Opinion
3:24cv522-MCR-HTC
10-31-2024
CECILIA CORDELIA PRESSLEY, Plaintiff, v. JANETTE M. RICHARDSON, et al., Defendants.
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
HOPE THAI CANNON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Cecilia Cordelia Pressley (“Pressley”), proceeding pro se, has filed an in forma pauperis motion, Doc. 2, and a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Doc. 1, alleging that Defendants Janette M. Richardson (“Richardson”), an Assistant State's Attorney, and Kylie E. Kennon (“Kennon”), an Assistant Public Defender, withheld exculpatory evidence in a state criminal action against Pressley. Upon review, the Court will grant Pressley's in forma pauperis motion, Doc. 2. The undersigned has also screened the complaint and finds it should be dismissed without prejudicebecause: (1) Pressley's claims are Heck-barred; (2) Richardson is immune from suit; and (3) Kennon cannot be sued under § 1983.
However, Pressley's claim against Richardson should be dismissed with prejudice.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
I. Background
On July 7, 2016, Pressley was charged with misdemeanor battery in State v. Pressley, 2016 MM 4084A, First Judicial Circuit in and for Escambia County, Florida. See electronic docket, https://www.escambiaclerk.com/258/Online-Public-Records. In August 2016, Pressley entered a nolo contendere plea to that charge. Id. Pressley's allegations in this case arise from that misdemeanor criminal case.
Pressley attaches documents from the state court case to her complaint.
Under Florida law, a “conviction” includes a “nolo contendere plea by a defendant, regardless of adjudication of guilt.” Fla. Stat. § 960.291(3); see also Fla. Stat. § 921.0021(2) (“‘Conviction' means a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld.”).
Pressley's entire complaint, without alteration, states as follows:
The Prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and refusal to allow defense witnesses violates Process under 5th and 14thAmendments.
1. Brady v. Maryland (1963) 14th Amendment (Due Process Clause)
2. Sixth Amendment. Defendants have the right to confront and against them. Present Witnesses in their own defense.
3. Fifth Amendment (Due Process Clause). Prosecutorial misconduct, including and restricting defense witnesses, has deny Plaintiff, Fundamental fairness, a fair trial
4. Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
See attachments, court withheld evidence that could have been and should have been Presented at the time of the Trial.Doc. 1. As relief for the alleged constitutional violations, Pressley seeks “[p]unitive damages, $1000 for each hour of incarceration.” Id.
II. Legal Standard
Because Pressley is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss her complaint, or any portion thereof, if it determines it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim, Pressley must plead factual content which allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court must liberally construe Pressley's pro se allegations, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), but conclusory allegations and legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681; Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
III. Discussion
As an initial matter, Pressley's complaint wholly fails to meet the basic notice requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. While she alleges a host of constitutional violations, she fails to provide facts supporting those violations or state how each Defendant's conduct resulted in the alleged violation. For example, her complaint is devoid of any facts regarding Defendant Kennon, she has stated no facts to support a Fourth Amendment claim, and she does not identify the witnesses she claims she was precluded from confronting or presenting. Nonetheless, reading Pressley's claims liberally, the undersigned attempted to piece together her alleged Brady claim, and as discussed below, finds that claim as well as her other constitutional claims to be Heck-barred and the Defendants to be either immune from liability or not subject to suit under § 1983.
A. Heck v. Humphrey
Pressley's claims are barred by the case of Heck v. Humphrey.In Heck, the Supreme Court held:
Pressley also claims her Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Although not all Fourth Amendment claims are Heck-barred, see Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160-61 (11th Cir. 2003), Pressley does not provide any facts to support this claim. Thus, it will not be addressed.
[T]o recover damages for [an] allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Thus, a plaintiff suing under § 1983 may not obtain monetary damages if a favorable judgment “would necessarily imply the invalidity of [her] conviction or sentence.” Id. at 487 (1994).
Here, as stated above, Pressley pled no contest to a charge of misdemeanor battery. After entering a plea, Pressley filed a pro se motion to reopen her case based on newly discovered evidence, which the state court denied. Doc. 1-1. Based on the court's order, it appears the court denied the motion because photographs of the victim's injuries were taken at the time of the incident and thus are not newly discovered evidence. Id. Pressley filed a “response” to the state court's order, arguing that while the pictures may have been available, they were not known to her and, thus, the prosecutor failed to provide her with exculpatory evidence under Brady. Doc. 1-2 at 3-4. As relief, she asked for the state court to grant her a new trial. Id. at 5. Pressley appears to be making the same Brady claim here because she attaches photos of the victim's injuries to the complaint.
Because a claim that the Defendants suppressed exculpatory evidence in her state criminal misdemeanor action “necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity of [her] conviction or sentence,” Pressley's claim is Heck-barred. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 490 (finding § 1983 action alleging prosecutors and investigator knowingly destroyed exculpatory evidence was barred because it constituted challenge to legality of still outstanding conviction); Griffin v. Baltimore Police Dep't, 804 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 2015) (a § 1983 action based on Brady claims may not proceed around the Heck bar); see also, e.g., Horn v. Mitchell, 2024 WL 4342739, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2024) (the “claim[] that the state withheld exculpatory evidence . . . [is] Heck-barred”).
Similarly, because Pressley's claims that she was not allowed to confront witnesses, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and she was denied a fair trial, if successful, would also undermine the validity of her conviction, those claims are also Heck-barred. See e.g., Handlon v. United States, 2017 WL 2311759, at *7 (M.D. Fla. May 26, 2017) (“Plaintiff['s] assert[ions] that the defendants either falsified documents and evidence used in his prosecution, or failed to discover that certain incriminating emails were actually written by someone else” are Heck-barred); Gelin v. Boggs, 2022 WL 18861854, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 13, 2022) (“Plaintiff's complaints of prosecutorial misconduct that took place during his criminal trial are barred by Heck”), reconsideration denied, 2023 WL 2228168 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2023), appeal dismissed, 2023 WL 9789577 (11th Cir. Sept. 19, 2023); Hill v. Mazerac, 2023 WL 4365903, at *1 (N.D. Fla. July 6, 2023) (dismissing “Plaintiff's claims alleging fabrication of evidence, illegal arrest, and the denial of a fair trial in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments” as barred by Heck); Manson v. Off. of the Att'y Gen. State of Fla., 2024 WL 3855706, at *1 (N.D. Fla. July 25, 2024), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Manson v. Off. of Att'y Gen., Fla., 2024 WL 3848546 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2024) (Plaintiff's “claims also are barred by Heck, because a determination that [his] constitutional rights to a fair trial and the effective assistance of counsel were violated necessarily would undermine the validity of [his] conviction.”).
B. Defendants Richardson and Kennon
Pressley's claims also fail because Richardson has prosecutorial immunity and Kennon cannot be sued under § 1983. As an Assistant State's Attorney, Richardson is immune from suits seeking monetary damages for actions taken in pursuit of a criminal prosecution. See Hoffman v. Office of State Attorney, Fourth Judicial Circuit, 793 Fed.Appx. 945, 950 (11th Cir. 2019). This immunity extends to Richardson's alleged suppression of exculpatory evidence. Pribyl v. United States, 2020 WL 3420822, at *1 (N.D. Fla. May 18, 2020) (finding that the plaintiff's claim against a state court prosecutor for suppressing exculpatory evidence failed because of prosecutorial immunity); Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Prosecutors have absolute immunity when . . . suppressing exculpatory evidence”) (internal citations omitted).
Additionally, Kennon a public defender cannot be sued under § 1983. “[A] public defender does not act under color of state law [as required for a § 1983 suit] when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). While an exception exists if the public defender “conspire[d] with someone who . . . deprive[d] the plaintiff of one or more of his legally recognized rights under color of state law,” Pressley alleges no facts about Kennon's involvement in a conspiracy. See Hall v. Tallie, 597 Fed.Appx. 1042, 1044 (11th Cir. 2015). Pressley therefore cannot sue Kennon under § 1983.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1. The motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Doc. 2, is GRANTED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
And it is RECOMMENDED:
1. That Pressley's claim against Richardson be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) because Richardson is immune from suit for her actions as a prosecutor.
See Baxter v. Washington, 201 Fed.Appx. 656, 658 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Here, [Defendant's] actions fell within the scope of this absolute immunity doctrine [i.e., prosecutorial immunity], and, therefore, the district court correctly dismissed with prejudice [Plaintiff's] damages claims.”).
2. That Pressley's claim against Kennon be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE because Pressley's claim is Heck-barred and Kennon is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.
See Petersen v. Overstreet, 819 Fed.Appx. 778, 780 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting claims barred by Heck must be dismissed without prejudice because the claims do not accrue until the plaintiff's conviction is overturned).
3. That the clerk close the file.
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court's internal use only and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon all other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on the unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.