Id. Under the unique facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot say that such a conclusion was an abuse of discretion. In support of this argument, Collesano cites an Illinois case, Presbyterian St. Luke's Hosp. v. Feil, 394 N.E.2d 537 (Ill.App.Ct.1979). This case is of course not binding authority on this court, and the standard applied therein is not in line with the more recent decisions of our Supreme Court.
Additionally, consideration may be given to the nature of the excuse tendered for the noncompliance. Compare Lohja v. Checker Taxi Co. (1980), 92 Ill. App.3d 491, 416 N.E.2d 32; Presbyterian-St. Luke's-Hospital v. Feil (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 438, 394 N.E.2d 537. Despite petitioner's flagrant disregard of the court's orders and the unwarranted delay, frustration and expense she caused Regal, she asks this court to condone her conduct.
( Sanchez v. Phillips (1977), 46 Ill. App.3d 430, 434-35.) While it is true that the trial court is to seek a means to have discovery accomplished rather than merely to inflict punishment ( Gallo v. Henke (1982), 107 Ill. App.3d 21, 27; Presbyterian St. Luke's Hospital v. Feil (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 438, 444), it is also appropriate to consider the need for using discovery sanctions as a general deterrent which will provide a strong incentive for all litigants to fully and accurately comply with discovery rules ( Campen v. Executive House Hotel, Inc. (1982), 105 Ill. App.3d 576, 588). Taking into account the entire procedural history of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanctions ordered, and it was not obligated to choose one of the alternative courses suggested by Bruckman. As his final issue on appeal, Bruckman contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a change of venue. He filed his motion on the same day as his motion to vacate the January 7 order.
Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 219(c)) provides a nonexclusive list of sanctions for failure to comply with discovery rules ranging from a mere stay of the proceedings to a dismissal of the offending party's cause of action. However, in determining which sanction to impose, the trial court must seek to accomplish the discovery rather than to inflict punishment ( Presbyterian St. Luke's Hospital v. Feil (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 438, 394 N.E.2d 537), and because dismissal is a severe sanction it should be invoked only in those cases where the actions of the party show a deliberate, contumacious, or unwarranted disregard of the court's authority ( Bejda v. SGL Industries, Inc. (1979), 73 Ill. App.3d 484, 392 N.E.2d 38, aff'd in part and rev'd in part and rem'd (1980), 82 Ill.2d 322, 412 N.E.2d 464; Schwartz v. Moats (1971), 3 Ill. App.3d 596, 277 N.E.2d 529). Furthermore, as stated in White v. Henrotin Hospital Corp. (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 1025, 1028-29, 398 N.E.2d 24, 27: "Dismissal, being such a drastic sanction, should be employed only as a last resort [citations], when all other enforcement powers at the court's disposal fail to advance the litigation [citations], and it should be set aside if it will not cause a hardship for the parties to proceed to trial on the merits.
"Sanctions, when imposed for failure to comply with discovery rules or orders, should be such as to promote the goal of discovery, not to punish the offending party. . . . Dismissal [or default] should be employed only as a last resort." Presbyterian St. Luke's Hospital v. Feil, (1979) 75 Ill. App.3d 438, 31 Ill.Dec. 335, 339, 394 N.E.2d 537, 541. Judge Russell writing for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., (1977) 561 F.2d 494 considered the power of the trial court to impose sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P., Rule 37(b).
Plaintiff cites cases holding that dismissal under Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 219(c)) is a harsh sanction, to be imposed only when the conduct of the offending party shows a deliberate disregard for the discovery rules or orders not complied with. This is, of course, the rule (see, e.g., Presbyterian St. Luke's Hospital v. Feil (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 438, 394 N.E.2d 537), but of the cases cited by plaintiff, the factually closest case is 612 North Michigan Avenue Building Corp. v. Factsystem, Inc. (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 922, 340 N.E.2d 678, in which the court affirmed the entry of a default as a sanction. In view of plaintiff's repeated, unexplained, apparently deliberate failures to comply with discovery, over an extended period of time, dismissal was not improper in the case at bar.