Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-2742-BC (H)
April 16, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff James Pribila ("Pribila") brings this lawsuit against Emerson Electric Co. ("Emerson") and U.S. Electric Motors ("U.S. Motors") (collectively, "Defendants"), asserting a cause of action for age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"). Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 28, 2002. Having reviewed the pertinent pleadings and the evidence submitted therewith, the Motion is GRANTED for the reasons that follow.
The following background facts are taken from Pribila's Original Complaint, filed December 19, 2000 ("Complaint") and from the parties' summary judgment pleadings. Unless characterized as a contention by either party, these facts are undisputed.
U.S. Motors, a division of Emerson, was engaged in the design, manufacture and distribution of various types of commercial electrical motors. From 1997 to 2000, Pribila was employed by U.S. Motors as an Outside Sales Engineer for North and West Texas. In 1999, when the demand for commercial electrical motors began to decline, U.S. Motors determined that a headcount reduction in its sales force was necessary. The Vice President of Sales, Dan Skoch, instructed the National Sales Manager, Gary Sajewich, to rank all employees in the outside sales group and recommend six positions for elimination. According to Sajewich, he ranked such employees based on their past performance (including sales figures) and, in some cases, on the relative importance of their positions. (Defs.' App. at 91.) Where available, Sajewich claims that he relied on numerical rankings given employees by their regional sales managers during annual performance appraisals. (Id.)
Employees were rated on scale from 1 to 6, with 1 being the best and 6 being the worst. On Pribila's 1993-94 performance appraisal, he received a "2," which means "commendable." In 1994-95, he received a "3," which means "competent." (Defs.' App. at 92.) Then, for the next two appraisal periods, Pribila received a "4," which means "needs improvement." (Id. at 92-93.) On his last formal performance appraisal, which Pribila admits receiving, Pribila was placed on probation for six months. (Id. at 22; Defs.' Reply App. at 2.)
Sajewich ranked Pribila near the bottom of the list, as one of the poorest performing salespersons in the outside sales group. Sajewich allegedly based Pribila's low ranking on the following factors: (1) Pribila's annual evaluations, which reflected a "downward trend" in his performance; (2) memos and e-mails written by Pribila's supervisors that were critical of Pribila's performance; (3) conversations with Pribila's supervisors and personal meetings with Pribila regarding his unsatisfactory performance; (4) Pribila's failure to improve his communication and computer skills, despite numerous requests that he do so; (5) Pribila's failure to follow-up on assigned tasks; and (5) Pribila's failure to bring in new customers in 1999. (Id. at 91-95.) Pribila concedes that his supervisors expressed concern about his job performance. (Pl.'s Resp. at 2.)
Pribila was ranked 57th out of 59 employees in the outside sales group. (Pl.'s App. at 3.)
Based on Pribila's low ranking and the ease with which Pribila's job duties and sales territory could be absorbed by existing sales personnel in the area, Sajewich recommended to Skoch that Pribila's position be one of the six eliminated pursuant to the reduction-in-force. (Defs.' App. at 95.) Sajewich also recommended that the positions of the following employees be eliminated: (1) Andria Cadogan, age 28; (2) Susan Borgstrom, age 31; (3) Garrett Gray, age 36; (4) Deborah Taylor, age 46; and (5) Robert Reynolds, age 65. (Id. at 95-96.) Skoch reviewed and approved Sajewich's recommendations and eliminated the positions of the above listed persons, effective January 7, 2001. Upon Pribila's termination, Pribila's job duties and sales territory were absorbed by several existing sales personnel, including several persons who were over the age of 40 and at least one person who was under the age of 40.
Pribila, who was 53 years old at the time he was terminated, filed this suit against Defendants for wrongful termination under the ADEA. Defendants now move for summary judgment. The issues have been briefed by the parties and this matter is ripe for determination.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and record evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that, as a matter of law, the movant is entitled to judgment. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Only disputes about material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment. Id.
In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the movant to prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Latimer v. Smithkline French Lab., 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 1990). If the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the summary judgment movant need not support its motion with evidence negating the non-movant's case. Rather, the movant may satisfy its burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case. Id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 .
Once the movant meets its burden, the non-movant must show that summary judgement is not appropriate. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). "This burden is not satisfied with `some metaphysical doubt as to material facts,' . . . by `conclusory allegations,' . . . by `unsubstantiated assertions,' or by only a `scintilla' of evidence." Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552 (1986)). The non-moving party must "come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (emphasis in original) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To determine whether a genuine issue exists for trial, the court must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and the evidence must be sufficient such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 302 (5th Cir. 2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.
III. ADEA Burden-Shifting
For age discrimination claims in which there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the Fifth Circuit applies the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, the plaintiff is required to establish a prima facie case for the particular type of discrimination he is alleging. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 . Upon meeting this requirement, a presumption of discrimination arises which the employer must then rebut by setting forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. See id. Once the employer meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie case disappears, and the plaintiff must then point to evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for the alleged discrimination, See id. at 804.
The Supreme Court clarified the plaintiff's burden in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000). In Reeves, the Court explained that "a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated." Reeves, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. at 2109 . "The determination must be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the nature, extent and quality of the evidence, as to whether a jury could reasonably infer discrimination." Crawford v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 234 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2000).
IV. Analysis
Defendants move for summary judgment on Pribila's ADEA wrongful termination claim on the basis hat Pribila cannot establish all elements of his prima facie case. Alternatively, Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis that Pribila cannot point to evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants' proffered reason for terminating him is merely a pretext for discrimination.
A. Prima Facie Case
The ADEA makes it unlawful for "an employer to . . . discharge any individual . . . because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1). To establish a prima facie violation of the ADEA in a reduction-in-force case, a plaintiff must show: (1) that plaintiff is within the protected age group (between the age of 40 and 70); (2) that plaintiff has been adversely affected by the employer's decision; (3) that plaintiff was qualified to assume another position at the time of the discharge; and (4) "evidence, circumstantial or direct, from which a factfinder might reasonably conclude that the employer intended to discriminate in reaching the decision at issue." Amburgey v. Corhart Refractories Corp., 936 F.2d 805, 812 (5th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
Defendants argue that Pribila fails to point to any evidence to support the third and fourth elements of his prima facie case. The Court, however, notes that "a plaintiff need only make a very minimal showing" to establish a prima facie case under the ADEA. Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 41 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Thornbrough v. Columbus Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1985)). Because Pribila has shown that he was over 40 years of age when he was terminated and that younger employees were retained, the Court will assume arguendo that Pribila has established a prima facie case. See id.; E.E.O.C. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1180 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Meinecke v. H R Block, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995)). Thus, the burden now shifts to Emerson to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Pribila.
B. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason
"An employer meets its burden of production in employment discrimination cases by proffering admissible evidence of an explanation that would he legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the employer." Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957 (citing Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1991)). Defendants claim that Pribila was terminated as part of a reduction-in-force. In support of their summary judgment motion, Defendants present undisputed evidence which shows that the demand for commercial electrical motors began to decline in 1999, and that U.S. Motors determined that a headcount reduction in its sales force was necessary. (Defs.' App. At 91.) Because a reduction-in-force is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Pribila's termination the Court finds that Defendants have satisfied their burden of production. See Texas Instruments, 100 F.3d at 1181 (a reduction-in-force or consolidation "is itself a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharge"); Nichols, 81 F.3d at 41; Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 958; Armendariz Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1995). Thus, the presumption raised by Pribila's prima facie case disappears and the burden shifts to Pribila to point to evidence that Defendants' proffered reason for his termination is a pretext for age discrimination. Nichols, 81 F.3d at 41 (citing Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Defendants also argue that Pribila was terminated due to his poor job performance. Because the Court finds that Defendants' reduction-in-force is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Pribila, it need not consider this additional proffered reason.
C. Pretext
To show pretext, Pribila points to the rankings list that Sajewich compiled when determining which positions to eliminate as part of the reduction-in-force. On that list, Pribila was given a performance rating of "4" on a scale from 1 to 6, with 1 being the best and 5 being the worst (6 was reserved for trainees). Pribila points out that there were three employee under the age of 40 who also had performance ratings of "4" but who were retained: Brian Heindle, Bob Zopf and Dwayne Cresse. Pribila argues that this evidence raises a fact issue on discrimination. Defendants disagree, arguing that Pribila must point to evidence that he was "clearly better qualified" than the younger employees who were retained. In Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit explained that in a reduction-in-force case, the fact that a younger employee was retained is not evidence of discrimination unless the plaintiff is "clearly better qualified" than the younger employee:
[T]he issue is not whether [the plaintiff] or the retained employees were better qualified. An employer is entitled to make that decision for itself. "The ADEA was not intended to be a vehicle for judicial second guessing of business decisions, nor was it intended to transform the court into personnel managers." Nevertheless, a plaintiff can take his case to a jury with evidence that he was clearly better qualified than younger employees who were retained.Waither, 952 F.2d at 123 (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted); see Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 959 ("Walther requires the employee to submit evidence that is comparative in nature . . . ."). Here, Pribila offers no comparison of his qualifications to the younger, retained employees. Because Pribila fails to point to any evidence from which a jury could find that he was clearly better qualified than Heindle, Zopf or Cresse, there mere retention of such younger employees does not raise a genuine issue of material fact on pretext.
To the extent Pribila argues that his work performance warranted a rating higher than "4" and that he should have been ranked higher on Sajewich's list, Pribila must still point to evidence that he was clearly better qualified than the employees under 40 who received higher rankings. See Walther, 952 F.2d at 124 . Because Pribila has not done this, the Court finds this argument meritless.
Pribila next argues that there are discrepancies in the employee rankings, which show that Sajewich's ranking system was a sham and that age was a determinative factor in the terminations. Pribila points to the rankings of George Stuckey and Aaron Wood. Stuckey, who had a performance rating of "3," was ranked significantly higher than Wood, who had a performance rating of "2." As Defendants note, however, the higher ranked employee, Stuckey, was 58 years old, and the lower ranked employee, Wood, was 29 years old. Thus, no reasonable juror could infer age discrimination from this evidence.
The Court also rejects Pribila's argument that Susan Borgstrom's termination is evidence fo age discnmination, Pribila compares Borgstrom, who had a performance rating of "2" and was ranked 5th on the list, to Brian Heindle, who had a performance raring of "4" and was ranked 54th on the list. Borgstrom, who Pribila claims was "over 40" and had a higher ranking, was terminated while Heindle, who was under 40 and had a lower ranking, was retained. Pribila's own evidence, however, shows that Borgstrom was 31 at the time she was terminated, and not "over 40," as Pribila erroneously contends. (Pl.'s App. at 2.) Thus, Borgstrom's termination is nor evidence of age discrimination.
Pribila points to no other evidence to support his contention that the reduction-in-force was merely a pretext for age discrimination. Accordingly, the Court finds that Pribila has failed to carry his burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact with regard to pretext.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.