Opinion
Case No. 00-CV-10103-BC
February 18, 2003
The plaintiff filed the present action on March 17, 2000 seeking review of the Commissioner's decision denying the plaintiff's claim for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits. The case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder by this Court's predecessor, the Honorable Victoria A. Roberts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(b)(3). Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a reversal of the Commissioner's decision and an award of benefits.
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment requesting affirmance of the administrative decision. Magistrate Judge Binder filed a Report and Recommendation on November 28, 2000 recommending that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied, defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted and that the findings of the commissioner be affirmed. The plaintiff filed timely objections to the Report and Recommendation, to which the defendant responded, and this matter is now before the Court.
The Court has reviewed the file, the Report and Recommendation and the objections thereto, and has made a de novo review of the administrative record in light of the objections filed. The plaintiff's principal objection is that the Administrative Law Judge, and the Magistrate Judge, failed to follow the rule that the opinions of treating physicians are generally entitled to controlling weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).
The plaintiff in this case is now thirty-years old and has not worked since October 1994. He has had multiple back surgeries and suffers from lumbar radiculopathy, a left arm laceration which severed his ulnar nerve, and low intellectual functioning with an IQ of 77. He formerly worked as a laborer in the construction industry, at a marina, and in food service and distribution. He claims that he cannot work at his former jobs because of intractable back pain which has only been partially relieved by the several surgeries.
The plaintiff's application for Social Security Disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits was denied initially and on reconsideration, and following a hearing on May 5, 1998 before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) John A. Ransom, benefits were denied once again because of a finding that the plaintiff was not disabled.
In the case before the Court, the plaintiff challenges the ALJ's conclusion that the Commissioner sustained its burden at step five of the five-step sequential analysis, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 416.920, that the plaintiff was able to perform a restricted range of sedentary and unskilled work. Finding that there was a significant number of jobs within that limitation available in the national and local economy, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled.
This Court's review is limited to determining whether there is "substantial evidence" in the entire record to support that conclusion, and whether it is based upon a correct application of the controlling law. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). In recommending affirmance of the ALJ's decision, the Magistrate Judge found that substantial evidence in the whole record supported the ALJ's conclusion. The plaintiff complains, however, that the Magistrate Judge ignored his argument that the ALJ did not properly apply the so-called "treating source" rule, or explain why it was inapplicable.
The Rule promulgated by the Secretary of Health Human Services states that: "more weight [will be given] to opinions from your treating sources, since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). The Sixth Circuit has consistently applied this rule. A treating physician's opinion should be given greater weight than those opinions of consultative physicians who are hired for the purpose of litigation and who examine the claimant only once. See Jones v. Secretary of Health Human Services, 945 F.2d 1365, 1370 (6th Cir. 1991); Farris v. Secretary of Health Human Services, 773 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1985). If a treating physician's opinion is not contradicted, complete difference must be given to it. Walker v. Secretary of Health Human Services, 980 F.2d 1066, 1070 (6th Cir. 1992); King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1984). However, a treating physician's opinion may be rejected if there is good reason to do so. All v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1988). Where a treating physician renders an opinion using legal language as opposed to medical terminology, the Court may likewise reject it if it is not supported by clinical evidence in the record. See Casey v. Secretary of Health Human Services, 987 F.2d 1230, 1234-35 (6th Cir. 1993). In this case, the plaintiff does not seriously dispute his ability to perform the tasks which would be consistent with sedentary work. The Magistrate Judge correctly observed that sedentary work involves lifting and carrying articles that do not exceed ten pounds in weight, and can involve a certain amount of walking and standing on an occasional basis. Rather, the plaintiff contends that he is unable to leave his home to perform any such work because his pain medication requires him to rest at regular intervals during the day.
The plaintiff points to, and places great weight upon, a letter from Dr. A. M. de Rosayro, dated April 27, 1998 in which it is stated:
"Today, Mr. Presley continues to report improved pain, describing a pain score of 1 to 2 out of 10 in severity at home. He describes approximately two out of seven days per week that are bad for him. His pain now is increased to 5 out of 10 in severity secondary to his traveling to Birch Run to Ann Arbor today. He continues to be able to do some light housework and continues to sleep better. He continues to still have some problems with his insomnia, taking to one to one and a half hours to fall asleep. However, he is able to remain asleep approximately five hours and feels rested upon awakening. Despite the increase in his activity, it is still limited to light housework, and he has not been able to significantly leave the home setting."
Tr. at 188. The ALJ, in considering this evidence, drew a distinction between a physician limiting the plaintiff to home-bound activity, and the plaintiff himself claiming that he was unable to leave his own house. The Court found that Dr. de Rosayro's letter contained a statement of the latter, not the former. The ALJ then concluded that the plaintiff's own claims of pain, at least to the extent that he described them, were not "fully credible," particularly since this very letter described improvements in the plaintiff's own reports of pain.
The Court agrees that the ALJ's reading of Dr. de Rosayro's letter was reasonable. The plaintiff points to no evidence in the record in which a physician states that the plaintiff is unable to perform sedentary work, and there is no medical opinion in the record which confines the plaintiff to his home. The ALJ did not improperly reject an opinion or conclusion of a treating physician, and did not violate 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Finally, the Magistrate Judge properly explained his basis for concluding that there was substantial evidence in the whole record supporting the determination of non-disability, concluding that the ALJ's decision was within the so-called "zone of choice." See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc). This Court finds that the Magistrate Judge applied the correct law to a proper review of the administrative record.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [dkt #14] is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment [dkt #15] is GRANTED. The findings of the Commissioner are AFFIRMED, and the complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.