds that all six Poulis factors support dismissal. While the undersigned is mindful of this Circuit's strong policy in favor of deciding cases on the merits, such a resolution is impossible where the plaintiff declines to participate in his own lawsuit. Here, Price's failure to file an amended complaint and notify the Court of his current address have prevented this case from progressing. Consequently, the Court concludes that on the record presented here, the extreme sanction of dismissal is supported by the Poulis factors.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed for Price's failure to prosecute.
IV. Notice
In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) & (C), and Local Rule 72.D.2, Plaintiff may file written objections and responses thereto in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive any appellate rights. Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See also Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.