Opinion
Case No. 1:03-cv-581
December 5, 2003
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff has paid the initial partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. No. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996) ("PLRA"), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court must read Plaintiff sprose complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
I. Factual allegationsPlaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Marquette Branch Prison, but the events giving rise to his complaint occurred while he was incarcerated at the Oaks Maximum Correctional Facility (ECF). In his pro se complaint, Plaintiff sues Clayton D. Burch of the Office of Legislative Corrective Ombudsman. Plaintiff essentially claims that Defendant Burch failed to investigate his complaints regarding prison conditions at ECF. Plaintiff seeks the following relief:
What I want the court to do for me is check into my issues/complaints that are very serious. For blatantly neglecting to check into my complaints. To ignore, to pay no attention to: to fail to perform. In my opinion my claims to Clayton D. Burch was [sic] serious and my health and welfare was [sic] in extreme danger. Therefore, I want the court to grant my one hundred million dollars.
II. Failure to state a claim
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Jones v. City of Carlisle, 3 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1993). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corrections Corp. of America, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff does not allege any violation of the federal Constitution or laws in his complaint. At most, Plaintiffs allegations could be construed as a claim that Defendant Burch was required by the Due Process Clause to investigate his complaints. However, it is well established that an individual does not have a constitutional right to have his complaint investigated or prosecuted. See Hale v. Vance, 267 F. Supp.2d 725, 731 (S.D. Ohio 2003) ("Neither the Fourth, Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution nor any federal law of which this Court is aware imposes a duty upon a police detective to investigate criminal activity or the actions of police officers responding to reports of suspected criminal activity."); White v. Toledo, 217 F. Supp.2d 838, 841 (N.D. Ohio 2002) ("[T]he law is also clear that there is no `constitutional, statutory or common law right that a private citizen has to require a public official to investigate or prosecute a crime.'") (quoting Doe v. Mayor and City Council of Pocomoke City, 745 F. Supp. 1137, 1138 (D. Md. 1990)); accord Saltier v. Johnson, 857 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1988) (individual does not have a constitutional right to have a crime prosecuted); Roman v. Reading, 257 F. Supp.2d 799, 802-03 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (Due Process Clause does not require police officers to protect individuals from violence); Fulson v. City of Columbus, 801 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D. Ohio 1992) ("A public official charged with the duty to investigate or prosecute a crime does not owe that duty to any one member of the public, and thus no one member of the public has a right to compel a public official to act."). Because Plaintiff has no due process right to an investigation of his complaints, his claim against Burch is without merit.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff's action fails to state a claim and will therefore be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $105 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $105 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.