Opinion
No. X04-CV 01-0103512 S
November 17, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE BIFURCATION
In this case, Plaintiff alleges acts of tortious interference with a development agreement between it, the Eastern Pequot Tribe and Pequot Resorts, Inc. It claims that one group of defendants, collectively referred to as the Chance defendants, interfered with the plaintiff's agreement by forming their own development agreement with the Eastern Pequot Tribe. Subsequently a second group of defendants, the Eastern Capital defendants, also is alleged to have interfered with the same agreement. After a ruling on the opening of a nonsuit against the plaintiff, the Chance defendants appealed the court's decision. All proceedings as to the Chance defendants are now stayed during the appeal. If the court were to continue its previously ordered trial schedule, the claims against the two groups of defendants will be bifurcated. Plaintiff opposes such bifurcation while the Eastern Capital defendants argue that the delay inherent in awaiting the outcome of the appeal is prejudicial to them. For the reasons set forth in detail below, the court concludes that the claims against the two groups of defendants are intertwined and should not be separated for trial.
1. LEGAL STANDARD
Both the plaintiff and the Eastern Capital defendants cite the relevant law and argue that its application requires completely different outcomes. In Dumas v. Mena, 82 Conn.App. 61, 64, 842 A.2d 618 (2004), our Supreme Court stated: "[p]ursuant to General Statutes § 52-205 and Practice Book (Section) 15-1, the trial court may order that one or more issues that are joined be tried before the others. The interests served by bifurcated trials are convenience, negation of prejudice and judicial efficiency . . . Bifurcation may be appropriate in cases in which litigation of one issue may obviate the need to litigate another issue . . . The bifurcation of trial proceedings lies solely within the discretion of the trial court."
When examining the parameters within which such discretion might be exercised, the court in Whalen v. Ives, 37 Conn.App. 7, 21, 654 A.2d 798, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 905, 657 A.2d 645 (1995) observed "[d]iscretion means a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice . . . It goes without saying that the term abuse of discretion does not imply a bad motive or wrong purpose but merely means that the ruling appears to have been made on untenable grounds . . ."
2. CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES
The central claim of the Eastern Capital defendants is that justice delayed is justice denied and that their development agreement with the Eastern Pequot Tribe, entered into in 2000, is not connected to the agreement the Chance defendants had with the Tribe. It argues that there is no factual link between the two development agreements alleged to have interfered with the plaintiff's development agreement with the Tribe. In addition, waiting for the conclusion of the Chance appeal is prejudicial to Eastern. First, this is so because the events complained of are already five years old, memories fade and evidence may be compromised in the upcoming years before the Chance appeal is concluded. Second, the continued pendency of this lawsuit harms the Eastern Capital defendants' reputation, since the allegations concern intentional torts and trade practices, claiming such defendants engaged in immoral or unscrupulous acts.
These defendants are Eastern Capital Funding, LLC and David Rosow.
These defendants are Chance Ventures, Inc., and Andrew, Michael and Abraham Gosman.
PRI argues on the other hand, that its claims against all of the defendants are interrelated and there is likely to be a significant overlap as to witnesses and documentary evidence. There is discovery that remains to be completed, in particular as to the Chance defendants, which may well produce evidence relevant to both. That discovery is perforce stayed at the present time. In addition, duplicative testimony that bifurcation will require is an undue burden and expense to the plaintiff and is prejudicial. Bifurcation also suggests the possibility for inconsistent outcomes after trial. PRI claims that bifurcation will not promote judicial economy and efficiency, it will produce the exact opposite result, to the lasting prejudice of the plaintiff.
3. DISCUSSION
The court has previously ruled on the matter of the interconnectedness of the claims against the two groups of defendants. Prior to the argument on bifurcation, the court heard and determined the defendant Eastern Capital's motion for summary judgment. It determined that there were significant material issues of fact as to whether the three development agreements that the parties formed with the Tribe are inexorably linked. It also appeared from the submissions that the development agreements the two groups of defendants formed with the Tribe represent a continuing course of conduct, which may have interfered with the plaintiff's rights under its agreement. Supporting the related nature of the claims is Eastern Capital's argument that to the extent there are any damages sustained by the plaintiff, such damages were caused by the Chance defendants.
The defendants also submitted a settlement agreement between them, to the effect that the resolution of any claims between them and the payment of any sums from one to the other is dependent upon the resolution of the claims made by PRI in this lawsuit.
Considering the various claims of prejudice and their underlying factual supports as articulated by the parties, because the claims against both groups of defendants are interrelated and because there is a common group of facts which should be tried at one time, the court finds bifurcation would be extremely prejudicial to the plaintiff. This case does not represent circumstances "in which litigation of one issue may obviate the need to litigate another issue." Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., 243 Conn. 401, 423-24, 703 A.2d 1132 (1997).
Factors to be considered in the detailed analysis required in bifurcation cases have been articulated in federal cases. Among those factors are: "(1) whether the issues are significantly different from one another; (2) whether the issues are to be tried before a jury or to the court; (3) whether the posture of discovery on the issues favors a single trial or bifurcation; (4) whether the documentary and testimonial evidence on the issues overlap and; (5) whether the party opposing bifurcation will be prejudiced if it is granted." Dallas v. Goldberg, 143 F.Sup.2d 312, 315 (S.D.N.Y., 2001). In determining whether a party seeking bifurcation has met its burden of proof, the court should be guided by the principle that "[o]rdinarily a jury is entitled to hear all of the evidence and deliberate over all of the issues in the case at one time . . . and the movant must justify bifurcation on the basis of the substantial benefit that it can be expected to produce. Svege v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp., 329 F.Sup.2d 283, 284 (D.Conn. 2004).
Application of these factors to the case at bar also supports the court's determination to deny bifurcation. As to the first factor, the issues in the two sets of claims against these defendants are not significantly different. As plaintiff has argued, if the matters are separated for trial, there will be duplication of both testimony and documentary evidence. Although this case is to be tried to the court, the potential for inconsistent results is present. The third factor is also met in that discovery at the moment is stayed against the Chance defendants, who may possess documents or evidence relevant to both sets of claims. The fourth factor is also present, as discussed above, as the testimonial and documentary evidence will overlap. The fifth factor, prejudice to the party opposing bifurcation, the court has discussed above and found to exist. For all the foregoing reasons, the court does not permit bifurcation of this case for trial. The trial schedule previously ordered in this case is hereby vacated, pending the outcome of the Chance appeal.
BY THE COURT
BARBARA M. QUINN, Judge