Opinion
02 C 4492
January 23, 2003.
OPINION
Plaintiff, Anthony C. Pressley, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"), alleging violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, Mr. Pressley asserts that defendants violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; that defendants violated the First Amendment; and that defendants libeled him, all such acts resulting in emotional distress. Defendants have moved to dismiss Mr. Pressley's claims.
One struggles to make sense of this complaint. We have read Mr. Pressley's complaint with deference to his pro se status and construed his complaint to make as much legal sense as possible to do. As will be clear, he is in the wrong court.
This case arises out of Mr. Pressley's dealings with the Illinois Department of Public Aid ("IDPA"). The IDPA sought child support from Mr. Pressley and ultimately sought to intercept his tax refunds because of his failure to pay the ordered child support. Mr. Pressley sought and was granted two separate administrative hearings to contest the IDPA's efforts to collect the past-due support, neither of which ended favorably for Mr. Pressley. Mr. Pressley did not seek administrative review of either decision but rather, filed this action 39 days after the date of his second hearing.
Mr. Pressley sues defendants in both their individual and official capacities. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over actions brought by a citizen against a state, state agency, or state officials acting in their official capacities, unless the state consents to suit in federal court, which Illinois has not. Scott v. O'Grady, 975 F.2d 366, 369 (7th Cir. 1992). (citation omitted). Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). Therefore, Mr. Pressley's claims against defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed.
Mr. Pressley's claims against defendants in their individual capacities also fails because Mr. Pressley has not properly established a due process violation. The Fourteenth Amendment protects only against deprivations "without due process of law." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981) (citation omitted). Although Mr. Pressley is not required to exhaust administrative remedies, "if a state provides an adequate means of addressing a property deprivation, the victim of the deprivation has been afforded due process of the law." Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co., 852 F.2d 951, 955-56 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Mr. Pressley had the right to have both IDPA decisions reviewed by the Circuit Court under 735 ILCS 5/3-103, which he did not do, and nowhere in his complaint does he allege that this available state remedy is constitutionally inadequate. Rather, Mr. Pressley contends that defendants did not follow the administrative process. Even if these allegations were true, it is not enough to survive dismissal. In order for Mr. Pressley to state a valid procedural due process and § 1983 claim, he must "include a challenge to the fundamental fairness of the state's procedures," Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 339, 341 (1986), which he has not. Hence, Mr. Pressley's claims against defendants in their individual capacities must also be dismissed.
With respect to Mr. Pressley's libel action, allegations of libel are not appropriate in a § 1983 action because an allegation of defamation by a public officer is not a constitutional tort, since the interest invaded, namely the interest in reputation, is not deemed liberty or property interest within the meaning of the due process clause of the Constitution. Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 408 (7th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). With respect to Mr. Pressley's First Amendment claim, he cannot proceed with his due process claims and therefore, his First Amendment claim also fails because the First Amendment is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, 858 (7th Cir. 2000). Even if this were not the case, Mr. Pressley's claim would be dismissed because Mr. Pressley has not identified a cognizable injury attributable to defendants' actions, which is required for a § 1983 claim. Niehaus v. Liberio, 973 F.2d 526, 531-32 (7th Cir. 1992).
Dismissal of a complaint is proper if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). After reviewing Mr. Pressley's allegations and accepting them as true for the purpose of this motion, it appears that Mr. Pressley's complaint must be dismissed. Finally, because Mr. Pressley has not properly pled a federal violation and thus cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, Mr. Pressley's requests for declaratory and injunctive relief must also be denied. City of Beloit v. Local 643, 248 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2001); Promatek Industries v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 811 (7th Cir. 2002).
Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.