Opinion
A-13891 0351
11-01-2023
LINDSEY LEE PRESHAW, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Jane B. Martinez, Law Office of Jane B. Martinez, LLC, Anchorage, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, for the Appellant. Madison M. Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Michael P. McConahy, Judge. Trial Court No. 4FA-17-02598 CR
Jane B. Martinez, Law Office of Jane B. Martinez, LLC, Anchorage, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, for the Appellant.
Madison M. Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Lindsey Lee Preshaw pleaded guilty to attempted murder in the first degree, assault in the first degree, and vehicle theft in the first degree. Seven months after pleading guilty, but before sentencing occurred, Preshaw moved to withdraw her plea. The superior court denied her request, and Preshaw now appeals.
AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A) & AS 11.31.100, AS 11.41.200(a)(1), and AS 11.46.360(a)(1), respectively.
Under Alaska law, a defendant is not entitled to withdraw a plea as a matter of right. Instead, the defendant must move for permission to withdraw the plea.Before sentencing, the trial court must grant a motion to withdraw a plea if "withdrawal is necessary to correct manifest injustice." Absent this showing of "manifest injustice," however, "the trial court may in its discretion allow the defendant to withdraw a plea for any fair and just reason unless the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea." The burden is on a defendant to establish such a reason. Generally, a defendant's "mere change of mind" does not qualify as a fair and just reason to withdraw a plea, even in the absence of prejudice to the State.
Id.
Id.
See Monroe v. State, 752 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Alaska App. 1988); see also Perry v. State, 928 P.2d 1227, 1228 (Alaska App. 1996).
See Shetters v. State, 751 P.2d 31, 35 (Alaska App. 1988) (citing McClain v. State, 742 P.2d 269 (Alaska App. 1987)).
Here, Preshaw moved to withdraw her plea on the grounds that she had been on antipsychotic and antidepressant medications that had adversely affected her thinking. She also asserted that she had felt disoriented at the time the pleas were taken, she had been sleeping an inordinate amount of time, and she had not been allowed access to her discovery.
The superior court held an evidentiary hearing, and Preshaw testified that she had been "incoherent" when she pleaded guilty. But the superior court (who had presided over the change of plea hearing) discounted this testimony, finding that Preshaw's responses at the change of plea hearing were "measured, contemplative, thoughtful, and responsive." The court further found that her pleas had been knowing and voluntary, and that she had competent representation at the change of plea hearing and adequate opportunity to ask questions.
The court also emphasized that, at the time of the plea, a trial day was set (for which the State had subpoenaed thirty witnesses), and the court found that both the State and the victim had relied on the pleas. The court noted that a significant amount of time had passed before Preshaw moved to withdraw her plea, and that she did so only after reviewing the presentence report and the State's sentencing recommendation. The court therefore concluded that Preshaw's request to withdraw her plea was "manipulative" and not supported by a "fair and just reason."
See Wahl v. State, 691 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Alaska App. 1984) ("[T]he reason given by the defendant for withdrawal of a plea must be examined in light of factors such as the extent of delay in making the request, the amount of prejudice to the prosecution, and the possibility that the request constitutes an attempt by the defendant to manipulate the proceedings in order to obtain an unfair tactical advantage.").
See id.
See id.
We have reviewed the record and the superior court's findings at the evidentiary hearing. Based on that review, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Preshaw's motion to withdraw her plea.
See McClain, 742 P.2d at 271 (citing Ningealook v. State, 691 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Alaska App. 1984)).
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.